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A COMPARISON OF SELECTED FOREIGN POLICY SPEECHES
OF SENATOR TOM CONNALLY
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
In some quarters of official Washington, D.C., 1950, 
Tom Connally was regarded as a shrewd, wily elder statesman, 
a chief architect of a bipartisan foreign policy which ena­
bled America to preserve a unified front in a dangerous 
world, who, along with Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg, 
served as an indispensable link between the President and 
the Senate. In other quarters, Tom Connally was regarded as 
an old-time politician, who, by the accident of seniority 
and the committee system, had been carried to a position of 
international importance beyond his shallow knowledge of the 
world.
To some, Connally's sharp wit was a charming weapon 
deflating diplomatic stuffed shirts, and his homely common 
sense held administrative policy within reasonable bounds
1
which the public would support. To others, he was irascible, 
indiscreet and unpredictable, a man whose sarcasm and irre­
sponsible witticisms might someday upset the international 
applecart.
This provincial Senator who became the chief Con­
gressional spokesman on foreign policy was Thomas Terry 
Connally, servant of the people of Texas in Congress from 
1917 to 1952, years in which he served as ranking minority 
member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and, later, as 
chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
during years in which the Senate moved from isolationism to 
internationalism in foreign affairs.
Who was Tom Connally?
He was one of the first in Congress to support an in­
ternational peace organization. On May 7, 1924, he prophe­
sied:
When this Republican elephant finds a league of nations 
with the name of Woodrow Wilson erased from it and sees 
that instead of being called a league, it is called an 
association of nations and gets used to that— he may 
trumpet a few times and switch his tail, but finally, he 
will probably encircle it with his rusty old trunk and 
say: "This thing, after all, is just what I've been
looking for.
^As cited in Beverly Smith, "The Senator Loves a 
Fight," The Saturday Evening Post, 223 (July 1, 1950), 72.
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In 1939, he made the chief speech for the Administra­
tion in the Senate fight to repeal the Neutrality Act.
In 1943, the Connally Resolution committed this coun­
try to membership in a postwar international peace organiza­
tion and became one of the landmarks of our new bipartisan 
foreign policy.
He was the choice of the Administration to hold the 
smaller countries in line as United States representative on 
the committee which wrote the "Big Five” veto power into the 
charter of the United Nations.
He was given the responsibility of gaining Senate 
approval for the United Nations Charter.
He led the postwar fight in the Senate for the North
Atlantic Treaty and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.
Life Magazine editorialized on May 22, 195O:
During Senate debate on the E.C.A. (Economic Co-operation 
Act) he [ConnallyJ led the fight for an adequate authori­
zation with skill, humor and a sure eye for the weak 
points of the opposition. He stood firm for essentials, 
and all in all, did a fine job for Paul Hoffman and good 
international sense. The Country and its Western Allies 
owe him a vote of thanks.2
In summarizing Connally's role in governmental af­
fairs during the critical years from 1930 to 1950, Hodding
^"Senator Tawm," Life, 28 (May 22, 1950), 42.
Carter wrote:
As chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and 
a party stalwart, the country boy from Texas became one 
of the New Deal's, and the nation's, most important 
spokesmen in war and peace. He fought for TVA and lower 
tariffs, against pre-war isolationism and the opponents 
of the United Nations . . . .  He was one of America's 
history makers of the twentieth century.3
Throughout these history-making years, Connally's 
oratory played an important role. Upon his election to the 
Senate in November, 1928, the New York Times commented that 
"Mr. Connally is rated as an orator and his favorite pastime 
as a member of Congress has been to 'bait' the Republican 
m a j o r i t y . H i s  rhetoric was in the great Senate tradition 
that reached from Daniel Webster to William Borah. Prom his 
first days in the Senate he became known as its best rough 
and tumble debater.
Whereas many senators cleared the galleries and the 
floor in a few minutes by inept speaking, news that Connally 
was to speak actually could impel senators to cut short their 
lunches and hurry back to their desks.
Connally's oratory, in the opinion of most contempo­
rary writers, did play a part in keeping isolationist senators
3nodding Carter, "Ole Senator Tom," Saturday Review, 
37 (October 2, 1954), 36.
^The New York Times, November 6 , 1928, p. 16.
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at bay during the war and postwar years when great foreign 
policy measures were being considered by Congress.5
Nevertheless, Connally has been virtually ignored by 
historians and speech critics alike. Today, he is primarily 
remembered as the author of the Connally Reservation restrict­
ing the Jurisdiction of the World Court. Stanley Walker, 
writing in the Nation as early as 1954, indicated that "it is 
the custom in many respectable quarters today to smile conde­
scendingly when the name of Tom Connally is mentioned.
The explanation for this attitude could be in the 
philosophy which Connally brought to the office of chairman 
of the Foreign Relations Committee. He saw himself as a 
spokesman for Administration foreign policy, not as an inno­
vator or molder of foreign policy. He tried to "get the bugs 
out of the bill"? and put it in a common sense shape that 
could be guided through the Senate and ultimately accepted 
by the public.
Such a person is often dismissed as a "party hack" 
but in Connally's case, as Walker points out, "it would be
5[Gouverneur Paulding] , "'The Mane' Remembers," Re­
view of My Name Is Tom Connally, Reporter, 11 (October 7, 
1954), 4 7 .
^Stanley Walker, "A Solid Figure, Faintly Comic,"
The Nation, 179 (October 16, 1954), 336.
?As cited in Smith, 73•
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unfair and untrue, "8 The Reporter editorialized in October, 
1954:
The amazing story to be read between the lines [of his 
autobiography] is how this stubborn, highly prejudiced 
Texan, when only a freshman Congressman, grasped the in­
ternational idealism of President Wilson and managed to 
keep his vision clear through more than three decades of 
front line struggles.9
The speaking of such a person should provide an in­
teresting and valuable study.
Purpose of the Study 
Tom Connally's Senate career passed through four 
phases.10 (l) From election in 1928 until elevation to the
chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee in July, 1941, 
he was regarded as a rather typical Southern senator, inter­
ested in the Democratic Party, the high price of cotton and 
the suppression of the Negro voter. During this period, he 
led filibusters against the anti-lynch and anti-poll tax 
bills. (2) From July, 1941, until November, 1943, he was re­
garded as a rather ineffective chairman of the prestige
®Walker, 336.
9[pauldin^, 47.
lOThese generalizations of Connally's political pres­
tige represent probable majority opinions of Senate colleagues 
and representatives of the press.
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committee of the Senate, Foreign Relations, and was publicly 
accused of letting the Senate's important role of "advise and 
consent" die by default. (3) Following the passage of the 
Connally Resolution in late 19^3 until January, 19^9, Con­
nally was regarded as the chief Administration spokesman on 
foreign affairs in the Senate, the originator of a working 
bipartisan foreign policy and the chief American trouble­
shooter in postwar international conferences. (4) During the 
final phase of his career from January, 1949, until retire­
ment in January, 1953, he was regarded as a co-villain, with 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson and President Harry Truman, 
in formulating a give-away foreign policy that saved Europe 
at the expense of losing Asia. He became less popular with 
Senate colleagues and, at seventy-six, was a prime target for 
baiting by a restless Republican minority.
During each of the phases, Connally spoke on impor­
tant foreign policy matters. In October, 1939, he spoke for 
the repeal of the Neutrality Act. In November, 1943, his 
resolution committed this country to participation in an in­
ternational peace organization. In July, 1945, he spoke for 
United Nations Charter ratification and in September, 1949, 
he led the fight for a Mutual Aid Program to implement the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
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This study compares Connally’s Senate speaking during 
each of these critical periods. A comparison of speeches an­
swers three questions: (l) Did Connally's speaking reflect
his changing prestige in the Senate?
(a) From fifth-ranked to chairman of the Foreign Rela­
tions Committee.
(b) From provincial senator to internationally known 
governmental representative.
(c) From an ignored to respected to distrusted Senate 
leader.
(d) From a spokesman for FDR to a spokesman for Truman.
(2) Did Connally's speaking reflect the changing character 
of the Senate?
(a) From pre-war isolationism to wartime international­
ism to postwar moderation in foreign policy.
(b) From heavily Democratic to Republican to slightly 
Democratic.
(3) Did Connally's approach to speaking reflect the changing 
speech situations?
(a) Did style and method of delivery change?
(b) Did developing material change?
(c) Did tactics in debate change?
Previous Research 
An investigation of Knower's "Index of Graduate Work 
in Speech," Auer's "Doctoral Dissertations, Work in Progress," 
H. W. Wilson Company's Doctoral Dissertations Accepted by 
American Universities and University Microfilms Inc., Disser­
tation Abstracts failed to reveal any studies of Tom Connally
9
in the fields of speech, history or political science.
Sources of Material 
Material for this study fall into four categories:
(l) biographical material of Connally, (2) material describ­
ing the Senate and senators of the Connally Era, (3) back­
ground materials dealing with each of the speaking situations 
and (4) material providing the speech texts.
Certain material, such as the autobiographical My 
Name Is Tom Connally, periodicals such as Time, Life, News­
week and U. S. News and World Reports, and newspapers such 
as The New York Times, The Port Worth Star-Telegram. The Dal­
las Morning News and the Austin Statesman, served as sources 
in all areas of the study. The magazines and newspapers 
proved particularly helpful in providing background material 
for the speaking situations.
Other biographical material on Connally's career as 
an orator came from sources such as Public Men In and Out of 
Office, edited by J. T. Salter and profile sketches such as 
Robert Goughian's in Life, March 23, 1942, and Beverly Smith's 
in The Saturday Evening Post, July 1, 1950.
Material describing the Senate and senators of Con-
*rally's time included Kenneth W. Colegrove's The American 
Senate and World Peace, Donald R. Matthew's U. S. Senators
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and Their World, Allen Drury's A Senate Journal 1943-1945, 
James A. Robinson's Congress and Foreign Policy Making, Wil­
liam S. White's Citadel, The Story of the U.S. Senate, as 
well as the published memoirs of such key figures as Arthur 
H. Vandenberg, Jr., James P. Byrnes and Harry S. Truman.
Texts for Connally’s four speeches were available In 
the Congressional Record, Volumes 8 5, 8 9, 91 and 95. The 
portions of the Tom Connally Papers, located In the Library 
of Congress, which dealt with texts of speeches delivered 
during the four periods studied were microfilmed for use In 
the dissertation.
Method of Organization 
The following division of material represents the 
method of organizing this study.
II. Connally, The Speaker
Chapter II presents an examination of Connally as a 
speaker. Connally's non-Congresslonal speaking ca­
reer and the general attributes of Connally's speak­
ing are examined In an attempt to capture the mood
and style of the speaker.
Each of the next four chapters Is divided Into four
parts: (l) the make-up of the Senate audience; (2)
the historical background for the speech; (3 ) the 
Interaction between the Senate audience and Connally 
on the question and (4) an analysis of Connally's 
speaking.
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III. The Neutrality Act Debate, 1939
Connally, fifth-ranked in seniority on the Foreign 
Relations Committee, little known outside the Senate 
and the South, spoke to an audience bitterly divided 
on the issue of intervention or isolation.
IV. The Connally Resolution Debate, 1943
Connally, an untested and rather lightly regarded 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, spoke 
to an audience generally friendly to the concept of 
a peace organization but undecided about the firmness 
of commitment to be made.
V. The United Nations Charter Ratification Debate, 1945
Connally, internationally recognized foreign policy 
spokesman for the Administration, spoke to an audi­
ence receptive to the ideas expressed in the charter 
and ready to commit this nation to those ideas.
VI. The Mutual Aid Program Debate, 1949
Connally, aging and declining in prestige, spoke to 
an audience growing disillusioned with foreign aid 
and one that was highly suspicious of commitment of 
United States military forces to an organization be­
yond the power of Congress.
VII. Conclusion
The concluding chapter compares Connally's speaking 
in the four legislative debates and answers the ques­
tions raised on page eight of this dissertation.
CHAPTER II
CONNALLY, THE SPEAKER
Upon retirement from national politics in January, 
1953, Thomas Terry Connally reflected upon thirty-six years 
of Congressional battles, international conferences, tumul­
tuous national conventions, election campaigns, army service, 
courtroom trials, college and country school elocution con­
tests .
World-famous contemporaries— Franklin Roosevelt, Harry 
Truman, John Garner, Cordell Hull, Dean Acheson, George Mar­
shall, Sam Rayburn, William Borah, Arthur Vandenberg, Woodrow 
Wilson, Jan C. Smuts, V. M. Molotov— felt the sting of the 
Texas Senator's tongue. For Tom Connally was an orator and 
oratory occupied a prominent niche in his career.
Connally's Non-Congressional Speaking Career
Connally's educational speaking.—  Connally partici­




In grammar school at Eddy, Texas, Friday afternoon 
exercises in reciting and debating were held for parents and 
family. Connally's first political debates were held in the 
Eddy schoolroom.1
In July, 1892, Connally entered Baylor University in 
Waco, Texas. During four undergraduate years, the extracur­
ricular activity which he found most interesting was debating. 
In June, I8 9 6, Connally, the youngest boy in his senior class, 
received three degrees— Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Oratory, 
and a diploma in Military S c i e n c e .2
In late 1896, Connally's parents agreed to enter him 
in the law school of the University of Texas in Austin. As 
before, he was active in debate and oratory. Once, Connally 
was selected to debate a Baylor team arguing the annexation 
of Hawaii. Given the negative position, the Texas team was 
shocked to learn, shortly before traveling to Waco for the 
debate, that the United States had annexed Hawaii. Connally
lost.3
^Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, as told to 
Alfred Steinberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954),
p. 17.
Zibid., p. 25. 
3lbid., p. 29.
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Connally's legal speaking.—  Following graduation in 
1898, Connally began law practice in Marlin, a central Texas 
town of 3500 people. Speaking helped Connally build his prac­
tice. A public relations campaign which included speaking at 
town picnics and joining a multitude of organizations, plus 
favorable publicity gained from work as a public defender in 
two locally notorious murder cases, helped the young lawyer 
establish a stable law business.^
Later, two terms as county prosecutor were hectic and 
marked by the successful prosecution of several sensational 
murder cases. During this period, Connally developed traits 
that followed him to Congress. He gained a reputation for 
being rough on hostile witnesses and for making dramatic 
speeches to Juries. He developed a technique for cross- 
examining witnesses, leading them on and on, until their sto­
ries became ridiculous beyond belief. Finally, everyone ex­
cept the squirming witness was laughing so heartily that the 
credulity of the witness was either destroyed or badly im­
paired.5
Connally's campaign speaking.—  Connally acquired ex­
perience in state politics prior to election to Congress, but
^Ibid., p. 45. 5ibid. , p. 58.
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his two terms In the Texas House of Representatives failed to 
provide much experience In political speaking. Campaigning 
In 1 9 0 0, Connally was unopposed for the flotorlal seat repre­
senting three counties. On the last day of the legislative 
session Connally delivered an anti-monopoly speech that was 
well received.^ Election was won In 1902, also without a 
campaign.
Connally gained campaign speaking experience In I906  
when he ran for the office of County Attorney of Palls County. 
Running against George Carter, a good friend, Connally won by 
a four to one majority In a hard campaign.
In 1 9 1 0, Connally returned to private law practice 
and during the next six years achieved economic security.
In 1915, Robert L. Henry, representing the eleventh 
Texas congressional district, vacated his seat In the House 
of Representatives. Connally, forty years of age and a suc­
cessful attorney, announced his candidacy. The campaign 
hinged more on the candidates' personalities than on Issues. 
Connally was fortunate when one of the candidates, Tom L. 
McCullough, challenged his opponents to a series of eight 
public debates, apparently believing that they would not ac­
cept. Only Connally, the experienced debater, did accept and
^Ibld., p. 50.
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the favorable exposure undoubtedly contributed to his 1 ,8 0 0  
vote victory.
During six terms in the House of Representatives, 
Connally rarely was opposed for re-election. But when Con­
gress was not in session he returned to Texas. Graduation 
exercises, picnics, barbecues, Jefferson-Jackson Club dinners. 
Armistice Day memorials, Fourth-of-July ceremonies— all pro­
vided opportunities for the novice legislator to speak and to 
meet constituents.?
Connally’s most intensive schedule of campaign speak­
ing occurred in 1928 in a campaign for Earle Mayfield's seat 
in the United States Senate. In a bitter campaign against 
Mayfield, the Ku Klux Klan candidate, and four other aspir­
ants, Connally finally won a runoff election by 60,000 votes.
Only once later, in 1934, did Connally need to cam­
paign actively for re-election. In 1940, he was unopposed 
by any serious contender, and in 1946, he was in Europe dur­
ing primary election campaigning.
Connally's radio speaking.—  During his Congressional 
career, Connally made many radio speeches, often serving as 
an interpreter of Administration policy. His first radio
7lbid., p. 115.
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speech, "Government Economy," was broadcast May 12, 1932.® 
During the next twenty years, Connally discussed "Take the 
Profits from W a r , "Repeal the Neutrality A c t , " W a r  
B o n d s a n d  "The San Francisco Conference."12
General Attributes of Connally's Speaking
During his thirty-six Congressional years, Connally 
expressed himself on virtually every important issue in gov­
ernment. Hiram Johnson of California once told Connally: 
"You’re not afraid of any man or issue."13
Connally's speaking on domestic issues.—  He was, by 
his own definition, a Southern-style liberal on most domestic 
matters.
Connally voted for most measures to relieve the cotton 
farmer and consistently favored the lowering of tariffs to
®U.S., Congressional Record, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1932, 75, Part 9, 10201.
9lbid., 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1936, 80, Part 4, 4374. 
lOlbid., 76th Cong,, 2nd Sess,, 1939, 85, Part 2, 226. 
lljbid., 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, 8 9, Part 11,
3 7 7 0.
2 3 4 1.
12lbid., 7 9th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 91, Part 11,
13a s cited in Gerald Movins and Jack Beall, "Plush Cov­
ered Cactus," The Saturday Evening Post, 214 (April 4, 1942),
5 6.
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benefit all areas of agriculture. In discussing one tariff 
bill, he said the bill did not benefit the farmers and forced 
the working man "to pay more to live."^^
Like most Southerners in the thirties and forties 
Connally professed little interest in equal rights for the 
Negro. He led an anti-lynch law filibuster in 1937 and later 
explained his position saying, "I'm against lynching. It's 
murder. But I am also opposed to lynching the Constitution 
of the United States."^5
He usually challenged organized labor. In 1941, he 
pressed for anti-strike legislation because "these strikes 
have got to s t o p . A  year later he issued a warning to 
both capital and labor indicating that "if you cannot run 
your business and manufacture supplies for war, the govern­
ment will take your business and run it for you."17 His con­
victions regarding organized labor's responsibility in time 
of war resulted in co-sponsorship of the Connally-Smith Anti- 
Strike Law in 1943.
l^The New York Times, June 9) 1930, p. 3 .
15as cited in Oliver Pilat, "That Senator from Texas," 
The Ü.N. World, 3 (April, 1949), 19.
l6The New York Times, June 8 , 1941, p. 3 6.
17ibid., February 24, 1942, p. 13.
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The Senator frequently expressed his belief in the
conservative, traditional aspects of the Constitution. At
the time of the "courtpacking" fight with Franklin Roosevelt,
Connally opposed revision of the Supreme Court under the
method and circumstances proposed by the President. His
philosophy of the working of a constitutional republic was
summarized in a lesson in fundamentals he delivered to Soviet
Minister Andrei Vishinsky:
Democracy is not anarchy. Democracy does not mean rule 
by goon squads. Democracy means that an executive func­
tion shall be performed by executives, legislative func­
tions shall be performed by legislatures and judicial 
functions shall be performed by the courts.l8
Connally's speaking on foreign policy issues.—  The 
fierce partisanship that marked the Texan's speaking on do­
mestic issues was usually absent in his statements on foreign 
affairs. He thought normal Democratic-Republican partisan­
ship should cease "at the water's edge" and personally pre­
ferred the term "non-partisan foreign policy" to the more 
popular "bipartisan" because the former signified "one unit 
working at the job."^9
l8 "Connally's Role," Newsweek, 28 (October 14, 1946),
60.
19"World Policy and Bipartisanship," U.S. News and 
World Report. 28 (May 5, 1950), 28.
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Through the thirties he saw the need for preparedness 
and a strong armed force. In 1938, he advocated a "big navy," 
calling it "an insurance for peace." With the world's best 
navy, "no power would dare attack the shores of the United 
States."20 Upon assuming the chairmanship of the Foreign Re­
lations Committee in 1941, he called for a vigorous and firm 
foreign policy to secure respect abroad and security at home. 
"We don't desire war," he declared, "but the world might as 
well know that we have rights and possessions for which we 
are ready to fight, if it's necessary for their security. "^1
The Senator's attitudes toward our World War 11 allies 
varied from trust and friendship to outright animosity. He 
was consistently a friend of Great Britain. Russia was tol­
erated. Connally felt that cooperation with Stalin was a 
necessary evil. But the Texan never trusted the Chinese.
He felt Chiang Kai-Shek could have helped more in the battle 
against Chinese Communist forces, and in 1949, he accused the 
generalissimo of absconding to Formosa "with several million 
dollars in gold. "22
20The New York Times, November 9, 1938, p. 24.
21lbid., July 31, 1941, p. 1.
22as cited in Beverly Smith, "The Senator Loves a 
Fight," The Saturday Evening Post, 223 (July 1, 1950), 70.
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Connally favored aid to Europe. He did not believe 
"in shopping for security at the bargain counter."^3 How­
ever, he felt each country receiving aid should get off the 
"dole" as quickly as possible. He Indicated that he opposed 
"handouts": "We can't go on doing that forever; we can't pay
off debts like that."^^
Connally regarded his contribution to the founding of 
the United Nations Organization as the chief accomplishment 
of his career. Twenty years after his first pronouncement 
for International cooperation, he reiterated: "if we are to
secure preservation of world peace--and that Includes our 
peace— we must pay the price. That price Is our cooperation 
with other nations of the world."^5
Connally favored giving International organizations 
power to enforce disarmament. As early as 1921, he argued 
for naval disarmament.^^ Thirty years later, he favored an 
attempt at new negotiations with the Russians toward Inter­
national control of atomic weapons. While admitting that
23"The Pin of the Shark," Time, 57 (January 22, 1951),
15.
2^The New York Times, May 2, 1950, p. 1?.
25As cited In Pllat, 20.
2&The New York Times, February 15, 1921, p. 15.
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chances were not good, the Texan thought It was "conceivable" 
that "the Russians, confronting this new turn In the poten­
tial power of the United States might modify their earlier 
tactics of obstructionism."27
Connally's physical appearance.—  If Tom Connally had 
not existed, a movie scenarist would have invented him. Con­
nally was pictured as big and broad, with "wise blue eyes," a 
nose weathered like "fine old oak burl," with naturally wavy, 
gray hair that curled luxuriously to meet his coat collar. 28 
During his boyhood Connally suffered from the title of 
"doublebarreled shotgun," a reference to his proportions 
which a native recalls were "so darn long and straight up 
and down."29 in adult life Connally approached the classic 
American proportions— six feet and two hundred pounds.
His physical appearance Impressed both visitors and 
colleagues. Frequently, visitors Inquired: "Who's that
handsome man down there— the one who needs a haircut?"30 
Former United States Senator Joe Bailey of Texas, no Connally
27ibld., February 2, 1950, p. 7.
2&As cited in Robert Coughlan, "Tom Connally," Life,
12 (March 23, 1942), 100.
29ibld., p. 1 0 2.
30as cited In Movlns and Beall, 27.
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admirer, once said of him: "Tom is the only man in the United
States Senate who could wear a Roman Toga and not look like 
a fat man in a nightgown."31
Connally dressed to fill his role of Senator. As a 
youth he began patterning his clothes after William Jennings 
Bryan. Stiff, white shirts were held together with gold 
studs. A wide black ribbon bisected a gently parabolic front 
and held a pince-nez. Black ties, between a string and a 
bow, were made to specifications by a Baltimore tie maker. 
Connally*s suits were generally black in winter, white in 
summer, with jackets cut low and billowy. He wore mirror- 
shiny black boots, and a black slouch hat sat high and square 
on the top of his head. The Texan's dress reminded some of 
an old-time Shakespearian a c t o r . 32
Connally'3 voice and use of language.—  Connally's 
voice and style of language were assets to his speaking.
The Texan's voice was well suited to oratory, repre­
sentative of the Southern dialect in American speech, care­
fully cultivated, well carrying, with a somewhat nasal twang. 
Connally had a wide range vocally with varying inflections—
31As cited in Coughlan, 100.
32ibid.
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purring, gravelly, thundering. He could, by mere tone or in­
flection, make ordinary words absurd or reverse obvious mean­
ings. While Connally served as chairman of the Foreign Rela­
tions Committee, his vocal inflections became a barometer of 
United States foreign policy. While Marshal Tito was sub­
servient to Moscow, Connally's pronunciation of Yugoslavia 
was magnificent. He threw back his head, wrinkled up his 
nose, and dragged out the third syllable in a scornful, 
bleating whinny; "Yugo-sla-a-a-a-a-av-ya." Later, Connally 
pronounced the name in an ordinary way.33
Upon his retirement, Connally was referred to as a 
"phrase maker."3^ However, Connally preferred the use of 
simple language. As early as 1927, he rebelled against ob­
scure language, protesting:
The pronouncements of the State Department lack pointed­
ness. They pulsate with the cryptic language of diplo­
macy rather than the clear cut meaning our people pre­
fer. The veneer obscures the substance. Let's have the 
real homespun talk the people can understand.35
Connally's methods of delivery.—  The Senator could 
and did utilize all four modes of delivery.
33as cited in Smith, 70.
3^james Reston, The New York Times, April 15, 1952,
p. 1 2.
35as cited in Smith, 72.
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In most major Senate speeches and at the conferences
formulating the United Nations Organization, Connally used a
manuscript. However, the Texan usually wandered from the
manuscript to develop ideas. On one occasion the New York
Times reported:
Although his speech was elaborately prepared and in manu­
script form before him. Senator Connally seldom referred 
to it. He wandered from the text time after time, both 
to illustrate his point and to escape the fetters a manu­
script places on his old school style of oratory.
The Senator, like most first-rate politicians, had a 
phenomenal memory. In Laredo one day, Connally met a man he 
had not seen in twenty-five years, called him by his first 
name and reminded him that he used to wear a moustache.37 
The good memory was an aid in speaking although Connally sel­
dom had occasion to memorize a speech.
In less formal debate Connally utilized the extempo­
raneous and impromptu methods of delivery. Reporters noted 
at the time of the Neutrality debates of 1941 that "Senator 
Connally did not read his speech but referred frequently to 
a paper which hung over his arm."38
3% h e  New York Times, October 5> 1939, p. 1.
37novins and Beall, 6l.
S^The New York Times, October 28, 1941, p. 1.
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Connally*s bodily action and gesturing.—  Whatever 
the method of delivery, the Texan's bodily action was highly 
calisthenic, full of sweeping gestures and elaborate panto­
mime.
Mimicry and plastic facial expressions were helpful 
arts cultivated early while a lawyer and used constantly. A 
shrug of the shoulders, a wide gesture of the sinuous arms, 
an angular finger, a jutting cigar, a droop at the knee, the 
stance or prance of his small feet— each contributed to drama 
or ridicule. When he called some opponent "an old woman," 
his favorite epithet, he minced and pranced around his desk.39 
In defending the Mutual Security bill in 1952, he evoked 
"bursts of laughter as, with quavering voice, he thumped his 
chest in imitation of an old-time political orator and defied 
economy advocates to vote cuts."^0
Connally's speaking was physically exhausting. Dur­
ing a speech he sweated through a collar, and many of his 
muscles were sore after a major speech.
He carried a physical, violent caricature of a United 
States Senator to international conferences. In London,
39coughlan, 100.
^^The New York Times, May 27, 1952, p. 7.
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during the first meeting of the United Nations General Assem­
bly, Connally delivered an American electioneering-style of 
speech complete with arm waving and table pounding. At one 
point the Soviet representative, Andrei Gromyko, leaned over 
to a tablemate and whispered, "I hope the tables have been 
reinforced l a t e l y . S o v i e t  Minister V. M. Molotov compli­
mented Connally by saying that the Texan had spoken eloquently 
"and with the picturesque gestures which we have come to like 
so much.*' Connally replied that he regretted "that Mr.
Molotov approves of my gestures, but disapproves of my 
w o r d s . "^2 Mr. Molotov could have found many sympathizers in 
the chamber of the United States Senate.
Connally*3 debate tactics.—  Carefully logical con­
struction did not mark Connally's speeches in running floor 
debate. His lack of reliance on logic was not because of an 
inability to reason. His sharp mind and his clever tongue 
gave little incentive for deep study or closely reasoned 
thought. But in axehandle, meatcleaver, personal debate, 
Connally was unsurpassed. He was characterized as "the best 
rough and tumble debater in the Senate."^3
4l%bid., January 25, 1946, p. 3.
42ibid., November 27, 1946, p. 8.
43"New Team," Time, 38 (August 11, 1941), l4.
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His drawling, dripping sarcasm was the terror of 
Capitol Hill. In the anti-lynch filibuster of 1937  ̂ Con­
nally 's sarcastic tactics kept the crowded galleries laughing. 
At one point he attacked Senator Robert Wagner of New York:
Where are the sponsors of this bill? Why are they not 
in this chamber? Where's the Senator from New York?
Why, he can't stand the gaff— he can't listen to the 
Senator from Florida tsar the bill to pieces. He can't 
stay here and listen to the Supreme Court opinions being 
read.^^
In 1952, Connally combined scorn with ridicule to belittle 
amendments and their proponents while leading the Mutual Se­
curity bill through the Senate. No attempt was made to halt 
the laughter from the floor and gallery that greeted his 
brief, but pointed, blasts at the opposition.^5
Connally often used a barbed, brutal wit to ridicule 
opponents. Once, as the Texan debated Senator Robert Taft, 
he interrupted the Ohioan, whose head was shimmeringly bald, 
with the admonition: "Don't shake your gory locks at mei"^^
In the course of a floor battle with Styles Bridges, Connally 
wondered "if the Senator would approach these matters with an
^^The New York Times, November 23, 1937, p. 5*
45ibid., May 29, 1952, p. 4.
46ibid., October 29, 1963, p. 1.
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open mind. Instead of an open mouth . . . . " ^ 7  Edward Burke 
of Nebraska, a slow deliberate speaker, once intended to re­
buke Connally for a seeming inconsistency. He began: "Am I
correct . . .  ?" Talking as he rose, Connally retorted: "l
don’t know, but I doubt it very much," and Burke, tipped off 
balance, never r e c o v e r e d . ^8
A talent for sarcasm and brutal humor often leads a 
speaker to engage in personal invective. Connally was skilled 
at employing invective in debate. Old friends regarded Con­
nally 's invective with affectionate indulgence, but many mem­
bers of the Senate hardly saw Connally as a playful old kit­
ten unaware of the sharpness of his claws. At one time or 
another most Republicans and some Democrats were slashed by 
his repartee. Connally's attacks usually had high entertain­
ment value for all except the victim.
In 1 93 6, Connally replied to an attack on President 
Roosevelt made by Senator Frederick Steiwer during a fili­
buster on the Guffey Coal Act. Noting Mr. Steiwer’s keynote 
speech at the Republican convention, Connally administered a 
verbal whipping as severe as any heard in the Senate. Mr.
^7’Connally, p. 3 1 2.
48ibid., p. 1 9 4.
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Steiwer barely attempted to answer the Texan, who paused fre­
quently and Invited interruption.^9 Connally denounced Homer 
Ferguson, who would have headed a proposed inquiry to investi­
gate Attorney General Tom Clark, in terms so violent that the 
Texan was forced by Senate rules to cease speaking. As Fergu­
son sat white with anger, Connally shouted that Ferguson 
"covered the whole case with his vomit of prejudice and ambi­
tion. "50 In a 1950 Incident, during debate over United 
States intervention in Korea, Connally dealt almost solely 
in personalities. Observers conceded that seldom had debate 
generated heat so quickly.51
Connally was an effective master of Senate procedure 
and the use of parliamentary tactics in debate. During a 
1937 filibuster. Senator James Byrnes passed floor responsi­
bility to Connally. He held the floor for three hours by 
ordering the clerk to read a speech made by Senator Hugo 
Black. If opposing Senators had objected, the Texan would 
have been required to read it himself. Instead the clerk 
droned out the speech which, when made, took more than five
^9The New York Times, June 21, 1936, p. 30.
50lbid., July 2 7, 1947, p. 2.
51lbid., May 24, 1950, p. I8 .
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hours to deliver.52 Two months later, the Senator used the 
strategy of quorum calls to interrupt business. After one of 
these demands for a quorum, Connally walked into the Senate 
lobby. "There comes Horatius at the point of quorum," some­
one in the lobby called, and the Texan joined in the laugh­
ter. 53
Conclusion
The political career of the Texas Senator was punc­
tuated by historic speaking opportunities. Connally usually 
spoke effectively upon these occasions. Upon his retirement, 
the New York Times reported that Connally was seventy-five 
years old, "but the years seem to have made him a sharper foe 
in debate."54 Even enemies and detractors of the Texan ad­
mitted that his oratory played an important part in keeping 
isolationist senators in line during the years when great 
postwar foreign policy measures were considered by the Con­
gress.
52noid., November 17, 1937  ̂ p. 1. 
53ibid., January 12, 1938, p. 2. 
S^lbid., July 6 , 1952, p. 39.
CHAPTER III 
THE NEUTRALITY ACT DEBATE, 1939
Connally's Audience for the Neutrality Act Debate
Prom the Senate gallery, a visitor may see a crowded 
chamber, a scene of high drama, climactic debate and roll 
call. The scene may be a kaleidoscope of action: Senators
moving on and off the floor going to the reception rooms, 
hurrying to telephones in party cloakrooms. Or the visitor 
may see an almost empty chamber, with a senator reading a 
dull speech to a few disinterested listeners.
The Senate chamber.—  The chamber is a large, cool, 
conservatively decorated rectangle on the second floor of the 
west side of the Capitol, overlooking Union Station, the Capi­
tol plaza and some of the worst slums in Washington. The pre­
siding officer sits upon a raised dais, flanked below by the 
Senate parliamentarian, the reading clerk and perhaps by a 
few blue-suited page boys. To the presiding officer's left 
is the Republican side of the Senate. To his right across a 
narrow aisle is the Democratic side. Directly ahead of the
32
33
presiding officer and In the far background Is the back door 
to the chamber and, flanking It, doors leading to the two 
cloakrooms, or lounges.1 The wall surfaces are treated with 
pilasters, and panels are enriched with glided ornaments. 
Heavy beams support the celling, which consists of glass 
panels containing mid-Victorian symbolic decorations repre­
senting "War," "Peace," "Union," and "Progress.
A post-World War II remodeling of the Chamber made 
it light beige, brightly lit, and handsome. Earlier, a kind 
of sickly, seagreen light prevailed with senators seemingly 
debating at the bottom of a tank where little pageboys darted 
like minnows.3 Speaking conditions are good, but the size of 
the chamber and the large galleries make a sizeable void for 
a voice to fill. For twenty-four years this physical speak­
ing environment challenged Tom Connally.
The Senate as an "institution. S e n a t e  means an 
assembly of old men or elders. In the United States these
^William S. White, Citadel, The Story of the U.S. 
Senate (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1956),
p. 147.
^George H. Haynes, The Senate of the United States 
(New York: Russell and Russell, I960), II, 918.
3Allen Drury, A Senate Journal 1943-1945 (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 22.
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elders form a legislative chamber of Imposing power which is 
sometimes helpless; a group of wise men who are occasionally 
foolish; an organization with an opportunity to educate and 
lead, which at times has only oppressed. The Senate thrives 
on contrast:
It is hard and efficient and it is soft and dawdling.
It is harsh and it Is kind. It is dignity and it is dis­
order. It is arrogant and it is humble. It believes in 
a kind of democracy (though the precise kind is a tale 
in itself) but it is in some things majestically undemo­
cratic. It halts usurpation and it usurps. It honors 
the system and it rejects the system.^
The Senate is probably the most powerful and indepen­
dent legislative body in the world. The convention that 
created the national legislature gave the Senate several ad­
vantages over the House of Representatives. While the entire 
House membership is subject to election every two years, the 
Senate membership as a group can not be repudiated. Through 
the staggered-term principle, only a third of the total mem­
bership is elected every two years and so it becomes literally 
impossible for voters to condemn a majority of Senators at 
any time. The Senate can have extended debate while House 
debate is rigidly controlled. The Senate has exclusive power 
to' approve treaties and to confirm the president's nominees.
It Bits as a court in impeachment trials.
^White, p. 2.
35
Thus, the convention created a body with mixed func­
tions In executive and judicial as well as legislative and 
Investigative fields. It Is this quality, a never-ending 
possession of a limitless writ over American life, that makes 
the Senate unique.5
What personality traits Identify members of "the most 
exclusive club In the world?" When Connally became a member 
of the Senate In early 1929, he observed that party regular­
ity was not as consistent as It had been In the House where 
party whips often swayed votes.^ Senators are more often In­
dividualists unafraid of either majority or minority leaders. 
The opportunity for Individualism allows senators to enhance 
personal reputations. The Senate has been a prolific breed­
ing ground for presidential aspirants.
Not all members like one another. Long service In 
the Senate led one senator to conclude that about one-third 
of Senate voting is dictated by animosity toward either the 
president or fellow senators. But In the Senate there Is 
usually a camaraderie that Ignores the political aisle that
^William S. White, "The Natural Habitat of Compro­
mise," Saturday Review, 39 (December 29, I9 5 6), 7 .
^Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, as told to 
Alfred Steinberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954),
p. 1 7.
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divides the membership.? Allen Drury believed personal amia­
bility to be the one characteristic of most senators and 
thought that "on an average more backslapping and handshaking 
are done in the United States Senate than in any other com­
parable area or body of men in the world."®
The seventy-sixth Senate.—  Following the 1938 elec­
tion, division of the Senate found sixty-nine Democrats, 
twenty-three Republicans, one Progressive, two Parmer- 
Laborites, and one Independent. A revolt of only twenty-two 
Democrats could break Administration control. The Senate was 
an unpredictable combination of eloquent isolationists and 
New Deal Democrats. Delightful characters in tail coats min­
gled with the more business-like young executives. Who were 
some of the "symbols of a people's erratic w i l l ? "9
Alben Barkley of Kentucky, future Vice President, was 
majority leader and "acting like a man who is working awfully
?Blair Moody, "The United States Senate," Holiday,
15 (February, 1954), 56.
®Drury, p. 1 2.
^Ibid., p. 2 7. The identifications in each chapter 
attempt to supply an insight into the personalities that com­
pose each Senate. Wherever possible, the insight is Connal­
ly 's. Drury was regarded as the most reliable secondary 
source. News magazines supply the remaining sketches.
37
hard and awfully earnestly at a Job he doesn't particularly 
like."10
William E. Borah of Idaho, a man of "splendid courage 
and independence . . . , was a giant, able to hold his own 
with any other member in debate."H He was a warm personal 
friend of Connally.
Styles Bridges of New Hampshire was an "isolationist-- 
a man of fair ability, industrious, ambitious and a good 
speaker."12
James Byrnes of South Carolina was regarded as a 
White House messenger. He was "perfectly subservient to the 
President's will. Regardless of what he himself believed he 
would urge senators to support the President's position."13 
He never tried electioneering with Connally.
Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri was the isolationist 
son of the former Speaker of the House of Representatives and 
a regular foe of Connally on most Issues.1^
John Danaher of Connecticut was "short, chubby and 
balding with a round, serious face and an obvious lisp." He
IQjbid., p. 11. llconnally, p. 2 1 5.
IZlbid., p. 3 1 5. 13ibid., p. 1 8 8.
l^Ibld., p. 214.
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looked like "some intent little teddy bear" when he rose to 
speak. 15 To Connally he was the "gentleman with the intel­
lectual 'Jimmy' outfit who pries into everything, everywhere, 
whether he is on a committee or not."^^
Walter George of Georgia, second in seniority on both 
the Foreign Relations and the Finance Committees, was espe­
cially knowledgeable on financial and tax matters.17 Like 
Connally, he had opposed the courtpacking plan, and Roosevelt 
had unsuccessfully attempted to purge him in 1938.
Carter Glass of Virginia, the ailing dean of the Sen­
ate, was "not a queen bee, but he goes around with a stinger 
out all the time."l® He was a conservative anti-New Deal 
Democrat.
Hiram Johnson of California was the old isolationist 
foe of Woodrow Wilson. Connally called him "very valuable," 
and reported that "I hold him in the highest admiration and 
esteem."19
l^Drury, p. 11.
l^The New York Times, October 21, 1941, p. 4.
iTConnally, p. 194.
l8ïom Connally, as cited in The New York Times, July
21, 1935, p. 2.
19u.S.. Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1 9 4 5, 9 1, Part 6 , 7 2 7 5.
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Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee shared a duplex apart­
ment with Connally and while some thought him harsh and vit­
riolic, to Connally he was "always friendly and a f f a b l e . "20
Charles McNary of Oregon, a good personal friend of 
Connally, was an "admirable" senator and a "capable minority 
leader. "21
Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota was a "trouble maker 
and a rabid isolationist who hoped to create more isolation­
ism and at the same time draw attention to h i m s e l f . "22
John Overton of Louisiana was "a fine man," though 
he had served as Huey Long's counsel when the Louisiana leg­
islature attempted to impeach L o n g . 23
Key Pittman of Nevada, the Foreign Relations Commit­
tee Chairman, was "hardly a strong voice for Wilson's prin­
ciples." He opposed entry to the World Court in 1935 and 
was physically unable to act as a vigorous chairman.2^ 
"Pittman," said one of the contemporary periodicals, "has a 
serpent's wisdom, but he is also a light-hearted soul with 
little stomach for the drudgeries of l e a d e r s h i p . "25
2®Connally, p. l8l. 21jbJ^., p. 166.
22ibid., p. 2 1 2. 23ibld., p. 1 6 7. 24xbid., p. 2 1 6.
25t.r.b., "Washington Notes," The New Republic, 100 
(October 1 8, 1939), 299.
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Robert Taft of Ohio impressed Drury as "one of the 
strongest and ablest men in the Senate . . . quick in debate 
and quick in h u m o r . C o n n a l l y  accused Taft of "sitting in 
his office with one eye on the map of Ohio and the other on 
his pocket book."27 In less heated moments Connally thought 
him an 'Industrious, tireless worker in behalf of measures 
he favored at the moment. He was a man of good ability, but 
not brilliant. He tried to assert his leadership on too many 
questions to be really effective on the important ones."2®
Harry Truman of Missouri was "a quiet senator who had 
not distinguished himself after one Senate term."^9 Connally 
and the future President were friendly.
Millard Tydings of Maryland was of "great help to the 
administration" on matters relating to the armed s e r v i c e s . 30 
He and Connally were on good terms.
Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan, although later of much 
help in formulating a bipartisan foreign policy, was written 
off in 1939 as "the most rabid of isolationists."31
26])rury, p. 1 0.
27The New York Times, May 6 , 1950, p. 2. 
oftConnally, p. 311.
29ibid.. p. 2 7 4. 30ibid., p. 1 9 4. Sljbid., p. 2 6 9.
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Robert Wagner of New York was the chief proponent of 
anti-lynching legislation. He was "given to reading long,
ghost-written s p e e c h e s . "3^
Burton K. Wheeler of Montana had been an ally in the 
court fight, but Connally was "never sure where he stood on
most issues."33
Wallace White of Maine was a "mild, friendly man" 
who told Connally he had once used one of the Texan's speeches 
in a Republican election campaign.34
Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin was a "true internation­
alist Republican." Connally appreciated his help in foreign 
policy matters although they had many good natured fights on 
domestic issues.35
Connally's position in the seventy-sixth Senate.—  
Connally belonged to a favored Senate type. The Democratic 
Party, which since the end of the Reconstruction Era has held 
equivalent Senate power to that of the Republicans, had been 
dominated by the Southerner. Usually they were more powerful 
in committee than their Northern colleagues and, in the final




decisions of the Senate, nearly always the Southerner's in­
fluence was more pervasive and persuasive than others of his 
party. When the Democrats were out of power during the twen­
ties, the Southerners were a listless opposition rarely driven 
to oratorical revolt. But usually the Southerner entered the 
Senate chamber with the quiet satisfaction of a man strolling 
contentedly into his sitting room. He loved the Senate as a 
center of unaltered tradition. He luxuriated in the splendor 
and power that rested there. He was usually more formally 
and more traditionally dressed than his colleagues and he 
was usually more archaically eloquent in debate.36 Connally 
was a personification of the typical, old-time, tradition- 
steeped Southern senator.
Connally was not ashamed to be called a politician.
He said: "When a successful politician is dead they call
him a statesman. That's fine. But so long as he remains 
alive he'd better not forget his politics."37 The Texan con­
stantly mended his senatorial political fences. One device 
used was a Sunday breakfast with Texas sausage, accompanied
36white, Citadel . . ., p. 72.
37As cited in Beverly Smith, "The Senator Loves a 
Fight," The Saturday Evening Post, 223 (July 1, 1950), l8 .
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by Texas pink grapefruit, Texas peach preserves, smoked ham, 
eggs and hot biscuits. Most senators were invited to at 
least one Connally breakfast.
His temper was unpredictable and fellow senators 
walked warily, but fondly, around him. Occasionally, Repub­
licans attacked him. Danaher, while a freshman senator, 
astounded members one day by observing that Connally was 
guilty of a "caustic. Jeering, mocking type of approach which 
has been all too common for him." He thought that Connally’s 
"gyrations and acting" were "all directed toward the gallery 
to elicit some present temporary applause." Danaher further 
charged that Connally's "kind of cheap, police-court lawyer 
tactics may have a certain appeal in some places, but this 
is not the place." The Connecticut Senator rebuked the Texan 
for his "japery" and suggested that "all we need to complete 
the performance is {Texa^ Governor O'Daniel's hillbilly 
band."3®
But such attacks were rare. Carl Hayden called him 
"a good friend" and wrote that "there never was a time when 
he addressed the Senate that his colleagues did not pay close
38as cited in Gerald Movins and Jack Beall, "Plush 
Covered Cactus," The Saturday Evening Post, 2l4 (April 4,
1942), 2 7 .
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attention to what he had to say."39 Ellender thought him "a 
very colorful person . . .  a great orator" and one who "com­
manded immediate attention whenever he rose to speak in the 
Senate."^0 Although he had attacked verbally a number of 
colleagues, Connally was amazingly well liked, both in the 
Senate and in Washington generally. White described the gen­
eral Senate attitude: "Connally was— simply Connally— and
who did not cherish the 'old man'?"4l
The Quest for Neutrality 
Probably the most effective medium for directing 
American public opinion into the path of Isolation during the 
nineteen-thirties was the Nye Committee to Investigate the 
munitions industry. The committee, chaired by the North Da­
kota isolationist, was formed in February, 1934. The commit­
tee probed the hypothesis that munitions makers, thirsty for 
profits, lured America into World War I. Committee pronounce­
ments increased demands for action to prevent a second such 
occurrence. The full extent of pacifist feeling became clear 
in late January, 1935, as the Senate considered entry of this
39Letter from Hon. Carl Hayden, United States Senator 
from Arizona, September 16, 1964.
^PLetter from Hon. Allen Ellender, United States 
Senator from Louisiana, September 16, 1964.
^IWhite, Citadel . . ., p. 123.
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country Into the World Court. More than 70,000 antl-World 
Court telegrams. Inspired by the Hearst press and by Father 
Charles Coughlin, a Roosevelt-hating radio priest, flooded 
Senate offices. The final Senate vote, fifty-two to thirty- 
six, was seven short of the necessary two-thirds majority.
The Pittman Act of 1935.-—  In April, 1935, Nye and 
Clark introduced a series of resolutions providing for a man­
datory embargo on arms, loans and credits during war time. 
After a summer of debate, the Pittman Neutrality Bill, a mer­
ger of two of the original resolutions, was favorably report­
ed to the Senate on August 7th.
The bill passed in twenty-five minutes. Upon presi­
dential proclamation that a state of war exist between two 
countries, the Act prohibited the export of arms, ammunition 
and implements of war to either belligerent. Transportation 
of such items to neutral ports for transshipment by American 
vessels was also forbidden. The Act established a Munitions 
Control Board to register and license persons engaged in war 
material traffic and gave the president authority to prohibit 
travel by American citizens on belligerents' ships during 
war time.^3 The Act was to last only until the new Congress
42connally, p. 211. 43ibid., p. 220.
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could convene in January and write permanent legislation, but 
the experiment with legislated neutrality had begun.
The Neutrality Act of 1936.—  War between Italy and 
Ethiopia tested the new legislation and found it unsatisfac­
tory. In a speech on November 6, 1935, Hull served notice 
that with the reassembling of Congress, the full power of the 
President would be devoted to abandoning the premise of the 
Pittman Act and to substituting an entirely different type 
of neutrality legislation.^^
However, six weeks of a new session passed before 
Congress approved a bill. On February 18, 1936, the Senate 
voted to continue the temporary Pittman Act, with three amend­
ments, until May 1, 1937. One amendment extended the arms 
embargo to countries which entered an existing war. A second 
barred loans and grants to belligerents. The third exempted 
Latin-American countries if involved in war with countries 
outside the Western Hemisphere.
The Neutrality Act of 1937.—  A little more than a 
year later, March 3, 1937, the Pittman Act became permanent 
legislation. Excepting one major addition, a "cash and carry" 
provision slated to expire on May 1, 1939, the law would
^^"American Neutrality," The Christian Century, 52 
(November 20, 1935), 1479.
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stand unless changed by Congress. Because the "cash and 
carry" provision apparently compromised our freedom of the 
seas, Borah and Johnson opposed the bill, but when the vote 
came, only Lodge and three others agreed with them. The vote 
was sixty-three to six. On May 1, 1937, the President signed 
the bill and the New York Herald Tribune dismissed the action 
as an effort "to preserve the United States from intervention 
in the war of 1914-15.
The move for repeal of the Arms Embargo.—  The Neu­
trality Act of 1937 placed the United States in the position 
of being unable to halt the aggressive acts of Hitler against 
Austria and Czechoslovakia. President Roosevelt was ready 
for repeal of the Act. The President also wanted continua­
tion of the "cash and carry" provision beyond the May expira­
tion date. But the Senate adjourned in late summer, 1939, 
with the Neutrality Act, minus the "cash and carry" provi­
sion, still law.
Hitler's march into Poland on September 1, 1939, and 
the subsequent declaration of war by Great Britain and Prance 
forced the President to reconvene Congress in special session 
on September 21, 1939. The President asked Congress to (l)
45as cited in "How to Be Neutral," Time, 34 (July 1 7,
1939), 18.
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repeal the arms embargo; (2) restrict movements of American 
ships in danger zones delineated by the President; (3) bar 
travel by American citizens on belligerent ships or in danger 
zones; (4) require buyers of American goods to take title be­
fore leaving the United States; (5 ) put all purchases on a 
cash basis; (6) retain the portion of existing law regulating 
the collection in this country of funds for belligerents and 
(7) retain the portion of existing law requiring licensing 
of arms traffic.^6
Pittman asked Connally to lead the Arms Embargo re­
peal fight with Barkley, Claude Pepper of Florida and Elbert 
Thomas of Utah as his floor assistants.
The Senate, Connally and Neutrality 
The seventy-sixth Senate was generally favorable to 
the Administration's domestic recovery program, but divided 
into several blocs of opposition to Administration foreign 
policy. The Nye-Vandenberg bloc regarded war as a profit- 
making device of bankers and munitions makers. The Clark- 
Wheeler bloc was consumed with anti-British feeling and per­
mitted that bias to guide thinking on international issues.
The Borah-Johnson bloc preached that the oceans were the
46”'War or Peace for America?' Is Issue in Congress 
Battle," Newsweek, l4 (October 2, 1939), 25.
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bulwark of our defenses, that we needed no other friends and 
that we should not entangle ourselves in the affairs of other 
nations.^?
At this critical period Internationalist Senate lead­
ership was weak. Pittman was 111 and had a mild Isolationist 
background. The next two Democratic members In seniority on 
the Foreign Relations Committee were Pat Harrison and George, 
both primarily Interested In economics and finance, Wagner, 
whose main Interests were labor and civil rights, preceded 
Connally.
In 1939, Connally was regarded as an admirer of Wood­
row Wilson's principles, a foe of the Nye Munitions Committee, 
the Instigator of legislation to take the profits out of war, 
an advocate of a big navy, the defender of the cotton farmer, 
a believer In the poll tax and, most recently, a leader In 
the battle against the courtpacklng scheme of President Roose­
velt. To some, his chief recommendation was an ability to 
trade Insults with Vandenberg and other Republicans, but Con­
nally had the confidence of anti-New Deal Southern Democrats 
such as Glass and Harry Byrd and he was regarded as a quasl- 
expert on foreign policy. He had served on the twenty-three
4 7Connally, pp. 214-15.
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man Foreign Relations Committee since December 14^ 1931, and 
was the fifth-ranked Democratic member.
In April, 1939, only thirty-three senators were pre­
pared to give a categorical answer to the question: "Do you
favor broadening the President's discretionary powers under 
the Neutrality Act?" Ten Democrats and one Republican were 
certain they did. Ten Republicans, nine Democrats, two 
Parmer-Laborites and one Progressive were certain they did 
not.^8 Nye shouted that "any effort to repeal or emasculate 
the Neutrality Act will keep the Senate here all summer. 
McNary, the Senate minority leader, after talking with Hull 
and Pittman, stated flatly that the Senate would act on no 
neutrality legislation at its first session.50 it did not.
In September, after news that Congress would recon­
vene, Vandenberg asserted that the isolationists in Congress 
would resist efforts to lift the arms embargo.51 Borah was 
quoted as saying: "We hear and read rather strange things
^8 "Bewildered Congress Groping for Sound Neutrality 
Policy," Newsweek, 13 (April 17, 1939), 14.
^9"Neutrality Ruckus," Newsweek, 13 (March 20, 1939),
16.
50"Neutrality Fight," Newsweek, 13 (June 26, 1939),
1 7.
51"Trial and Error," Newsweek, l4 (September I8 ,
1939),  27.
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these days. There is constant suggestion of shutting off 
debate."52 On the other hand, two Republicans, Taft and 
Warren Austin of Vermont, came out for embargo repeal. Many 
senators said they needed to "hear both sides before making
up their m i n d s . "53
In a meeting with Congressional leaders in early Sep­
tember, the President intimated that he wanted to repeal all 
neutrality legislation and depend upon the international law 
that was Wilson's guide in 1914-17. The surprised Congress­
men warned Roosevelt that the people would not support such 
action.5^ In March, seventy-six percent of the people had 
favored selling food to Great Britain and Prance even if they 
entered a war and fifty-two percent had favored selling them 
munitions as well. But an overwhelming eighty-three percent 
were opposed to sending United States troops or ships over­
seas to aid any country.55 Now, tens of thousands of letters 
and telegrams were overwhelmingly for retention of the arms 
embargo. In a single day, 200,000 pieces of mail, including
52"U.S. Neutrality Fight Turns on What Is Best for 
Country," Newsweek, 14 (September 25, 1939), 25.
53ibid., p. 2 6 .
54Newsweek, l4 (October 2, 1939), 25. 
55Newsweek, 13 (March 20, 1939), 16.
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10,000 telegrams, reached the Senate post office. Thousands 
of the letters were traced to followers of Father Coughlin 
and to members of other pressure g r o u p s . 5 6
Nevertheless, four days after the President's message 
to Congress, a bill drafted by Pittman, Thomas and Connally 
was submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee. The Repub­
lican committee members and Clark, the lone dissident Demo­
crat, were not Invited to express their views as the bill was 
reported out by a sixteen to seven vote. Twenty-four sena­
tors had met dally In Johnson's office while the new bill was 
being drafted; although forecasts of "sure" Administration 
votes ranged from forty-four to seventy-two, Johnson claimed 
twenty-four "die-hards" that would not be swayed.
On October 2nd, over 1,000 people attempted to jam 
Into the Senate gallery seating 450 for the opening day of 
debate.57 As debate started, Barkley said:
I think I am not exaggerating when I say that the dis­
cussion of the pending joint resolution during Its con­
sideration by the Senate may go down In history as one 
of the historic discussions of the Senate of the UnitedStates.58
56"peace Blizzard," Newsweek, 14 (October 2, 1939)»
29.
57"Questlon Marks," Time, 34 (October l6, 1939), 25.
58u.S., Congressional Record, 76th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1939, 8 5, Part 1, 50.
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Pittman, who would be dead in a year, opened the debate for 
the Administration in a speech that lasted more than an hour. 
For two hours, Borah, who would be dead in three months, 
stated with cool, withering clearness the case for isola­
tionism, the case against "cash and carry."
The next day. Senator M. M. Logan of Kentucky died, 
and the Senate adjourned in respect; but on October 4th, Con­
nally rose to speak for repeal of the Arms Embargo.
Connally*s Speaking for Bnbargo Repeal 
Connally's speaking on Arms Embargo Repeal consisted 
of a two-hour formal speech and several impromptu efforts 
scattered throughout the remainder of the twenty-six day de­
bate. He emphasized three ideas: (l) Most Americans wish
to stay out of war, (2) Most Americans', and senators', 
sympathies lay with the Allies in the European war. (3) 
Principal isolationist arguments were historically inaccu­
rate. Connally stated his thesis immediately: "We are all
sincere and earnest and honest and patriotic in our endeavors 
to keep out of the European war."59
Arguments used by Connally.—  Connally knew that de­
spite Hiram Johnson's claims of voting strength, the deluge of
59ibid.. p. 8 3.
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pressure group mall and the packed galleries that had cheered
Borah, embargo repeal strength numbered at least forty-four
senators. Connally indicated that he was not misled by the
galleries' applause for Borah. He said:
Many professional people come to these galleries, not 
professional people in the sense of being doctors or law­
yers or ministers, but professional listeners, who come 
here frequently with propaganda in their minds and ap­
plause in their hands to try to influence the Senate.^0
Connally also knew that all senators were aware of the Gallup
polls which indicated that fifty-two to sixty-six percent of
the American people favored selling arms and munitions to
Great Britain and Prance. Near the end of debate he suggested
the people's influence on senatorial opinions:
I have respect for the people and every time they go to 
the ballot box and express themselves, every time they 
elect a Representative or a Senator, they are electing 
something more than a suit of clothes and a hard-boiled 
shirt; they are electing someone they think at least has 
brains and courage and integrity and is willing to dis­
cuss and consider the question of war and peace.
If American opinion favored the Allies, senators should, by 
their actions, reflect public opinion. Since only twenty- 
four senators, by Johnson's estimate, were hard-core oppo­
nents of repeal, Connally's emphasis on public opinion, with 
its ever-present veto of political careers, was valuable.
GOlbid., p. 89. Glibid.^ p. 993.
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Expecting favorable support from the majority of 
senators and the general public, Connally's primary argument 
was aimed at showing that an arms embargo aided Germany while 
harming Great Britain and France.
In developing the argument, Connally did little to 
disguise his personal feelings. He was an old friend of 
Great Britain, as his fellow senators knew, and early In the 
debate he revealed his prejudice: "The Siegfried Line [Ger­
many's defense l l n ^ , If It Is broken, will not be broken by 
o r a t o r y . T h e  Texan obviously hoped that the Allies would 
break the Siegfried Line with United States arms aid. He was 
hoping that most senators shared his prejudice.
The Texan further developed the main argument by the
use of three extended hypothetical Illustrations. In the
first of these Connally said:
The Embargo Act applied to our citizens would mean that 
the highwayman who Is meditating holding up the Senator 
from Maryland [Tydings] on his way home tonight can get 
all the arms, all the blackjacks, he may desire . . . .  
But If the Senator wants . . .  to borrow a weapon . . .
In order that he might defend himself, the law says, "No, 
you cannot do It." This aggressor has a vested right to 
say to the United States, "You cannot sell anybody else. 
In time of war, arms with which to protect himself from 
aggression."^3
62Ibid., p. 83. G3ibld., p. 84.
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The other illustrations, like the first, presented innocent 
victims beset by gangsters. They were arguments designed to 
appeal to Americans' sympathy for an underdog. Connally pre­
sented Great Britain and Prance as innocent victims of German 
aggression and hoped that the senators would accept this pic­
ture of outraged Justice.
Connally developed the basic argument further as he 
pointed to a colored war map on the wall behind him to show 
countries adjacent to Germany who sold war materials. On the 
other hand. Great Britain and Prance, with sea power permit­
ting trade with the United States, were prohibited from using 
their advantage by the Arms Embargo.
Throughout the development of the main argument Ger­
many was called an "aggressor" who had launched a "Niagara 
of T e r r o r . G e r m a n y  was a "highwayman,"^5 a "safecrack- 
er,"66 a "poised rattler."67 They were "lurking assassins"68 
who had created a "tomb of Poland"69 and a "corpse of Aus­
tria."70 These were unfavorable images designed to reinforce 
sympathy for the Allies. They were wise picture images to
64ibid., p. 83. 65ibid., p. 84. ^^Ibld., p. 85. 
G7lbid., p. 93. 68ibid., p. 88. 69ibid., p. 87.
70ibid., p. 88.
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project to an audience that was believed to be sympathetic 
to Great Britain and France.
But Connally did not Ignore the Isolationist minority 
In the Senate. The principal argument of the Nye-Vandenberg 
bloc was the charge that munitions makers encouraged United 
States' entry Into World War I. Connally felt that this 
charge could not be proved historically. In refutation of 
the argument, Connally read a lengthy list of ships and car­
gos sunk by Germany In 191^-1916.71 These sinkings, the Texan 
felt, were the true cause of American entry Into the war. 
Later, he reminded Senators Nye, Clark, Lynn Frazier and 
Ernest Lundeen that "the propaganda that got us Into the World 
War was the German Submarine," and declared In summary: "The
munitions makers and the bankers did not drag us Into the 
World War."72
In another secondary argument, Connally refuted the 
Borah-Johnson bloc that argued for International law and 
"freedom of the seas." Connally first reminded the senators 
that "under International law from historic times every neu­
tral nation has had a right to sell arms and ammunition to 
warring nations."73 He warned that determination to sail In
71lbld., p. 90. 72ibid., p. 435. 73lbld., p. 86.
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war zones could lead to war again because "German submarines 
. . . wait unseen to destroy the lives of innocent American 
citizens if they go to sea now."7^ On October 24th, Connally 
attempted a compromise with the "freedom of the seas" advo­
cates. He sponsored an amendment which relieved Pacific 
trade from the stringent requirements of "cash and carry" 
and permitted ships to go to belligerent zones where there 
was relatively little danger of a t t a c k . 75 Connally's compro­
mise was wise because a few undecided senators, such as Josiah 
Bailey of North Carolina, announced support for repeal.
Connally also appealed to the isolationist bloc 
through the ethos of Borah. He readily agreed with an argu­
ment Borah had developed in the opening day. Borah had called 
the arms embargo "domestic legislation," unaffected by Euro­
pean events. Connally agreed: "it is a piece of domestic
legislation relating to what our ships shall do and what they 
shall not do, relating to what our citizens may do and what 
they may not do."7^ In all, Connally used Borah as an au­
thority twelve times. He also referred to Johnson in direct­
ing his appeal to the isolationist. Recognizing his own lack 
of prestige with this Isolationist bloc, the Texan used per­
sonal authority only once.
74ibid., p. 88. 75ibid., p. 781. 76ibid., p. 836.
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Connally*8 taetlcs In debate.—  The give and take of 
floor debate permitted Connally to use his sarcastic humor. 
Most of his barbs were reserved for the isolationists.
On October 24th, Connally revealed his Southern pre­
judice as he refuted Lundeen's argument that the United States 
should seize British and French bases in the Western Hemi­
sphere in payment for World War I debts. Connally suggested: 
"Why not go over and take Ethiopia and repopulate it with 
some of our own citizens here at home?"77
Connally's humor was usually more pertinent. The 
isolationists, with outside support from Herbert Hoover and 
Charles Lindbergh, offered to compromise by selling the Allies 
defensive weapons only. Connally contended: "The only way
in which we could make a distinction would be to write on one 
[of the tanks], 'This is for offense,' and write on the other 
[tank], 'This is for defense.'"78 While arguing against the 
"defensive weapon" amendment, Connally told a story concern­
ing Robert Toombs, the Georgian. Just prior to the Civil
War, Toombs was making wild speeches on the stump and said, 
"Why, we in the South can whip the Yankees with cornstalks."
After the war someone who had heard him say this asked him 
what had happened. "Well," said Toombs, "I did say that, but
77ibid., p. 437. 78ibid.. p. 44o.
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the trouble was the damnyankees would not fight us with corn­
s t a l k s . T h e  story was appropriate. No one could forecast 
the defensive weapons needed in a war because no one could 
determine the type of weapons to be used by an enemy. The 
"defensive weapon" amendment was defeated.
The floor debate also resulted in personal exchanges 
between Connally and other senators. The Texan concentrated 
on three isolationists who were particularly active during 
the embargo debate— Lundeen, Clark and Wheeler.
When Lundeen advocated confiscation of British and
French territories in the Western Hemisphere, Connally charged
that Lundeen "covers our position . . . with slime and
abuse. "80 And to Lundeen's suggestion that Connally might
possibly be wrong, the Texan admitted:
That would not be the first time the Senator from Texas 
made a mistake. He makes many of them. But when he has 
found that he has made a mistake, he tries to correct it. 
Some people never do. There are those who, like the Haps- 
burgs, "never learn anything and never forget anything.
At one point, Clark, who was at constant odds with 
Connally, rose to say, "I am astonished . . . ." "it is not 
the first time the Senator has been astonished," Connally in­
terrupted.82 Connally pressed the attack on Clark further by
79ibid., p. 9 0 3. QOlbid., p. 4 3 6.
Gllbid., p. 437. GZlbid., p. 436.
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analyzing the Missourian: "That is the trouble with the Sena­
tor. He wants to insulate himself in a sublimated atmosphere 
of isolation and self-consideration.
But Connally's best sample of personal invective oc­
curred after the final vote on the Resolution had been an­
nounced. Wheeler objected, calling the preamble a "stump 
speech." Several Democratic senators rose to question the 
fact that a "stump speech" existed in the wording of the pre­
amble. But Connally, red of face, glasses on the tip of his 
nose, answered Wheeler:
The Senator . . . says it is a stump speech. Just be­
cause you are licked [on the Resolution] you cannot take 
it. You have not the courage to take it. I knew what 
the Senator's answer Qbo the preambl^ would be. It 
would be just a lot of flub-dub, just a lot of "hooey."
If the Senator would make more stump speeches like that 
preamble, he would be in better favor with the Americanpeople.84
By now, most of the gallery had forgotten the congra­
tulations of Barkley on a calm and courteous debate. The arms 
embargo was repealed sixty-three to thirty, and at 9:45 p.m., 
October 27, 1939, the Senate adjourned.
Aftermath
The debate was over after twenty-six days and approxi­
mately a million words from seventy senators.
83ibid.. p. 438. 84it,id., p. 1030.
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Connally's speaking during the debate was typical of 
what the Senate expected of him in 1939. His formal address 
of October 4  was elaborately prepared, in manuscript form be­
fore him, but he seldom referred to it. Indeed, two days 
earlier, as the Senate considered whether to adjourn for the 
day or to continue, Connally said: "l have Just completed
the remarks which I desire to make , . . but they have not 
yet been typed in full . . . .  I can go ahead without any 
c o p y . " ® 5  His speaking after the major address on October 4 
was all impromptu, with no indication of advance preparation.
On the third day of debate, the proceedings dropped 
sharply in senatorial and public interest. Many thought in­
terest dropped because both sides were reluctant to discuss 
basic i s s u e s . 86 Connally met the challenge of issues. He 
built his speech around the premise that Great Britain and 
France must have aid. Most senators seemed afraid to reveal 
their partiality for Great Britain and France. The isola­
tionists viewed arms embargo repeal as an act to benefit 
munitions manufacturers and a sacrifice of traditional "free­
dom of the seas." Connally recognized these arguments,
GSibid., p. 75.
^^Kenneth G. Crawford, "Shadow-boxing in Washington," 
The Nation, 1 4 9  (October 14 ,  1 9 3 9 ) ,  4 0 3 .
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refuted them historically and often used the isolationists' 
leaders as authorities.
Connally'a formal speech did not reflect his wit or 
his talent for sarcasm, perhaps because of the solemnity of 
the occasion and his unaccustomed place of honor in a foreign- 
pollcy debate. As debate proceeded and public interest waned, 
and as repeal became virtually certain, Connally used his per­
sonal weapons more frequently. He picked the isolationists 
as targets. No undecided senator felt Connally's sting. As 
the isolationists fought a delaying battle, offering over two 
dozen amendments, Connally’s personal examination of the 
amendments became more sarcastic.
Connally's speaking seemed effective. The Arms Embar­
go section of the Neutrality Act was repealed. Connally's 
work was noted. Franklin Roosevelt, who had not spoken to 
Connally socially since the Supreme Court battle, telephoned 
him offering congratulations on his speech of October 4. 
Roosevelt later called the repeal of the arms embargo "the 
most important action that has taken place in our foreign 
policy during my administration."87 He signed the repeal 




THE CONNALLY RESOLUTION DEBATE, 19^3
Connally's Audience for the Connally Resolution Debate
The seventy-eighth Congress that convened In January, 
1943, was less friendly to the Roosevelt Administration than 
any of its five predecessors. On November 3> 19^2, American 
voters had rejected two of every nine Congressmen. Thirteen 
freshmen were elected to the Senate.^
The seventy-eighth Senate.—  The comfortable majority 
the New Deal enjoyed in 1939 was gone. The Senate that re­
pealed the Arms Embargo contained sixty-nine Democrats, twenty- 
three Republicans, two Parmer-Laborites, one Progressive and 
one Independent. The seventy-eighth Senate contained fifty- 
seven Democrats, thirty-eight Republicans and one Progressive.
Some familiar names were gone. Borah, Lundeen, Pitt­
man, Harrison, Ernest Gibson of Vermont, Alva Adams of Colo­
rado and Morris Sheppard of Texas were dead. Byrnes, Louis
l"New Faces," Newsweek, 21 (January I8 , 19^3), 24.
64
65
Sehwellenbach of Washington and John Miller of Arkansas had 
resigned their Senate seats. Seven of the thirty who had 
voted against Arms Embargo repeal were gone. In all, thirty 
men were In the Senate who were not senators In January, 1939.
Joseph H. Ball of Minnesota was a "huge young man, 
slow spoken and slow moving with pre-maturely gray hair and 
a good natured scowl,"2 He was a liberal Republican.
Ralph 0. Brewster of Maine was "bald and friendly. 
Intelligent and perceptive with a quick, dry, rather Ironic 
humor and a pleasant manner."3 Brewster was a conservative 
Republican.
Harold H. Burton of Ohio was "frank and forthright," 
and his ideas, while not "startling In originality," were 
"sincere and honest."^ A pre-war Isolationist, Burton had 
become liberal in foreign affairs.
Harlan J. Bushfield of South Dakota, "a tall spare 
fellow with a long face and a mop of white hair, who strongly 
resembled Andrew Jackson,"5 was a "conservative machine poli­
t i c i a n . C o n n a l l y  lectured him during a Senate debate:
^Allen Drury, A Senate Journal 1943-1945 (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 26.
3lbld., p. 38. ^Ibld., p. 3 2. 5ibld.. p. 42.
^"Senate's New Paces," Time, 40 (November l6, 1942),
16.
66
I know of his zeal and his dally attendance here and his 
study of all these measures, but I suggest to him that 
the most effective way to legislate Is to deal with one 
particular angle of a matter, and take action on It, 
without seeking to cover the whole earth.?
Albert B. Chandler of Kentucky, "overwhelmingly 
friendly and Impulsive," spoke with an "excitable good hu­
mor."® Connally said Chandler's "head will not have any 
cause to ache, because he does not worry about anything."9 
James 0. Eastland of Mississippi was a "youthful, 
round-faced, slow-talking gentleman with a deep devotion to 
the Constitution and States' Rights."10
Homer Ferguson of Michigan was a "jurist Investiga­
tor . . . Detroit's symbol of civic virtue,"H with an "out­
standing talent for cross-examination."12 He and Connally 
battled many times. The Texan said Ferguson might "be Junior 
[Senatoi^ In some respects, of course, but he Is senior In 
vilification and abuse and Insinuation. I award him the
?U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.,
194 3, 8 9 , Part 3, 3886.
^Drury, p. 64.
9u.S., Congressional Record, ?8th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
1944, 9 0, Part 7, 8 9 0 6.
l^Drury, p. 44.
llTlme, 40 (November I6 , 1942), 1 6 .
12Drury, p. 21.
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doctor of philosophy degree with regard to those things."13 
Albert W. Hawkes of New Jersey was former president 
of Congoleum-Nalrn, Incorporated.!^ Connally had "the high­
est regard and respect" for Hawkes.15
William Langer of North Dakota, "a man of great vio­
lence and great anger," was the "maverick of the Senate,"!^ 
and saw himself as the "champion of the underprivileged."1? 
He was one of the last Isolationists.
John L. McClellan of Arkansas, "sound, reasonable. 
Intelligent,"18 was a "New Dealer, but no rubber stamp."19 
Ernest W. McFarland of Arizona was "honest and de­
cent. His Instincts are right and he follows them with con­
siderable diligence."20 According to McFarland, when he was 
a freshman senator he "turned to Connally for advice, which 
was always willingly given. "21
l^u.S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1947, 93, Part 8, 104o4.
l^Tlme, 40 (November I6 , 1942), 1 6 .
15u.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1945, 91, Part 3, 3401.
l^Drury, p. 27.
1 7"New Faces," Time, 36 (November I8 , 1940), 1 9. 
lÔDrury, p. 4o. 19ïlme, 40 (November I6 , 1942), 1 6. 
20Drury, p. 2 1.
21u.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 
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Eugene D. Mllllkln of Colorado was "a very bald, 
plain man with prominent dark eyes, a wide, generous mouth 
and a lot of intelligence."22 Connally said Millikin was one 
of several Republicans of whom he was " f o n d . "23
E. H. Moore of Oklahoma, seventy-one years old, was 
an oil millionaire who had changed his party affiliation to 
R e p u b l i c a n . 24 Once, when Moore was being quizzed about slant 
drilling for oil, Connally said, "Under the circumstances 
under which he got here (by switching partie^, I think he 
has a slant on the whole State, or the State has a slant on 
him, one way or the o t h e r . "25
Kenneth S. Wherry of Nebraska— "lawyer, funeral 
director, farmer, owner of three automobile a g e n c i e s "26—
"had a blustering, impatient, didactic manner."27 Connally 
said that he and Wherry "often chatted. But we never allowed 
our mutual goodwill to affect our political views. Wherry
22i)rury, p. 36.
23Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, as told to 
Alfred Steinberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954),
p. 312.
24Time, 40 (November 16, 1942), l6.
25u.s., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1944, 90, Part 4, 5629.
26,Time, 40 (November I6 , 1942), 1 6 . 27Drury, p. 4l.
69
was most positive, given to discursiveness and superficiality 
and addicted to name-calling.
Connally*s position in the seventy-eighth Senate.—  
Connally's task was to guide a postwar resolution through the 
rather confused seventy-eighth Senate. In domestic matters, 
Connally was still regarded as one of the Southern-bloc lead­
ers. Since 1939, he had helped to block anti-lynching legis­
lation, had fought an anti-poll tax bill and, in 1943, had 
co-sponsored the Smith-Connally Act, which prohibited strikes 
in defense industries.
More importantly, Connally succeeded to the Foreign 
Relations Committee chairmanship on July 31, 1941. The Texan 
was, by committee position, the chief Administration foreign 
policy spokesman in the Senate, but by January, 1943, Connally 
had led only one major foreign policy debate: the further
repeal of certain sections of the Neutrality Act in late 1941. 
Because of his lack of aggressive leadership in reporting a 
postwar cooperation resolution. Time called him "an old poli­
tical gasburner,"^9 and more than once referred to him as a 
"minor statesman."
B^Connally, p. 311.
29"Default," Time, 42 (October 4, 1943), 22.
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But though the press was often critical, Connally's 
personal popularity among colleagues remained high. Sheridan 
Downey of California called Connally "a distinguished leader 
of the Senate, the man who may very greatly guide us in the 
stormy postwar e r a . "30 Lister Hill of Alabama called Con­
nally "a good f r i e n d . "31 John McClellan of Arkansas wrote:
When he [Connally] addressed the Senate, his fellow col­
leagues on both sides of the aisle gave him their fullest 
attention. He always knew his subject well and was able 
to impress and influence others. Pew men, if any, that 
I have known could be more persuasive and c o n v i n c i n g . 32
And even though little concrete legislation had been passed,
Connally's chairmanship of the prestige committee of the
Senate gave him a degree of authority not enjoyed during the
Arms Embargo debate.
The Search for Peace 
Even during the early stages of World War II, the 
government of the United States started planning for a post­
war organization dedicated to peace and international jus­
tice.
30u.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1943, 89, Part 6, 7 9 0 7.
31ibid., p. 8 0 1 6.
32Letter from Hon. John McClellan, United States 
Senator from Arkansas, September 1, 1964.
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The Declaration of the United Nations.—  In late De­
cember, 1941, Winston Churchill came to the United States for 
meetings with President Roosevelt, The meetings were de­
signed to draft a declaration of intention for the twenty- 
six nations at war with Germany, Italy and Japan. Connally 
and other Congressional leaders met with the two leaders to 
work on the drafting of a declaration. The Declaration of 
the United Nations was ready for signatures by January 1, 
1942.
The Declaration contained two points: (1) each gov­
ernment pledged employment of full resources against the ene­
my and (2) each government pledged cooperation with the other 
United Nations in not negotiating a separate armistice with 
any Axis power. The document was the first step in creation 
of the United Nations Organization. Connally called the 
document "an historic and significant declaration,"33
The BgH2 Resolution.—  In Spring, 1942, the State De­
partment organized an Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign 
Policy. The committee— composed of State Department offi­
cials, Congressional members and a few private citizens— was 
to plan an effective postwar organization to replace the
33connally, p. 225.
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League of Nations. Hull appointed Connally and Warren Austin 
to represent the Senate.
In March, 1943, two Democrats, Lister Hill of Alabama 
and Carl Hatch of New Mexico, and two Republicans, Ball and 
Burton, submitted the "BgHg Resolution" to the Senate. The 
Resolution encouraged United States initiative in forming an 
organization to (l) finish the war; (2) establish temporary 
governments in Axis-controlled countries; (3) administer 
postwar rehabilitation; (4) set up machinery for settlement 
of future disputes between the nations and (5) provide for a 
United Nations world police f o r c e . 34 The Resolution, on a 
parliamentary technicality, was not debated and was pigeon­
holed by the Foreign Relations Committee.
A week later, on March 24th, the Foreign Relations 
Committee agreed unanimously to submit all pending and im­
pending postwar resolutions to a sub-committee of eight mem­
bers— La Follette, Vandenberg, Elbert Thomas, White, George, 
Gillette, Barkley, and Connally. Seven resolutions were im­
mediately sent to the new group. Connally emphasized that 
discussions were to be "general," that the "whole field" 
would receive "the very closest and best" consideration.35
34"Declaration to the World," Time, 4l (March 22,
1943), 11.
S^The New York Times, April 1, 1943, p. 8.
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Action In other postwar fields.—  Some action In 
postwar planning had begun. A forty-four nation meeting on 
postwar food problems was held In Hot Springs, Virginia. In 
May, the United States and Great Britain sent representatives 
to Bermuda to discuss the refugee problem. Other conferences 
with the remaining United Nations were planned to discuss 
problems of monetary policy, health and transportation.
Further, the United Nations acting together organized 
the first International executive agency to function In World 
War II; a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Adminis­
tration to feed and clothe liberated peoples.36
The Fulbrlght Resolution.—  In June, a freshman Con­
gressman, James William Fulbrlght of Arkansas, Introduced the 
following resolution:
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate con­
curring) that the Congress hereby expresses Itself as 
favoring the creation of appropriate International ma­
chinery with power adequate to establish and maintain a 
Just and lasting peace among the nations of the world, 
and as favoring participation by the United States there­in. 37
The Fulbrlght Resolution served as a catalytic agent that 
drew together Internationalist Congressmen of varying politi­
cal and economic philosophy. Even Representatives Hamilton
36"The Job Starts," Time, 4l (June 21, 1943), 17.
37"Post-war Catalyst," Time, 4l (June 28, 1943), 15.
74
Pish of New York and John M. Vorys of Ohio, two pre-Pearl 
Harbor isolationists, favored the Resolution and its rapid 
acceptance indicated substantial bipartisan agreement on ba­
sic elements of postwar foreign policy. Connally emphasized 
that any postwar planning resolution approved by the Senate 
would be "one of our own making,"38 The Fulbrlght Resolution 
was pigeonholed.
The Mackinac Resolution.—  During the Congressional 
recess in August, Republican leaders assembled at Mackinac 
Island, Michigan, to draft certain planks of the 1944 party 
platform. One was a plank on postwar cooperation, and the 
Republicans went much further than critics predicted. The 
Republicans now favored "responsible participation by the 
United States in postwar cooperative organizations among sov­
ereign nations to prevent military aggression and to attain 
permanent peace with organized justice in a free world."39 
The Mackinac Declaration accomplished two purposes:
(1) it permitted Democrats and Republicans to collaborate 
thereafter in the pursuit of a commonly-shared objective and
(2) it effectively averted a threatened split within the
SSThe New York Times, June l8, 1943, P. 5- 
39*’Battle of Mackinac," Time, 42 (September 20,
194 3 ),  20.
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Republican party over the issue of international peace and 
American security after World War II. The Declaration, with 
precise meaning deliberately left vague, united the major 
factions within the party since both internationalist-inclined 
and isolationist-trained Republicans interpreted the Declara­
tion as a statement of their own position.
The Connally Resolution.—  Congress reconvened Septem­
ber 14, 1 9 4 3. As the House passed the Fulbrlght Resolution, 
360-2 9, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee studied twelve 
proposals. They were:
1. SR 22, by Mr. Wiley, inviting the President to join 
with the Senate in the creation of a Foreign Rela­
tions Advisory Council.
2. SR 7 6, by Mr. Pepper, authorizing the appointment of 
a sub-committee of the Committee on Foreign Relations 
to be known as the Committee on Reoccupation and Re­
construction.
3 . SR 9 1, by Mr. Gillette, approving the basic princi­
ples of the Atlantic Charter.
4. SR 99, by Mr. Thomas, favoring the calling of a con­
ference to formulate a program in international eco­
nomic cooperation.
5 . SR 114, the B2H2 Resolution.
6. SCR 10, by Mr. Kilgore, requesting the President to
invite foreign governments to participate in an in­
ternational constitutional convention to draft a con­
stitution providing for an international government.
7 . SR 1 3 5, by Mr. Pepper, relating to membership of the 
United States in the United Nations in order to im­
plement the Atlantic Charter.
8. SJR 56, by Mr. Thomas, relating to the participation 
of the United States in the establishment of a just 
and lasting peace.
9 . SJR 60 by Mr. La Follette, establishing a committee 
to provide for the formation of a pan-American Legis­
lative Union.
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10. SCR 1 6, by Mr. Vandenberg and Mr. White, relating to 
America's postwar plans.
11. HCR 2 5, the Pulbright Resolution.
12. JR 84, by Mr. Wilson, requesting the President to in­
vite friendly nations to enter upon consultation with 
delegates of the United States with a view to the 
promotion of permanent international p e a c e . ^0
On October 13, 1943, by a vote of seven to one, with 
La Follette dissenting, the sub-committee reported a resolu­
tion to the full committee. The full committee reported it 
out by a vote of twenty to two after strong opposition from 
Pepper, who favored a less vague statement. Connally reported 
the seventy-five word Resolution to the Senate:
Resolved, by the Senate of the United States: That the
war against all our enemies be waged until complete vic­
tory is achieved: That the United States cooperate with
its comrades-in-arms in securing a Just and honorable 
peace: That the United States acting through its con­
stitutional processes Join with free and sovereign nations 
in the establishment and maintenance of international au­
thority with power to prevent aggression and to preserve 
the peace of the world.
Controversy started immediately over the merits of the reso­
lution which Connally called "the best possible . . . that 
could be s e c u r e d . "^2 The New Republic called it a "practi­
cally meaningless compromise proposal,"^3 but Newsweek
40u.s., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943, 8 9, Part 7 , 8663.
4lThe New York Times, October 14, 1943, p. 1.
42ibid., October 15, 1943, p. 1.
^3"The Senate and the Peace," The New Republic, 109 
(October 2 5, 1943), 555.
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reported that it "promised to be a momentous document in 
American and world history.
The Senate, Connally and Postwar Collaboration 
The essential characteristics of the new Congress 
were not pleasant for the Administration to contemplate.
The New Deal’s emotional opposition, conservative Republi­
cans and reactionary Democrats, had a firm majority in both 
branches of Congress. By March, the seventy-eighth Congress 
was in revolt against Franklin Roosevelt.Legislation fa­
vored by Roosevelt did not face an encouraging future, and 
the President favored legislation pledging United States par­
ticipation in a postwar international organization. Did the 
Senate favor such legislation?
In late January, 1943, Senator Wagner, an Administra­
tion supporter, declared that he would introduce a resolution 
calling for a Joint planning committee— three members to be 
appointed from the Senate, three from the House and six by 
the President . However, Wagner never introduced his resolu­
tion although a similar resolution was re-introduced by Sena­
tor Wiley.
44"we’ll Cooperate with World, But Question Is, How?" 
Newsweek, 22 (October 25^ 1943), 42.
45T.R.B., "Washington Notes," The New Republic, 108 
(March 8, 1943), 3l6.
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Senator Wiley was not happy with the consideration
Connally gave his resolution. On February 25, in a Senate
speech, he said:
For eight months last year the resolution . . . lay in 
the dusty, musty pigeonholes of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations without consideration, and it is there now, to 
be resurrected, I hope, if my remarks have any effect 
. . . .  There has been no mediation on the resolution.
\o  study or analysis of it has been made by the commit­
tee. The resolution has been frozen in the committee.
Introduction of the B2H2 Resolution in March was en­
couraging for several reasons: (l) it was introduced by sena­
tors not in the mainstream of Senate foreign policy planning;
(2) it committed the Senate to postwar world cooperation and
(3) two of the sponsors were members of the opposition 
party.^7
The four sponsors of the BgHg Resolution, with Con­
nally and Wagner, met with Secretary Hull and the President. 
Ball explained that the Resolution represented a "minimum as 
to what the United States and other United Nations might 
agree upon."^8 Connally promised that the legislation would 
receive "due" consideration and study from his committee, but
46u.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943, 89, Part 1, 1297.
47 [Potomacus^ , "The Senator from Minnesota," The New 
Republic, 108 (May 31, 1943), 728.
48Time, 4l (March 22, 1943), 11.
79
he Indicated that before acceptance It would undergo material 
redrafting.^9 Connally reported later that the BgHg Senators 
were unaware of the joint study occurring between the Foreign 
Relations Committee and the State Department. Although the 
President publicly approved the Resolution in theory, Con­
nally reported that Roosevelt said; "Those Senators are hurt­
ing our efforts for a workable international organization."50 
Roosevelt's statement seemed accurate. In late April 
the Associated Press informally polled the Senate asking:
"Do you favor committing the Senate and country now to a post­
war course of preserving the peace through an international 
police force?" Only twenty-four senators answered "yes," 
thirty-two answered "no" and forty declined to comment.51
But in mid-July, Vandenberg, once solidly isolation­
ist, co-sponsored with White a resolution for postwar coopera­
tion which avoided specific commitments.52
Further, Henry Cabot Lodge, in an impressive Senate 
speech, stressed national self-interest as dependent upon in­
ternational cooperation. The applause which greeted, the
^9The New York Times, March l6, 1943, p/ 1.
50connally, p. 263.
51"First Roll Call," Time% 4l (April 26, 1943), 17.
52"The Great Debate," Time, 42 (July 12, 1943), 24.
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speech suggested that isolation as a foreign policy approach 
was becoming outmoded.53
However, Connally was under pressure from the Admin­
istration to delay action on a postwar resolution. In August, 
he was overheard saying, "We'd better hurry up and adjourn or 
some damn fool will be bringing up a postwar resolution or 
the poll-tax."5%
Connally cited sound reasons for delay in formulating 
a postwar resolution. Unlimited and unrestricted debate over 
such a resolution should be held only when the positions of 
our allies were understood more fully. He said:
The United States cannot alone provide a pattern of in­
ternational peace machinery and impose it upon the will 
of the allies. The United Nations must be consulted and 
issues involved in the war must be considered.33
Another hazard of early debate on delicate international is­
sues, Connally brought out, was the danger of partisan poli­
tics dominating the discussions. The Texan felt there should 
be "no partisan debate." He thought that "the disposition of 
some parties to drag in political considerations is already 
a p p a r e n t . "56 short, Connally wanted to report a resolution
53"Post-war Realist," Time, 4l (June 28, 1943), 15.
54”post-War Gold Brick," The Nation, 157 (November 6,
1943), 519.
55The New York Times. September 25, 1943, p. 8.
56ibid.
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out of committee when he was sure that It would pass with a 
big majority and a minimum of debate that could damage United 
States-Allled relations.
As Congress adjourned In August, the B2H2 sponsors 
reported that they would demand debate on the Resolution when 
Congress reconvened. Throughout August, eight teams of Con- 
gressmen--one Democrat and one Republican to a team— toured 
twenty-six states, speaking In favor of BgHg. Touring sena­
tors Included, besides the four sponsors, Truman, Ferguson 
and Burnet Naybank.
Congressmen returned to Washington In September and 
reported that public opinion favored United States partici­
pation In postwar International agencies. But public opinion 
had not agreed on details. An International police force was 
favored by fifty-seven percent. Fifty percent wanted a new 
League of Rations.5T
Still, the Foreign Relations Committee refused to re­
port any resolution. Ball threatened to attach the BgHg Reso­
lution to another bill unless the Committee acted "in a rea­
sonable time."58 Newspapers scolded the Committee, and
57"What Congressmen Found Out When They Went Back 
Home," Newsweek, 22 (September 13, 1943), I8 .
58"The Awakening," Time, 42 (October 11, 1943), 17.
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Committee members received stacks of letters from angry con­
stituents.
The Foreign Relations Committee represented the varied 
viewpoints on postwar planning In the Senate. Elbert Thomas, 
White, Barkley, Robert Reynolds, McClellan, John Tunnell, 
Wagner, James Murray, Claude Pepper and Theodore Green favored 
a strong resolution. Robert La Follette, Vandenberg, George, 
Guy Gillette, Arthur Capper and James Davis favored a vague 
statement. Clark, Nye, Johnson and Henrik Shlpstead were In 
opposition to any resolution.59
Finally, the Committee drafted the seventy-five word 
Connally Resolution, and senators quickly condemned and 
praised the committee's work. Ball said, "The Resolution 
merely would place the Senate on record as having caught up 
to the will of the American p e o p l e . "^0 Pepper felt that the 
resolution was one of "appeasement to some opposition they 
dare not arouse. All It will do Is to afford a political um­
brella to those who might like to get out of the rain of pub­
lic Indignation next y e a r . "&1 to White, the Resolution meant
59sialr Bolles, "Senators and the Peace," The Nation. 
157 (October l6, 19*3), 426-28.
60"Qulbbllng," Time, 42 (November 8, 1943), 17.
Gllbld.
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endorsement of a world police force; to Vandenberg and Austin, 
approval of a world court. But George, who opposed a police 
force, favored the Resolution, as did Nye.
On October 22, 1943, Connally reported that the com­
mittee Resolution recognized the impossibility of blue­
printing ”a plan for curing all the ills of the world." He 
urged that the Connally Resolution be accepted as a forward 
step toward the objectives of "all who believe in peace" and 
as "a contribution to cooperation among the nations of the 
earth" in the postwar p e r i o d . ^2 However, the BgHg Senators 
warned that unless the full Foreign Relations Committee made 
the Resolution more definite, they would take their fight for 
"strengthening and clarifying" amendments to the Senate
floor. 63
So, praised by supporters and condemned by critics 
for substantially the same reason, the Connally Resolution 
faced what many believed to be the most important Senate de­
bate on International affairs since the rejection of the Ver­
sailles treaty and the League of Nations covenant twenty-four 
years earlier. In October, Connally intimated to friends 
that he faced an opportunity that could preserve his name for
^^The New York Times, October 23, 1943, P. 5.
6 3 "Accouchement," Time, 42 (October 2 5, 1943), 19.
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history, and he took this attitude into the postwar coopera­
tion debate.
Connally's Speaking During the Connally Resolution Debate 
Seventy-seven senators answered roll call on October 
2 5, 1943. Connally rose to open the "great debate," defend- 
ing Senate Resolution 192, which pledged the United States 
to participate in a postwar international organization.
Connally's formal speech— October 25, 1943.—  Con­
nally was in a humorous mood before debate began. Just be­
fore the Texan spoke, Danaher submitted an amendment precisely 
defining almost every word of the resolution. As the clerk 
read the long, clarifying statement, Connally asked; "is 
Webster's Unabridged Dictionary offered as an exhibit or ap­
pendix to the pending resolution?"64
Connally's opening speech, the only prepared address 
he made during the debate, was a studied attempt to appeal to 
all factions of the Senate. The Texan, anxious to avoid ex­
tended debate, gave the senators nothing with which to dis­
agree and devoted much of his time to tracing the development
of international peace movements. Citing historical peace
-     - -    - -
t
64u.s., Congressional Record, 7 8th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1943, 8 9, Part 7, 8 6 6 2.
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plans of Abbe" de Salnt-Plerre, Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Ben- 
tham, Connally declared that "the Ideal of International 
peace . . . has thrilled the Imagination of men for more than 
a century. 65 Connally traced the evolution of peace machin­
ery from the "establishment of agencies to settle disputes 
between individuals;," and the assumption of authority over 
feudal barons by the crown," to the establishment of the 
United States Constitution and the formulation of a League 
of N a t i o n s . S u c h  development was designed to assure sena­
tors of the historic naturalness of the step before them.
Connally utilized the remaining time in directing ap­
peals to the most widely separated factions in the Senate: 
the bitter-end isolationists and the liberal BgHg intefha- 
tionalists.
Aware that the isolationists numbered less than ten,
Connally felt secure in reminding them that they had been
wrong twice in the past. First, they had defeated the League
of Nations in 1919, but the League had not failed. Connally
indicated the League's usefulness:
It has demonstrated where the pitfalls may lie and where 
any international organization for peace must be strength­




ought to lighten the pathway along which nations may tra­
vel In the years to come.67
Second, the Isolationists had sought neutrality as the guar­
antee of peace while Hitler was "secretly arming and march­
ing and drilling a mighty army" and on the other side of the 
world "the crafty Japanese for twenty years had been prepar­
ing for the hour they could strike the United States,
Only through the joint action of nations could aggressors be 
brought to justice. Nations needed to work together for peace 
as well as war. "Isolation has failed. Let us try collective 
security," Connally concluded.^9
Connally recognized that many of the liberal Inter­
nationalists opposed the vagueness of the Connally Resolu­
tion. To them, he defended generality:
It Is broad In Its terms for the reason that It Is ad­
vanced as a framework within which the makers of the trea­
ty may provide the detailed structure and the particular 
delineation and affirmative provisions that may be nec­
essary to accomplish the desired e n d s . 70
The duty of the Senate was first to advise and finally to
consent, but Connally warned that they could not "expect all
other nations to accept It [the Resolution] In detail." The
Senate could not "blueprint In advance the action of the
G7l b l d . , p. 8664. 6 8 ibj.d. , p. 8 6 6 5 .:
GSlbld. TOibld., p. 8664.
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nations whose Influence, power and arms must secure the de­
sired results."71
Connally tried to unite the widely divergent groups 
with an appeal that stressed the greatness of America. The 
United States, he said, could be powerful in world peace 
councils, as it was powerful in war. He concluded:
Prom our commanding point of vantage we must declare to 
the world that our influence and our might will be dedi­
cated to the maintenance of world peace and the suppres­
sion of military aggression whenever it may lift its ven­
omous h e a d . 72
The speech was over. It was short and general, com­
posed of many ideas designed to find general acceptance. 
Senate inaction might permit future wars and war brought 
"sacrifice, misery and tragedy,"73 to the world; war was 
"cruel and barbaric;"7^ war had "sorrowed thousands of homes 
. . . orphaned many thousands of children . . . wasted the 
national wealth . . . Injured our commerce . . . and forced 
staggering sacrifices on all our people."75 Senate action 
could secure peace and peace was a "hope,"78 an "ideal,"77 
a "hunger,"78 a "dream,"79 a "sublime objeotlve"^^ that
71lbid. 72xbid., p. 8 6 6 5. 73ibid., p. 8 6 6 3.
74ibid. 75ibid., p. 8664. 76xbid.
77ibid., p. 8663. 78xbid., p. 8664.
79lbid., p. 8663. GOxbld., p. 8665.
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combined our "highest hopes and best aspirations.
Clearly, Connally's attitude Indicated that he wanted
and expected little debate. He had not refuted any of the
twelve resolutions nor compared them with the Connally Reso­
lution. He read the Resolution, commented favorably on Its 
general terminology and appealed for American leadership in 
the postwar world.
Connally's speaking during debate.-- During the two- 
week debate, Connally's speaking reflected three different 
moods.
For two days, the Texan's speaking was tinged with 
truculence, bitterness and sarcasm, apparently triggered by 
his realization that the BgHg Senators, arguing for a stronger 
resolution, were going to prolong debate. On the opening day 
of debate. Senators Pepper, Ball, Burton, Hatch, Hill,
Bridges, Downey, Maybank, Guffey, Green, Murray, Truman, Kil­
gore and Ferguson submitted an amendment to Senate Resolution 
192 which guaranteed United States membership In an Interna­
tional organization. These were the Senators who provoked 
Connally's wrath.
Early In debate, Connally admitted he did not possess 
the powers with which the B2H2 group apparently predicted
81Ibid,
89
Allies' views toward a postwar cooperation resolution. He 
said:
If I had the intellectual, astronomical ability simply 
to look across the earth and see the leading powers among 
all the nations that are going to sit in on the peace 
treaty and if I could place the microscope of intellec­
tual inspection upon them to examine what they are going 
to do, even then I could not tell the Senate what these 
nations will do when they get together and argue and con­
struct the treaty and the Instrumentality about which we 
are speaking.
Connally called the resolution an ’’authorization” with "ap­
propriation” coming later. However, the B2H2 Senators disa­
greed, and the Texan battled them for two days.
Pepper initiated action by asking if he could "attract 
the attention" of Connally, "The Senator from Florida always 
attracts the attention of the Senator from Texas,"83 Connally 
snapped. Pepper wondered about the phrase "free and sover­
eign" nations. Who was "free and sovereign?" Would Prance 
be eligible? Connally exploded:
The Senator from Florida is a cultured gentleman. He was 
schooled at Harvard. I do not know whether he ever went 
to Groton, but he is from Harvard. If he does not know 
what "free" means, I cannot tell him, and I decline to be 
interrogated on a fundamental question of what the word
"free" means.84
82ibid., p. 8672. 83ibid., p. 8671o
84ibid.. p. 8672.
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Pepper wished to submit an invitation to the French govern­
ment in exile. Connally found it hard to believe that Pepper 
wanted "to create this international agency tomorrow and the 
day after tomorrow admit France under the leadership of Laval 
and with Hitler’s bayonets sticking in the ribs."85
Connally complained to the other EgKg Senators that 
he was "not here to be heckled and browbeaten."86 He reminded 
Ball of his words of early September: "For months . . .
(Ball) had threatened that if we did not report the resolu­
tion promptly he would move to discharge the committee and 
get action. Now we have it here and we cannot get action,"8? 
Ball protested that he was delighted a resolution had been 
reported, Connally was unconvinced:
Yes, the Senator got action, which he did not want, and 
because he got it he is sore, and mad, and is trying to 
smear and emasculate the resolution and tell the rest of 
the world that it is not any good and does not amount to 
anything— helping us a good deal with foreign nations, 
and in the war e f f o r t . 88
Hatch entered the word battle to comment that a group of Wash­
ington ministers had communicated to him a desire to address 
the Foreign Relations Committee but were refused, Connally 
reminded the BgHg group that they had little prestige, "if 
the ministers wanted to get in contact with the Foreign
85ibid. 86ibid. 87Ibid., p. 8732, 88ibid.
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Relations Committee and . . . went to the Senator from New 
Mexico [Hatch]], they went to the wrong place,"^9 Connally 
asserted. Pepper rejoined the battle and suggested that Con­
nally was disagreeing with an interpretation of the Resolu­
tion made by the ministerial committee chairman. The Texan 
bitterly corrected Pepper; "l do not disagree with someone 
who is not here. I disagree with the Senator from Florida, 
who is here, looking me in the eye. Is that plain? Does the 
Senator understand that?"90
The Pepper-Connally feud, simmering since Pepper's 
opposition to the Resolution in committee, exploded the next 
day in one last bitter exchange. Pepper said a Connally 
statement had "an element of correctness" in it. Connally 
indignantly said:
The Senator says "an element of correctness." I was 
either correct or not correct . . . .  The Senator from 
Texas wants other Senators to respect his integrity and 
his sincerity, that is all he wants. When the Senator 
from Florida says that . . .  he is insulting.91
Pepper had taken enough abuse for his relatively inoffensive
statements. He gave Connally a rare verbal lashing. Pepper
said :
First, when he had answered questions not more than fif­
teen minutes yesterday, he advised the Senate in a moment 
of noticeable impatience, that the debate had degenerated 
into a heckling; and he was the chairman of the committee
Q9ibid. 90ibid., p. 8733. 91ibid., p. 8735.
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who should have been the authentic voice telling his fel­
low Senators what this resolution meant . . . . He has 
been impatient with debate. He did not desire debate and 
now every time a remark is made here he seems to take it 
as a personal affront . . . .  I do not like to have the 
Senator not give me opportunity to correct my statement 
without making a spectacle of an offense upon the floor 
of the Senate. 92
The battle was over. It was an unnecessarily rude affair on 
both sides. The B2H2 group, particularly Pepper, had asked 
a number of unnecessary and obvious questions attempting to 
make Connally admit that terminology was vague. On the other 
hand, Connally's answers were usually brusque to the point of 
rudeness. The Texan's attacks on Ball and Hatch were unpro­
voked, and constituted poor strategy in view of the popular­
ity of the two Senators.
The scolding by Pepper changed Connally's attitude. 
For the next three days, he adopted a pose of bored indif­
ference to all speeches and read newspapers in the Senate 
chamber. His guise of indifference merely concealed frustra­
tion. The guise was broken twice.
First, he upbraided the Senate for delay. Secretary 
Hull was in Moscow at a Foreign Ministers conference and Con­
nally felt that passage of the resolution would aid Hull.
He worried that "while that conference is under way, we are
92lbid., p. 8736.
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here wrangling over whether an 'an' should be Inserted some­
where in the Resolution and whether 'organization' and 'au­
thority' are of equal dignity."93 Later in the week, the 
Texan dropped his indifferent pose again when his sincerity 
toward international cooperation was questioned. Connally, 
remembering that Ball, Burton, Maybank, Kilgore and Ferguson 
were freshman senators, reminded the Senate of his record.
Those have been my views for twenty-five years or longer. 
I am not a new convert . . . .  I have surrendered noth­
ing of principle. I may have surrendered phraseology.
Are the Senators so afraid . . . that they must instruct 
. . .  in minutiae? Must we tell . . . where to put a 
comma and where to put a period?9^
During the last week Connally ceased to pretend in­
difference and became a long-suffering martyr striving for 
action. Every day of the last week he asked for debate re­
strictions which forced the BgHg Senators to object, a prac­
tice they preferred not to employ because of the accepted 
practice of Senatorial courtesy and the sure knowledge that 
Connally would retaliate in some future debate.
The Texan emphasized the stalling tactics of the lib­
eral bloc and the overall lack of genuine interest in pro­
longing debate. He again complained that the group "prodded 
and harassed" the Foreign Relations Committee and then delayed
93ibid., p. 8804. 94ibid., p. 8858.
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debate. Connally reported the difficulty in obtaining a quo­
rum. There were twenty-nine calls during the fourteen-day 
debate.
Connally made pointed references to the obvious fact 
that the senators were not working. Of Danaher, an old foe, 
he said : "The Senator cannot explain jhis amendment very
well if he is going to stay in an adjoining room."95 Later, 
Connally said he was "not responsible for the fact . . . that 
debate has been going along with empty benches for days. I 
have no power to compel Senators to attend . . . . " 9 6  Fin­
ally, he lectured the old isolationist Shlpstead: "It has
been said that he wishes to speak for about an hour. He can­
not speak in his office. He must speak here."97
Connally received assistance in his battle for speed 
when the Foreign Ministers signed the Moscow Pact on November 
1, 19 4 3. Article four of the Pact called for establishment 
of a "general international organization." Fast Senate ac­
tion became necessary if the United States wished to present 





On November 3rd, in an effort to expedite passage of 
the resolution, Connally submitted two amending paragraphs. 
The amendments provided :
(1) That the Senate recognize the necessity of there be­
ing established at the earliest practicable date a 
general international organization, based on the prin­
ciple of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving 
states and open to membership by all such states, 
large and small, for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.
(2) That, pursuant to the Constitution of the United 
States, any treaty made to effect the purposes of 
this resolution, on behalf of the government of the 
United States with any other nation or any associa­
tion of nations, shall be made only by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate of the United States 
provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.98
The first paragraph, with the exception of the first three 
words, was the text of article four of the Moscow Pact and 
obviously was included to satisfy the BgHg adherents. The 
second paragraph was added to satisfy conservative senators 
that passage of the resolution did not constitute their prior
"consent" to a future treaty.
On November 5, 1943, with the two amendments. Senate 
Resolution 192 passed, eighty-five to five. The five oppo­
nents were the last of the isolationists— Johnson, Langer, 




The "great debate" became a quibble. The failure of 
debate to materialize was probably attributable to the Admin­
istration's (and Connally's) analysis of the expected opposi­
tion to a postwar resolution. Connally wanted a big major­
ity and little debate because he feared the Isolationists 
with their antl-Allles propaganda. To achieve his twofold 
objective, Connally's strategy was to speak little (and then 
generally), avoid discussion and yet pass a resolution which 
later could be taken as a mandate for membership In a future 
International organization.
Opposition came. Instead, from Internationalist sena­
tors. This unexpected obstacle undoubtedly contributed to 
Connally's truculence In the first hours of debate. It must 
have been difficult for the long-time advocate of Interna­
tional organization to discover himself suddenly defending a 
resolution accused of a lack of teeth. Connally chose to as­
sume that the resolution's general wording was wise and proper. 
As the Senate prepared to vote, Connally said: "l leave It to
the judgment of the future as to whether. In view of the de­
velopments and the situation, the course of the committee was 
not a wise one, and justified and vindicated by events."99
99ibld., p. 9221.
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Later, Connally chose to salve the wounds opened by 
the rather crude debate. He thanked the Foreign Relations 
Committee in general and Senators George, Elbert Thomas, 
Barkley, Gillette, Vandenberg, White and McNary in particu­
lar. The latter senators had served on a sub-committee with 
Connally.
Wallace White replied:
My observation is that a committee never rises above its 
chairman. [ÇonnallÿJ. . . from the very beginning of 
the controversy and of this study, has manifested zeal, 
patience, and tolerance for the opinions of others. In 
the parliamentary sense he managed the progress of the 
Resolution with infinite skill, and he spoke in its be­
half with that eloquence which always distinguishes 
him.100
Connally's summation before the vote was probably 
correct. The resolution drafted by the committee was ade­
quate. In November, 1943, blueprints for an international 
organization could not have been drawn. The Senate's task 
was to erase the record of isolation to which it had been 
committed for twenty-four years. The resolution accomplished
that purpose. Connally had said: "In foreign relations it
is of the highest importance that our country present a united 
front."101 Senate Resolution 192 was the landmark of a bi­
partisan foreign policy.
lOOlbid., p. 9313.
IOIas cited in Beverly Smith, "The Senator Loves a 
Fight," The Saturday Evening Post, 223 (July 1, 1950), 72.
CHAPTER V
THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER RATIFICATION DEBATE, 19^5
The Audience for the Charter Debate
The United States Constitution states: "He [the
President] shall have power, by and with the advice and con­
sent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of 
the Senators present concur.
The Senate and treaty ratification.—  When the Senate 
rejected the League of Nations at the close of World War I, 
it solidified its image as an obstructionist body. Former 
United States Attorney General Wickersham said that "a body 
of ninety-six men of such diverse characteristics and opin­
ions as members of the Senate is almost hopeless as an exe­
cutive force but it is ideal for the purposes of obstruc­
tion, and John Hay wrote: "A treaty entering the Senate
is like a bull going into the arena. No one can say Just
lu.S., Constitution, Art. 2, Sec. 2.
2as cited in Kenneth W. Colegrove, The American Sen­




how or when the final blow will fall. But one thing is cer­
tain. It will never leave the arena a l i v e . I n  fact, how­
ever, the Senate is not a "graveyard of treaties." About 
two-thirds of treaties negotiated between the President and 
foreign powers have been accepted by the Senate.
Senator Connally was a strong defender of the Sen­
ate's role of "advice and consent." He felt that the Senate 
rule which required a two-thirds vote for treaty ratification 
was essential to a stable foreign policy, and he fought all 
attempts to abolish it. Senator Gillette said, and Connally 
agreed, that "to make treaties subject to the ratification 
of . . . both [the House and the Senat0 . . . would almost 
assuredly project those treaties into turmoil and the tender 
mercies of a political campaign."^ And despite a resolution 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee proposing that treaties 
be ratified by a simple majority of both the House and Senate, 
both Connally and Vandenberg reminded delegates at San Fran­
cisco that the Senate had the final word in United States 
ratification of the United Nations Charter.
The seventy-ninth Senate.—  Isolationists— Wheeler, 
Johnson, Nye, La Follette, Taft and Vandenberg— suffered a
3as cited in ibid., p. 9.
^As cited in ibid., p. 22.
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loss In prestige when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.
But the isolationist senators had not abandoned the hope of 
limiting active United States participation in an interna­
tional organization. They expected a strong public reaction 
away from internationalism at the end of World War II. But 
in November, 1944, with the election of the seventy-ninth 
Senate, the voters revealed strong internationalist sympa­
thies by defeating most isolationist candidates. Nye, Reyn­
olds, Danaher, Clark of Missouri, Worth Clark of Idaho, Davis 
of Pennsylvania and Rufus Holman of Oregon were replaced by 
men who pledged United States cooperation in postwar affairs.5 
The only isolationists who won re-election, both more narrowly 
than expected, were Alexander Wiley and Charles Tobey. The 
voters expected the new senators to ratify a postwar coopera­
tion treaty.
Homer E. Capehart of Indiana was a farmer, a radio- 
phono-television manufacturer and a Republican conservative.6
Forrest C. Donnell of Missouri was an isolationist 
who had defeated the isolationist Bennett Clark. Connally 
called Donnell "the man with the P.B.I. intellect. He probes
5"The New Senate," Time, 44 (November 13, 1944), 21.
^Allen Drury, A Senate Journal 1943-1945 (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 485.
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into these matters and imagines 'boogers' in every bush."?
J. William Pulbright of Arkansas was thirty-nine 
years old, a former Rhodes scholar, former president of the 
University of Arkansas and author of the Pulbright Resolution 
for postwar peace.®
Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa was an able, popular 
ex-governor with international l e a n i n g s . 9
Clyde R. Hoey of North Carolina, sixty-seven, with a 
cutaway coat, bow tie and flowing hair, was a sensible man 
of quiet and obvious ability and an internationalist.10
Brien McMahon of Connecticut, a former United States 
Assistant Attorney General, had defeated the isolationist 
Danaher. Connally reported that he had "at all times found 
him [McMahon] to be honorable and able, and possessing a fine 
conception of public service."H
Warren G. Magnuson of Washington was a "1,000# New 
Dealer," and a liberal veteran of four years in the House of 
Representatives.1^
? "Texas Tom in the Bush," Time, 55 (June 3, 1950), 16. 
^Drury, p. 224.
^Time, 44 (November 13  ̂ 1944), 21. lOorury, p. 326.
llu.S., Congressional Record, 8lst Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1950, 96, Part 11, 15513.
12Drury, p. 326.
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Wayne Morse of Oregon was a former speech teacher, 
former dean of the University of Oregon law school and former 
public member of the War Labor Board. He promised to be a 
liberal Republican.13
Glen J. Taylor of Idaho had defeated the Isolationist 
Clark. The former manager of a dramatic stock company, he 
was a liberal who won In his third political campaign.1^ 
Taylor's liberal leanings often led him to trouble. Connally 
once answered him by saying that Taylor dealt In "speculation 
on which I do not dare to venture an opinion, because the 
Senator Is so much better advised than I am as to what the 
Communists have In mind."15
Milton R. Young of North Dakota, appointed to serve 
John Moses' term, quiet, decent, diligent, was typified as a
"little right of center."IG
Connally'3 position In the seventy-ninth Senate.—
In the period from November, 1943, to July, 1945, Senator 
Connally emerged as the leading Administration spokesman on 
foreign policy In the Senate. He believed the Senate to be
13lbld., p. 322. I4ibld., p. 484.
15u.s., Congressional Record, Both Cong., 2nd Sess., 
1948, 94, Part 2, 2384.
l6"Majorlty Pared," Time, 45 (March 19, 1945), 18.
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an Important segment of the foreign policy team. In March, 
1944, when Roosevelt indicated that the Senate might be by­
passed in the formulation of a peace treaty, Connally de­
fended the right of senators to be heard. However, he viewed 
the senators' role in treaty making in literal terms of "ad­
vice and consent," not in terms of leadership, and he was 
criticized by some because his chairmanship of the Foreign 
Relations Committee had not "caught the vision of the way 
great Senate debate might inform and inspire the nation."17 
In February, 1945, Roosevelt asked Connally to serve 
as a member of the United States delegation at the United 
Nations Conference in San Francisco. Connally discussed with 
the President the desirability of sending a bipartisan dele­
gation. Since the Charter had to be passed as a treaty. Re­
publican support was necessary to achieve a two-thirds major­
ity. Upon the appointment of Republicans Vandenberg, Charles 
Eaton and Harold Stassen, Connally said:
The President recognized the functions of the Senate and 
his action indicates his desire to have the utmost coop­
eration . . . .  I feel that the members of the Senate 
designated by the President as members of the delegation 
to the United Nations Conference will cooperate with the 
Executive Department in striving to secure the best pos­
sible organization for world peace and security.I8
17"The Senate and the Peace," Time, 43 (March 13, 
1944), 1 6.
l^The New York Times, February 14, 1945, p. 8.
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Connally's personal prestige with colleagues was at 
its apex during the period of Charter ratification. A fel­
low Southern senator, Theodore Bilbo, said: "This body was
represented [at San Prancisc<TJ by one of the most intellec­
tual and keenest brains on the floor of the Senate, a man 
whose patriotism has never been questioned."19
Before he left the Senate, the isolationist James 
Davis of Pennsylvania said: "In these trying times . . .
[ConnallyJ . . . has approached his tasks . . . with compe­
tence and determination. He has rendered a magnificent and 
unselfish service to the people."^0
The freshman senator, Pulbright, said: "l wish to
pay tribute to the wisdom and foresight with which . . . 
[Connally] . . .  so ably assisted by the members of his com­
mittee has laid the background for the adoption of this 
Charter."21 Pulbright later wrote that "the Senator was ex­
tremely effective in extemporaneous debate . . . with a great 
talent for attracting the attention of the Senators . . . .
19u.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1945, 91, Part 6, ÔI5 8.
20lbid., 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1944, 90, Part 7,
9 7 1 5.
2llbid., 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 91, Part 6,
7 9 6 2.
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He was one of the most colorful characters I have known."22
Pepper, often a critic, said Connally "has carried on 
with patience, consideration and generosity to all. He en­
joys the esteem and respect of the Members of the Senate."23 
Another freshman, Saltonstall, wrote;
As a whole, I liked Tom Connally and generally listened 
to him . . . particularly because he was the spokesman 
for the Administration on vitally important foreign policy 
questions. He was also very courteous to people who he 
respected . . . and he was always very friendly to me on 
and off the floor.2^
Connally had the respect of the isolationists. Ship­
stead of Minnesota said: "He is a great orator. He is a
great statesman. I am very fond of him . . . .  While we may
disagree, I know that he is a great patriot . . . and that he
is very conscientious in his concern for the United States."25 
Vandenberg, upon his return from San Francisco, said:
I want also to pay my particular tribute of affection and 
appreciation (to Connallÿ] . . . .  Without the faintest 
hint of partisanship at any time, he made it constantly
22Letter from Hon. J. William Pulbright, United 
States Senator from Arkansas, September 1, 1964.
23u.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1945, 91, Part 3, 3485.
24Letter from Hon. Leverett Saltonstall, United 
States Senator from Massachusetts, September 11, 1964.
25U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess,, 
1944, 90, Part 5, 6179.
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possible for each one of us representing the minority to 
play our full role in these deliberations. He carried 
some of the heaviest burdens of the conference with pa­
tience, fidelity and imminent success. He was a tower 
of strength to this great undertaking in every respect of 
its labors. He has put the nation greatly in his debt.26
This statement, from the leading member of the opposition
party, may have influenced greatly the Republican senators’
acceptance of Connally.
The Road to Internationalism
The United States Senate moved toward international 
cooperation with passage of the Connally Resolution in No­
vember, 1 9 4 3.
The "committee of eight."—  On March 22, 1944, Secre­
tary of State Hull appeared before the Senate Foreign Rela­
tions Committee and expressed a desire to work closely with 
a Senate sub-committee on the steps needed to establish a 
specific international organization. Connally, departing 
from the usual committee assignment method, which allocated 
a majority of seats to the majority party, chose a "commit­
tee of eight," composed of four Democrats— George, Barkley, 
Gillette and himself— and four Republicans— Austin, La Fol­
lette, Vandenberg and White.27 Connally, by his choice of a
26ibid., 7 9th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, 91, Part 5, 6981.
27Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, as told to 
Alfred Steinberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1954), p. I6 5.
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bipartisan committee, got the opposition to agree with Impor­
tant principles of postwar cooperation. The Republicans on 
the "committee of eight" Influenced their party colleagues 
In the Senate; thus the committee served to eliminate much 
partisan debate, which otherwise would have been Inevitable, 
on a postwar organization.
Dumbarton Oaks.—  In an atmosphere of working blpar- 
tlsanlsm between the Senate and the Executive, a once-delayed 
world security conference began In August, 1944, at Dumbarton 
Oaks, a sixteen acre estate In Washington's Georgetown sec­
tion. Connally emphasized In a pre-conference Interview that 
"we aim to have a League of Nations that Is a going concern 
before the end of the war," and he described Dumbarton Oaks 
as "exploratory talks on an almost clerical basis."^8
Thirty-nine delegates represented the United States, 
Great Britain and Russia at the meeting. The purpose of the 
conference, Washington's largest International meeting since 
the 1921 Disarmament Conference, was to prepare a memorandum 
on the possible creation of a World organization to preserve 
the peace. The United States plan, based on Franklin Roose­
velt's "Great Blueprint," called for a world assembly of all 
peace-loving nations, a world council dominated by the Big
28«The New York Times, August 17, 1944, p. 11.
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Pour with some representation to smaller nations, and a world 
court.29 The Conference concluded in late September with a 
plan, similar to the "Great Blueprint," which called for a 
world organization consisting of an assembly, a council and 
a court of international Justice.
The Mexico City Conference.—  In late February, 1945, 
Senate-State Department relations were maintained with the 
appointment of Senators Connally and Austin to represent the 
Senate at the Mexico City Conference. The Conference approved 
sixty-one resolutions, including the important adoption of the 
Act of Chapultepec. In Connally's words. Republican Austin 
and himself were instrumental in the Act's passage.30 Austin 
paid tribute to Connally's work during the Conference. He 
said :
The respect and honor for the judgment of . . .[Connally]
. . . which was entertained by our Latin American friends 
. . . paved the way for the ultimate acceptance of the 
very important amendments which finally were made in the 
Act of Chapultepec. 31
The Act converted the unilateral Monroe Doctrine of 
1823 into a multilateral hemispheric agreement and, with this
^9"At Dumbarton Oaks," Time, 44 (August 28, 1944), 14.
30connally, p. 270.
31u.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1945, 9 1, Part 2, 2024.
109
declaration, the United States and Latin America abandoned 
an ancient Pan-American principle; that American nations 
should not intervene, singly or together, in each others' ex­
ternal affairs.
The Crimea Conference.—  Earlier in February, the 
principles of Dumbarton Oaks were reaffirmed at an eight-day 
meeting of the Big Three leaders at Yalta. A disagreement 
over voting rights of the big members was solved. The United 
Nations Conference was to convene in San Francisco, April
25th.
The San Francisco Conference.—  Roosevelt did not 
live to see the beginning of the San Francisco Conference 
but the need for international cooperation was emphasized by 
President Truman. The former Senator assured old congres­
sional friends of his "intense desire" for cooperation. To 
Senators Connally and Vandenberg, the new chief executive 
said: "I'm expecting you men to do a good Job at San Fran­
cisco. I'm counting on you for that."32
Immediately before the opening of the conference, 
however, San Francisco became shrouded in pessimism. Some 
doubted that the conference would open on schedule and pre­
dictions for the ultimate success of the conference dwindled.
32"The Thirty-Second," Time, 45 (April 23, 1945), 22.
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News that the Russians were sending a second-rate delegation, 
and that the Big Three at Yalta had altered the voting rules 
of the proposed world assembly, was discouraging to small 
power delegations. The crowding of belated neutrals and un­
savory regimes, typified by Argentina, to San Francisco 
heightened the pessimistic mood.33
But the Conference began on time. The blg-power 
draft of a world charter was based on the premise that the 
method of maintaining peace was to let major powers make and 
administer rules with a minimum of Interference and assis­
tance from lesser powers. After three weeks of debate, the 
premise remained Intact but It had survived severe strain.
The Latin American bloc, with twenty conference votes, un­
animously demanded complete freedom from any checks or super­
vision by the Security Council. Connally and Vandenberg, 
aware of the Monroe Doctrine’s appeal to the Senate, agreed 
that some concession to the Latin bloc was necessary If the 
Charter was to be ratified.3^
Connally worked under a handicap at the Conference 
because In late April an Associated Press release, attributed 
to Connally, prematurely announced the surrender of Germany.
33"Too Soon," Time, 45 (April 9, 1945), 23.
34"peace," Time, 45 (May 21, 1945), 23.
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Whatever the cause, Connally was In the background during 
part of the San Francisco Conference. But near the end of 
the Conference, when the small powers fought for recognition 
by reorganizing the veto authority in the Security Council, 
Connally defended the blg-power position. Later, the small- 
power spokesman, Herbert Evatt of Australia, praised Connally 
for his eloquence in presenting the big-power stand.35
The Foreign Relations Committee hearings.—  The San 
Francisco Conference concluded with more agreement than disa­
greement, and Connally and Vandenberg returned to the Senate 
with the United Nations Charter. Connally estimated that 
Foreign Relations Committee hearings would begin in early 
July. They would be pushed "with the greatest dispatch," 
and he predicted fast action on the Senate floor, but he 
warned a reporter:
Don't get this wrong and give the impression that I pro­
pose to railroad this measure through the Senate. I wish 
the debate to be conducted with every opportunity for any­
one to speak who has legitimate cause. But what I do not 
wish to see is a session that will drag out through July 
and August in order to give every Senator a chance to 
talk indefinitely just to make an impression upon the 
folks back h o m e . 36
35The New York Times, June 15, 1945, p. 8. 
36ibid., June 28, 1945, p. 12.
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The hearings began and ended in five days. Repre­
sentatives of scores of national organizations, leaders of 
church, education and women's groups, leaders of the thinning 
ranks of isolationists came to the caucus room on the Senate 
Office Building's third floor. Very little substantial argu­
ment was made against the Charter. Charter opponents had no 
apparent strategy for concerted attack. Many powerful nation­
al organizations went on the committee record in support of 
the Charter. After five days, Connally halted the hearings 
and called for a vote. The Charter passed by a twenty-one 
to one vote. Johnson voted against approval and Shipstead 
did not vote.37 The Charter was unchanged by one reservation 
or one amendment. At a comparable point, the Senate had al­
tered the League of Nations Covenant by four reservations 
and thirty-eight amendments.
The Senate, Connally and the United Nations 
The Democratic majority in the Senate, fifty-five to 
forty-one, was a new low for Roosevelt's Administration. The 
Republican party was a full partner in the Senate and the Re­
publican minority could no longer protest for the record and 
leave policy-making to the New Deal. The strong minority was
37"Negative Test," Time, 46 (July 23, 1945), 22.
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forced to assume partial responsibility for policy and could 
no longer capitalize fully on Administration errors.
The senators quickly announced their international
sympathies. In January, under the direction of Pulbright and
H. Alexander Smith, the new senators wrote a public letter to
the President. The senators felt that the United States
should take an active role in an effective peace organization
if Great Britain and Russia were also willing to join. The
letter, approved by Senate leaders of both parties, was signed
by all freshmen senators.38 Connally praised the senators'
action. He said:
I feel sure that the action of these senators will be of 
very great help and will give impetus to what many of us 
have been undertaking to accomplish in the past . . . .
I regard it as particularly appropriate and particularly 
helpful that the new Senators have addressed to the Pre­
sident this great letter setting forth their views.39
But most important, shifts of principle occurred 
among the older senators. In January, during the first for­
eign policy debate of the session, Vandenberg, long an iso­
lationist, said that the United States must stop discussing 
and act to achieve collective security. The top Republican
38"The Freshmen Assist," Time, 45 (February 5> 1945),26.
^%.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1945, 9 1, Part 1, 467.
114
foreign policy spokesman offered a concrete solution pledging 
the use of force to keep Germany and Japan disarmed forever. 
The Administration was pleased, and Roosevelt invited Connally 
and the Foreign Relations sub-committee to the White House 
for conferences. Connally felt that Vandenberg, classified 
as "the most rabid of isolationists," labored hard and some­
what unsuccessfully in his speech to justify his change of 
heart. "Most of the issues mentioned by Vandenberg cannot be 
settled at the moment, but must wait the definitive treaty of 
peace," Connally stated.^1
Other pre-war isolationists also had changes of heart. 
In early June, Robert La Follette of Wisconsin, who was bit­
terly isolationist before Pearl Harbor, indicated support for 
a world organization that operated on majority rule and en­
tailed a partial sacrifice of national sovereignty by member 
nations.^2 Bushfield said that he would vote for a United 
Nations organization if the power of the American delegate 
were limited. A few senators, like Taft, wanted to limit
^®"Force Without Recourse," Time, 45 (January 22,
1945), 15.
"U.S. Hand Abroad Strengthened by Vandenberg's 
Call for Action," Newsweek, 25 (January 22, 1945), 36.
^2"Historic Test of Foreign Policy Holds Chief In­
terest of the Senate," Newsweek, 25 (June 25, 1945), 29.
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United States economic cooperation.^3
But Wheeler was a chief source of worry for supporters 
of an international peace organization. In January, he spoke 
for three hours against internationalism. Some sources felt 
his speech fell "flounder f l a t , b u t  in June, returning 
from a trip to European and Mediterranean theatres of war, 
the staunch isolation leader still thought that "it would be 
a mistake for the Senate to vote . . . for a United Nations 
organization . . . until after the peace conference has been
held."45
General Senate opposition to ratification of the Unit­
ed Nations Charter was gradually overcome. In February, 1945, 
The New Republic stated:
Applying past Senate tests to the Dumbarton Oaks formula 
a reasonable guess would be that there are now about 
fifty-five senators for ratification (forty-one Democrats, 
fourteen Republicans), twenty-one are doubtful (eleven 
Democrats, ten Republicans), and twenty are isolationists 
and opposed (five Democrats, fifteen R e p u b l i c a n s ) .46
43t .r .B., "Washington Notes," The New Republic, 113 
(July 16, 1945), 77.
44"This Above All," Time, 45 (January 29, 1945), 17.
45Newsweek, 25 (June 25, 1945), 29.
46t .R.B., "Washington Notes," The New Republic, 112 
(February 5, 1945), 174.
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In March, a New York newspaper, PM, polled the Senate asking: 
"Would you, on the basis of information now available, vote 
for United States entrance into the world security council to 
be established at the San Francisco Conferences?" Eighty- 
seven senators replied: forty-nine said unequivocally "yes";
four "probably yes"; none said "no"; thirty-four said "yes, 
with reservations." ^  concluded that the survey gave evi­
dence that the battle of the peace was not yet won.^?
However, when Connally and Vandenberg left the Senate 
in late April to attend the San Francisco Conference, the 
senators honored them with a standing demonstration of bi­
partisan approval. Connally, brushing tears from his eyes, 
was obviously moved deeply as he spoke of the solemnity of 
the conference. As he concluded, the line normally dividing 
Democrats from Republicans momentarily dissolved and the 
senators embraced Connally in a display of confidence and 
affection.^ A Senate reporter wrote:
Senators Connally and Vandenberg . . . showed how wise 
President Roosevelt was in naming these men as members 
of the American delegation. Their influence on their 
colleagues has been an important factor in developing
^7"Battle of the Peace," Newsweek, 25 (March 26,
1945), 46.
4&The New York Times, April 21, 1945, p. 1.
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the practical certainty that the Charter will be ratified 
without too much d e l a y . ^9
As he departed for San Francisco, Connally assured 
fellow senators that the American delegates would do their 
best to return with a document that would preserve interna­
tional peace. Connally emphasized two things; (1) San Fran­
cisco would be a non-partisan conference and (2) the princi­
ples of Dumbarton Oaks would be l i b e r a l i z e d . 50
In late June, as the treaty went to the Senate, Presi­
dent Truman’s wishes for speedy ratification were seconded by 
Majority Leader Barkley, who thought "it would be a splendid 
thing if the United States was first of the fifty United Na­
tions to ratify the charter."51 Minority Leader Wallace 
White of Maine joined Barkley in expressing hope that the 
Senate would pass the treaty before the summer recess. White 
declared :
Everything in the Charter has been a subject of study for 
a long time and we have known the objective ever since 
the introduction of the Connally Resolution. There would 
be a great advantage if the Senate moved with all proper 
celerity to consideration and ratification.52
^9"The Charter Goes to the Senate," The New Republic, 
113 (July 9, 1945), 3 5.
5 0"To the World," Time, 45 (April 30, 1945), 20.
5lNewsweek, 25 (June 25, 1945), 29.
52%bid.
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Senators who were expected to make an attack on the 
Charter denied such intentions. Wheeler declared that he 
would lead no "speakhead/* and Johnson, a prime force in the 
League of Nations battle, said that he might "possibly" vote 
aye.53 Senate reporters wrote that the only remaining ele­
ment of suspense was the length of debate. So successfully 
was groundwork laid for Senate approval of the Charter that 
pessimists predicted no more than fifteen negative votes.
Some observers predicted unanimous approval.
Connally hazarded a prediction that not more than ten 
senators would vote against the Charter in the final vote.
He said: "Those senators who believe we should tread our
path alone will vote against the Charter. But those who re­
alize that this can't be done, and that the United States 
cannot live in a cellophane wrapper will favor the charter."54
When the United States Senate received the Charter in 
late July, Washington observers saw evidence of a popular 
groundswell favoring international cooperation that would 
overcome all legislative opposition. Connally changed his 
prediction of ten opposition votes downward to no more than
53"Senate Rallies to World Charter in Historic Re­
versal of Attitude," Newsweek, 26 (July 9, 1945), 27.
5 4 % e New York Times, June 28, 1945, P. 12.
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six.55 On July 23> the second so-called "great debate" In 
the United States Senate over American participation in a 
world security league began. However it was not great, nor 
was it really a debate.
Connally's Speaking in Behalf of the Charter 
Connally's speaking during the Charter debate empha­
sized his thought that gaining acceptance in the Senate for 
the United Nations Charter would be the foremost achievement 
of his career. The Charter was a "great instrument in the 
history of the world . . .  in the field of international re­
lations."56 The principles of the Charter could "lead the 
nations of earth away from the cruel wages of battle into the 
ways of peace."57 For him, the issue was clear. He declared:
Senators who object to international cooperation for any 
purpose will vote "no." Those who prefer that we go 
alone will reject the charter. It is my sincere belief 
that those who believe in .cooperation with other nations 
in an effort to avert the horrors and miseries of war, 
to suppress aggression and conquest, and to enthrone the 
rule of law and reason and Justice in international re­
lations will vote to ratify the t r e a t y . 58
55jbid., July 15, 1945, P. 18.
56u.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1945, 91, Part 6, 7953.
57%bid., Part 5, p. 6878. 58ibld.
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Connally was a student of history. As a young Con­
gressman, he watched the Senate debate ratification of the 
League of Nations Covenant. He knew why ratification had 
failed in 1919, and he was determined that those reasons 
would not halt ratification in 19^5. In two major addresses 
to the Senate on June 28th and July 23rd, he was careful to 
reassure Senators that the errors of 1919 had been corrected.
Connally'3 June 28th Speech.—  In 1919, senators felt 
that Senate prestige was abused. Prior to the League debate, 
the senators were made to feel unimportant to the process of 
ratification. In 1945, Connally appealed to fellow senators' 
prids as he spoke of the life or death power which the Senate 
possesses in all treaty ratifications. He admitted that 
"the charter cannot have vitality, it cannot breathe, it can­
not act until ratified by the Senate . . . .  No treaty can 
attain the force of law for our people until it passes the 
scrutiny and receives the sanction of this b o d y . "59 He de­
veloped the prestige argument by inferring that the Senate 
vote would influence world acceptance of the Charter. He 
professed a "confident belief" that Senate ratification of 
the Charter would gain it "overwhelming approval by the United 
Nations."Go Connally appealed to senators of both parties to
59ibid., p. 6877. GOlbid., p. 6874.
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consider their "high and solemn r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . S e n a t e  
prestige and power had been recognized.
In 1919, the Republicans felt that they were over­
looked In treaty negotiations. In 19^5> Connally proved that 
the Charter was the work of all parties and all branches of 
government. "This time," Connally said, "the charter was 
not struck off by the brain of a single Individual."62 He 
was happy to report that there was "splendid unity and har­
mony "63 within the bipartisan delegation at San Francisco.
He assured the senators that the delegation received "in­
spiration and assistance" from all the advisors and consult­
ants and that "we had constantly sitting at our sides, ad­
mirals and generals from the Army and Navy, counseling with 
ug.”64 The Texan built a picture of a bipartisan, bl- 
departmental team that formulated a Charter, and he was rea­
sonably sure that no Republican vote would be lost because 
of partisan politics.
Having dealt with two errors that defeated the League 
of Nations, abused prestige and partlsanlsm, Connally Intro­
duced a factor that always Interests vote-seekers. In 1919, 
the American people, though favoring the League, kept their
Gllbld., p. 6877. p. 6874.
63ibld., p. 6877. 64ibid., p. 6876.
122
wishes relatively unknown. In 1945, the people spoke out 
loudly for Charter ratification. He was "confident that the 
people overwhelmingly support the new charter."^5 The impli­
cation was clear. Only a year earlier, the Senate had sev­
eral members who had voiced opposition to postwar cooperation. 
The voters had altered the Senate and expected the new Senate 
to act constructively toward the Charter. The argument was 
particularly appropriate for the freshmen senators.
During the month preceding debate, many Charter pro­
ponents strategically avoided discussing the power of the 
Charter. They discussed, rather, what the Charter could not 
do.^6 Connally also recognized in conclusion that "the rights 
and sovereignty of the United States are not imperiled."^7 
Connally did not develop this theme. As the Charter went to 
public hearings, he preferred to let senators draw their indi­
vidual interpretations.
Connally's July 23rd Speech.—  On July 23, as the 
Charter returned to the Senate, Connally returned to the 
themes he had introduced a month earlier. Building Senate 
prestige, the Texan indicated that he believed that "the fate
GSibid., p. 6875. ^^Time, 46 (July 23, 1945), 22.
^7u.s., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 
1945, Part 5, 6 8 7 8.
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of world peace" hinged on Senate action and he described the
picture of a powerful Senate and a watching world :
Ratification of the Charter by the Senate may well give 
a tremendous impulse to its ratification by the other 
nations of the earth. They know how the League of Na­
tions was slaughtered here on the floor. Can you not 
still see the blood on the floor? Can you not see upon 
the walls the marks of the conflict that raged here in 
the chamber where the League of Nations was done to
death?68
The Senate had the power of life or death over the treaty.
The picture was satisfying to senatorial egos.
Connally again reminded the Senate of the country's
bipartisan foreign policy. In defending Foreign Relations
Committee action, he said:
I do not recall that there was ever a time when partisan 
political considerations were entertained or advanced.
We took the position which we thought was the proper one 
and which we think the Senate position is, that in for­
eign relations there was no place for party politics or 
for the various activities along those lines, but that 
in our dealing with foreign nations we should present a 
united front.
The treaty was not the work of one party.
Connally introduced a third theme in the July 23rd
speech. In 1919, senators of both parties had felt they were
uninformed during formulation of the League Covenant. Connally
reminded the senators that this error was corrected in 19 4 5.
GGibid., Part 6, p. 7954. 69ibid., p. 7950.
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He gave the audience a complete review of the step-by-step
negotiations demonstrating that in the role of "advice" the
Senate was often consulted. Connally reviewed:
We jjbhe committee of eighlfj carried on consultations with 
Secretary Hull, with his staff, and through him, with the 
White House, over an extended period of time. I wish to 
say that the State Department in those consultations gave
us access to all the documents which were available, and 
kept us advised as to all the angles and aspects of the 
foreign situation.
The bipartisan committee, and through it the Senate, had 
shared deliberations in United States foreign policy. Con­
nally examined Dumbarton Oaks :
The widest publicity was given to the sessions. They 
were held in Washington, and covered a period of several 
weeks . . . .  Through that medium the public and the 
Senate were made generally acquainted with the objectives 
which were in mind.71
The hearings on the completed Charter were also open to the 
senators. Connally reminded the audience that his committee 
had "arranged for printing and publication of the hearings, 
and undertook each morning to place in the office of each 
Senator copies of the hearings which were held on the day 
previous."72 No senator could vote against the Charter be­




Connally reminded the senators of American public 
opinion. He professed minor interest in polls "since the 
Literary Digest passed out of existence . . . but still the 
result of the 0lallu£) poll is an indication of the over­
whelming sentiment of the American people in favor of the 
ratification of the treaty.
But with assurance that the Charter had a large safe
vote, the Texan emphasized for the first time that the United
States might be committed to obligations under the treaty.
In answer to a question advanced after the conclusion of his
prepared speech, he said:
I have faith in the Senate. I believe that if we adopt 
the Charter and make a promise to furnish troops accord­
ing to these agreements the United States Senate, whether 
it be Republican or Democratic, will rise to its duty and 
respond to its obligations, and by a two-thirds majority 
will keep the faith which we have pledged to the other na­
tions of the world and live up to the obligations which 
we have assumed.
Connally's prepared speeches were designed to reinforce 
a friendly Senate attitude toward the Charter. The Texan 
wasted no time refuting the Charter's few opponents. The iso­
lationists— Langer, Shipstead, Wheeler and Johnson— were ig­
nored. Connally reminded veteran senators that the errors of 
1919 had not been repeated in 1945. He reminded the freshmen
?3lbid., p. 7951. 74ibid., p. 7990.
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senators that most of them were there because the public de­
sired United States participation in a postwar union. He re­
minded all senators that world action waited on their vote. 
The first speech introduced the Charter to the public. The 
second opened the Charter to debate by the Senate. In both 
cases ; Connally expected overwhelming approval.
Connally's speaking during floor debate.-- The Con­
nally of 1945 presented a strong contrast to the Connally of 
1 9 4 3. Self-assured, confident of Charter passage, satisfied 
with his role in Charter formulation, the Texan was unlike 
the hesitant leader of the Connally Resolution debate. The 
rather frantic, self-conscious, petulant attitude was gone.
He was an international figure and he perpetuated that image 
throughout the short debate.
He indicated only twice that he desired speed in pas­
sage of the Charter. On June 28th, he expressed hope that 
"the Senate will proceed to the consideration of the treaty 
at the earliest possible moment,"75 and later, on July 23rd, 
after debate had begun, he hoped that senators would be ready 
to speak because "the Senate cannot afford to wait on Sena­
tors to prepare s p e e c h e s . "76
75ibid., Part 5, p. 6877. 76ibid., Part 6, p. 7959.
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Connally engaged In personalities with a fellow sena­
tor only once during the five-day debate. After a few hot 
words with Senator Scott Lucas, Connally said: "I certainly
am unable to fathom the Senator from Illinois. Anything I 
say which is kind about him he questions, and with respect 
to other things I say, he seems to think I am reflecting on 
him. I have no such idea."77
Connally made maximum use of his association with the 
writing of the Charter in San Francisco. On June 28th, after 
paying tribute to the American delegation, particularly Van- 
denberg, he had added: "Of course, I also took part in the
Conference from time to t i m e . "78 Connally used this prestige
device to answer questions and advance agreement during the 
debate. He told McKellar that "you would have been stirred,
I am sure, had you been on the steering committee represent­
ing all fifty of the nations, when the roll was called and 
every nation responded ' y e a . '"79 "we heard it constantly at 
San Francisco"®® that Charter ratification would inspire the 
world to peace. He reassured Taft of the correctness of an 
interpretation because "l have had close contact with this
77ibid., p. 8029. 78ibid., Part 5. P. 6877.
79ibid.. Part 6 , p. 7954. ®Qlbid.
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question because I happened to be a member of the committee 
which dealt with the subject of the veto."8l
Twice more the Texan interrupted floor debate to
serve as an interpreting authority. Once, Connally said:
"As members of the American delegation, the Senator from
Michigan and I advanced the word Qi wording in the Charte^
and it immediately received confirmation and adoption by the
C o n f e r e n c e . "82 Again, in elaborating upon an interpretation,
he utilized his personal experience;
I had the honor of being a member of the committee of the 
San Francisco Conference which dealt with the Security 
Council. I gave a great deal of attention to trying to 
preserve the strength, dignity and influence of the Se­
curity Council because I regarded it as being one of the 
cardinal agencies of influences of the entire organiza­
tion.83
Connally used his prestige as a member of the delegation to 
great advantage during the Charter debate.
Connally had predicted that not more than six sena­
tors would reject the Charter. On July 28, 1945, the Senate 
ratified the United Nations Charter by a vote of eighty-nine 
to two. Langer and Shipstead voted against United States 
participation.®^ Old Hiram Johnson, the League foe, lay
8l%bid., p. 8017. 82ibid,, p. 8063.
83ibid., p. 8114. 84xbid., p. 8158.
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dying at Bethesda Naval Hospital, unable to vote his protest 
against United States entry Into an International peace or­
ganization.
Aftermath
The "Great Debate” was over. There was no debate. 
Quorum calls were used as time killers when no speaker was 
prepared to speak on the Charter. Once, the Charter was laid 
aside while Harley Kilgore, Edwin Johnson and Pepper spoke 
at length on a bill to establish a national research founda­
tion.
Against a background of apparent disinterest, Con­
nally did his job as Charter advocate adequately. He could 
not adapt to meet opponents’ arguments because there were no 
active opponents. Thus, he adapted to meet arguments that 
had been used In the old League fight. Unable to find living 
opponents, he fought the ghosts of Henry Cabot Lodge and 
William Borah. He reminded senators of their power and re­
sponsibility, of their share In the writing of the Charter, 
and of the need for a non-partisan expression of Internation­
alism.
To the younger senators, aware that all had expressed 
Internationalist sympathies, he directed responsibility for 
fulfilling the wishes of the American public.
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He gave the minority party full credit for its ef­
forts and studiously avoided any clashes with old enemies. 
Even a cynical three-hour diatribe by Wheeler, his old oppo­
nent of the Neutrality battle, failed to draw comment. Con­
nally gave no senator the opportunity to use personal ani­
mosity as an excuse for vetoing the Charter.
Furthermore, realizing that his own popularity was 
unusually high, he drew repeatedly from personal experience 
to explain the Charter. In this aura of good feeling, no 
senator challenged him personally, as they had in the Reso­
lution debate.
The Texan enjoyed the debate. He simply listened to 
speakers, occasionally interpreted Charter wording and won 
his decision. A few minimized his role in debate, but they 
forgot that only a year earlier there were rumors that Roose­
velt might bypass the Senate completely to Join a postwar 
organization. Connally had then said that the Senate would 
not be bypassed. The Senator kept his word.
CHAPTER VI
THE MUTUAL AID PROGRAM DEBATE, 1949
On July 5, 1949, the eighty-first Senate convened in 
an old room, last occupied by the Senate in 1859, while the 
regular Senate chamber underwent needed repairs. The old, 
semi-circular chamber, where the Monroe Doctrine was first 
pronounced, served as the arena for debate over ratification 
of the North Atlantic Treaty and implementation of the Mutual 
Aid Program.
The Eighty-First Senate 
The "new" Senate chamber.—  Conditions were crowded. 
There were no galleries. Democratic senators were assigned 
chairs on the left of the chamber, and Republican senators 
were assigned chairs on the right. Because of limited space, 
individual desks for all senators were not placed in the 
chamber and, except for the majority and minority leaders, 
no senator was assigned a desk or a particular chair. Sena­
tors were seated on a "first come, first served" basis, with 
the chairs wedged uncomfortably close together. Deprived of
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desks, most speakers addressed their colleagues from the front 
of the room. Two desks were placed on each side of the cham­
ber and these were used by senators who desired to speak from 
a prepared manuscript. 1
Vice President Barkley testified to one improvement 
over the regular chamber: "The chair would like to say that
it is obvious that the acoustics of the chamber are very ex­
cellent . . . .  The chair can hear even a whisper coming 
from any point in this chamber.
Members of the eighty-first Senate.—  The Senate that 
convened in January, 1949, was only vaguely similar to the 
Senate that had adjourned in late 1945. Forty-three men in 
the chamber in 1949 were not senators in 1945.
Many Democrats were upset in the election of November, 
1946. The Democrats were a fifty-five to forty-one majority 
when the Senate ratified the United Nations Charter, but in 
January, 194?, the Republicans held a fifty-one to forty-five 
majority. The Republicans had won twelve new Senate seats 
and lost only two. Among the Democrats caught in the flood 
of Republican ballots were David Walsh of Massachusetts,
Ij.S., Congressional Record, 8lst Cong., 1st Sess.,
1949, 95, Part 7, 8809.
Zibid.
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Guffey of Pennsylvania, Tunnel1 of Delaware, Hoffman of Ohio, 
Murdock of Utah and Mitchell of Washington,3 Nineteen mem­
bers of the eighty-first Senate were first elected in 1946.
Raymond Baldwin of Connecticut was a three-term Re­
publican governor who classified himself as "an international 
Willkieite."4
John W. Bricker of Ohio was a conservative, a three- 
term governor who had been the Republican Vice Presidential 
nominee in 1944.5
Ralph Flanders of Vermont was a Republican, liberal- 
minded businessman, who had the support of the labor vote in 
Vermont.&
William Jenner of Indiana was thirty-eight, an air 
force veteran and the leader of a Midwestern bloc of conserva­
tive Republicans.?
James P. Kern of Missouri was an oil company lawyer, 
an isolationist and a crusader against Kansas City boss Tom
Pendergast.8
3"An Era Begins," Newsweek, 28 (November 18, 1946), 33. 
4"The Standouts," Newsweek, 28 (November 18, 1946), 37. 
5lbid.
G"New Paces in the Senate," Time, 48 (November 18,
1946), 25.
?Ibid. QNewBweek, 28 (November 18, 1946), 37.
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Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin was a thirty-six year- 
old Republican, an ex-marine aviation intelligence o f f i c e r . 9 
George Malone of Nevada, Republican, was an avid 
booster of the industrial future of the West, an engineer and 
the publisher of the encyclopedic Western Economic Empire.10 
A. Willis Robertson of Virginia was a conservative 
Democrat, a veteran Congressman and a disciple of economy- 
minded Harry Flood Byrd.H
John J. Sparkman of Alabama was the former Democratic
whip of the House of Representatives.12
Arthur Watkins of Utah was a gray-haired isolationist 
lawyer who ran two weekly newspapers as a h o b b y . 13
William Knowland of California had been appointed in 
1945 to serve the unfinished term of the late Hiram Johnson. 
Knowland and Connally had many battles over the Par Eastern 
policy of the Administration. Connally said of Knowland:
"l have observed him here in the Senate . . . .  [Progress 
could be mad^ if the Senator and his group would exercise
^Time, 48 (November 10, 1946), 2 5 .
IQwewsweek, 28 (November 1 8, 1946), 37.
llTime, 48 (November I8 , 1946), 25.
1 2 j b i d .  1 3 l b i d .
135
the same ingenuity in getting action which they exhibit in 
trying to embarrass s o m e o n e . "l4
But the members of the Eightieth Congress were con­
demned by the President and the public in November, 1948,
The Democrats, regaining control of the Senate, did not lose 
a single seat already held and won nine Republican seats.
The Democratic majority was fifty-four to forty-two. Thir­
teen members of the eighty-first Senate were elected for the 
first time in 1948.
Clinton P. Anderson of New Mexico was a former Secre­
tary of Agriculture in the Truman Cabinet. He had replaced 
Carl Hatch, who had announced his retirement. As Connally 
paid tribute to Hatch, he welcomed Anderson: "l may say, of
course, we are all pleased to have him here with us. We are 
sure he will have a career of usefulness and efficiency."15
Virgil Chapman of Kentucky was a Democrat with twenty- 
one years experience in the House of Representatives.l6 Con­
nally "knew him intimately and was associated with him in 
very cordial relationships. Added to his ability, his
l^U.S., Congressional Record, 8lst Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, 95, Part 2, 1635.
15ibid., Part 1, p. 314.
l6"The New Senate," Newsweek, 32 (November 8, 1948),
9.
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capacity and his learning, he had an outstanding trait of 
courage."1?
Paul Douglas of Illinois, a liberal Democrat, was a 
former economics professor at the University of Chicago.
Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota was a Democratic New- 
Dealer, a former mayor of Minneapolis, sparkplug of the newly- 
formed liberal Americans for Democratic Action and a civil 
rights leader. 19
Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas was a Roosevelt New-Dealer 
who had served six terms In the House of Representatives.20 
Estes Kefauver of Tennessee was a liberal Southern 
Democrat and a veteran of five terms In the House of Repre­
sentatives.21
Robert Kerr of Oklahoma was a wealthy oil man, an ex­
governor who had served as the keynote speaker at the Demo­
cratic Convention In 1944.22
ITu.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 
1 95 1, 97, Part 2, 2123.
iSNewsweek, 32 (November 8, 1948), 9.
19lbld.
20"Educatlon of a Senator," Time, 53 (January I7,
1949), 13.
21"Senate Sweep," Time, 52 (November 8, 1948), 23. 
22}jewsweek, 32 (November 8, 1948), 9.
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Russell Long of Louisiana, only thirty, was the Sen­
ate's youngest member and the son of the former "Kingfish”
of Louisiana. 23
Three new senators— Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachu­
setts, Guy Gillette of Iowa and Matthew Neely of West Vir­
ginia— had formerly served in the Senate prior to the Mutual 
Aid Program debate. Pour additional changes were made in the 
Senate before September. Karl Mundt of South Dakota, a former 
college debate coach and veteran of the House of Representa­
tives, was named to replace the late Harlan Bushfield. Gar­
rett L. Withers of Kentucky, an ex-school teacher, was ap­
pointed to the seat vacated by newly-elected Vice President 
Alben B a r k l e y . I n  April, Prank P. Graham of North Caro­
lina, President of the University of North Carolina and former 
President of the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies, was 
appointed to the seat of the late J. Melville Broughton.^5 
The formation of the eighty-first Senate was completed with 
the appointment of John Poster Dulles of New York, top-flight 
international lawyer, official Republican party foreign policy
23"Ringing in the New," Time, 53 (January 10, 1949),
1 3 .
24"Reiuctant Senator," Newsweek, 33 (January 24,
1949) ,  23 .
^5"The Graham Appointment," Newsweek, 33 (April 4,
1949), 25.
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advisor and member of the United States delegation to the 
United Nations, to the seat vacated by the ailing Robert Wag­
n e r .  26 The appointment of Republican Dulles to Democrat 
Wagner's post left the Democrats a fifty-three to forty-three 
voting margin.
Connally*3 place In the eighty-first Senate.—  What 
was Connally's role in the eighty-first Senate? The Demo­
cratic victory had returned him to the chairmanship of the 
Foreign Relations Committee. Connally seemingly retained the 
same view of the committee's function that he had held during 
his earlier chairmanship. But Connally's second tenure as 
Foreign Relations Committee Chairman was not as happy as his 
first. James Heston, Washington correspondent for the New 
York Times, summarized the situation;
In Mr. Connally's second term as Chairman the theory that 
the Foreign Relations Committee is the most orderly and 
sedate committee is rapidly vanishing. In 19^3 he took 
the lead . . . for a postwar international security or­
ganization and was at that time one of the most effective 
debaters in the upper chamber. Ever since he resumed the 
Chairmanship of the committee at the beginning of this 
year, however, he has been a center of controversy . . . . 
In the debate on the North Atlantic Treaty the feeling 
here is that Senator Connally has not always encouraged 
incisive constructive debate.27
26"Freshman with a Reputation," Time, 5^ (July l8 , 
1949), 17.
27The New York Times, May 10, 1949, P. 3.
139
Connally was not well. Suffering from a nervous dis­
order, popularly termed shingles, he was more irascible than 
usual. On several occasions he clashed with Homer Ferguson 
and declared publicly that "the only way the Senator can pos­
sibly embarrass me is by agreeing with m e . ”28
He charged the freshman Kefauver with missing com­
mittee meetings to go "out chasing crapshooters s o m e w h e r e ”29 
and had numerous arguments with Knowland over the Administra­
tion policy in China.
The Texan's two chief antagonists during the treaty 
and arms debates were Watkins, a man "who has had his south­
bound parts worn off by arguments he cannot meet,”30 and 
Forrest Donnell. During treaty hearings, Connally invited 
them to sit with the committee to hear testimony. The two 
accepted but accused Connally of being very slow about ex­
tending an invitation to them. Connally in turn cried out: 
"Everyone knows that you are not for the treaty and are here 
to impede it, to obstruct it, and to filibuster . . . . " 3 1
28as cited in Beverly Smith, "The Senator Loves a 
Fight," The Saturday Evening Post, 223 (July 1, 1950)j 19.
29The New York Times, February 17, 1950, p. 4.
3Qlbid., February 8 , 1952, p. 1.
31lbid., April 28, 19^9, p. 13.
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Watkins created confusion by excessive badgering of 
witnesses. After being halted on one occasion by Connally, 
Watkins protested that he was being "chided" and Connally 
retorted, "I am not complaining about your trying to find 
out what the witnesses think, but the Senator spends a great 
deal of time explaining his own views." Watkins stalked from 
the r o o m , 32 connally reported later that "l had to do it.
He was wantin' us to death."33
However, Connally, at seventy-three, was still per­
sonally liked and respected by the majority of his colleagues.
Clinton P. Anderson of New Mexico remembered that Con­
nally was an "effective speaker" with "a very sharp tongue for 
anyone who crossed him." Anderson indicated that he "used" 
Connally in his 1928 campaign for the House of Representa­
tives and "thought he was most effective and a very interest­
ing speaker."34
John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, who served an in­
terim term in the Senate in 1947-48, found Connally "always
32ibid., May 10, 1949, p. 3-
33Tom Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, as told to 
Alfred Steinberg (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company,
1954), p. 335.
3^Letter from Hon. Clinton P. Anderson, United States 
Senator from New Mexico, August 31, 1964.
I4l
ready In debate, very articulate, and . . , quite caustic 
and biting." Cooper thought Connally's "appearance made him 
an impressive figure and contributed to the command of his 
audience when he spoke in the Senate." Cooper wrote that 
Connally "was always very kind and courteous and helpful to 
me, and I enjoyed his friendship very much. I consider him 
one of the most interesting men I have served with in the 
Senate."35
Paul Douglas of Illinois thought it "correct to say 
that he was very sarcastic and used ridicule rather than ar­
gument." He did not find Connally "as effective in his later 
years as he had been b e f o r e . "36
Karl Mundt of South Dakota, the former college speech 
teacher, wrote that the Texan "seemed to demonstrate what you 
and I heard called 'the old style Southern oratory.'" Mundt 
indicated that Connally "manifested a quick wit and a capa­
city for ready r e t o r t . "37
35Letter from Hon. John Sherman Cooper, United States 
Senator from Kentucky, November 10, 1964.
36Letter from Hon. Paul Douglas, United States Sena­
tor from Illinois, August 31> 1964.
37Letter from Hon. Karl Mundt, United States Senator 
from South Dakota, September 1, 1964.
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A. Willis Robertson of Virginia called Connally "my 
good friend," having met the Texan in 1924 and "formed a 
strong liking for him." Robertson felt "Senator Connally 
was the most effective debater we had during his service in 
the Senate." Robertson remembered "the wonderful quality of 
his Irish wit, which would often make his opponents smile 
even when he was thrusting a harpoon into them."38
Margaret Chase Smith of Maine wrote that she "did not 
have too great an opportunity to watch and listen to Senator 
Connally," but, "he was impressive and [audience] reactions 
were most favorable." She added, "There were times when he 
was not taken seriously because he did not want to be taken 
seriously."39
John Sparkman of Alabama called Connally "an easy and 
ready speaker." Sparkman wrote that "he ^ConnalljJ always 
did such a work [handling a bil^ in a masterful manner."
The Alabaman recalled a Connally speech defending Attorney 
General Tom Clark in 194? and wrote that "I can assure you
38&etter from Hon. A. Willis Robertson, United States 
Senator from Virginia, September 4, 1964.
39Letter from Hon. Margaret Chase Smith, United States 
Senator from Maine, August 31  ̂ 1964.
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it was a masterpiece which held the Senate spellbound for 
over an hour."^0
Connally was still respected as the chief Congres­
sional representative of United States foreign policy. But 
it was a foreign policy of Harry Truman, not a wartime Frank­
lin Roosevelt, and the Texan's prestige, while still high, 
was considerably less than when he returned from San Fran­
cisco in June, 1945.
An Alliance for Defense
On March 17, 1948, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, the 
United Kingdom and France signed the Brussels Alliance. Al­
though the idea of a security pact for Western Europe seemed 
practical, the potential of such an alliance was limited 
without moral and military support from the United States.
The Vandenberg Resolution.—  In mid-1948, the Vanden- 
berg Resolution 239, was reported out of the Foreign Rela­
tions Committee. The resolution recommended six objectives, 
of which three were intended to strengthen the United Nations 
and three were designed to encourage regional mutual self- 
defense arrangements. The Resolution passed the Senate on
^^Letter from Hon. John Sparkman, United States Sena­
tor from Alabama, October 8, 1964.
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June 11, 1948, by a vote of sixty-four to f o u r . ^ l  However, 
work was delayed until January, 1949, on an alliance linking 
the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Prance, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg against aggression by the 
Soviet Union.
The North Atlantic Treaty.—  The final draft of the 
North Atlantic Treaty pledged the United States to defend 
Western Europe with armed force if "necessary.” The treaty 
was modeled after the Rio Treaty of 194? which contained 
similar mutual defense pledges from Western Hemisphere na­
tions. Essentially, the North Atlantic countries agreed that 
they believed in the United Nations but invoked their right 
under the Charter to form regional defense alliances. The 
countries promised to establish adequate armed forces but re­
frained "from the threat or use of force in any manner in­
consistent with the purposes of the United Nations." They 
considered an armed attack on one as an attack on a l l . 42
The treaty was greeted in the United States by what, 
considering the immensity of commitment, seemed almost dis­
interested silence. In the fourteen weeks of pact negotia­
tions only a trickle of mail reached the State Department.
^^Connally, p. 328.
^2"Lesson Learned," Time, 53 (March 28, 1949), 17.
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Apparently, the public accepted the principles enunciated in 
the treaty.
The treaty was signed in early April by the Ministers 
of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Prance, Iceland, Italy, Luxem­
bourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom and 
the United States. Ratification was required by the Senate 
and by the Parliaments of the six original sponsors.^3
While Secretary of State Dean Acheson felt the pact 
did not "bind the United States to any arms program," he 
added, "We expect to ask Congress to supply our European part­
ners some of the weapons and equipment they need to be able 
to resist a g g r e s s i o n . "44 Acheson feared that linking the 
treaty with the Mutual Aid Program might cause Congress to 
reject both, so in committee hearings the Secretary attempted 
to prove that arms aid and the treaty logically belonged to­
gether but, in reality, were separate. The Mutual Aid Pro­
gram, he explained, was a logical extension of the treaty,
but arms assistance was not directly "a product of the pact—
an instrument which is not yet in effect."^5 On the contrary,
43"A Simple Document," Time, 53 (April 11, 1949), 21.
44"what It Means," Newsweek, 33 (March 28, 1949), I8 .
45"Bound Together," Time, 53 (April I8, 1949), 21.
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’’even without the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
the need for assistance and the recommended response of this 
government would be the same.” So, he concluded emphatically, 
"these requests and our replies therefore, in no sense repre­
sent a price tag to be placed upon the pact."^^
Later, the Secretary told the Foreign Relations Com­
mittee that the United States planned to provide the treaty 
nations of Western Europe with $1.13 billions of military 
supplies plus an additional $320 millions primarily for Greece 
and Turkey.^? When Acheson finished, Connally asked a ques­
tion bothering many senators: If a senator voted for the
treaty, was he committed to vote later for the arms program 
augmenting the treaty? Acheson answered:
There is something in this treaty that requires every 
member of the Senate, if you ratify it, when he comes to 
vote on military assistance, to exercise his Judgment 
less freely than he would have exercised it if there had 
not been this treaty.^8
On June 6, the Foreign Relations Committee favorably 
reported the treaty by a vote of thirteen to nothing. The 
report stipulated, at Senator George's insistence, that the
46Ibid.
^7"The Tab,” Time, 53 (May 2, 1949), 20.
48"The Answer is 'Yes,'" Time, 53 (May 9, 1949), 23.
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treaty gave the United States President no new powers to send 
troops into combat without consent of C o n g r e s s . ^9
On July 21j with every senator except Ellender pre­
sent, the Senate ratified the North Atlantic Treaty. The 
first critical vote rejected a reservation proposed by Wherry 
which specified that the United States had no obligation to 
furnish arms to its new partners. The Senate then approved 
the treaty by a vote of eighty-two to thirteen.50
The Mutual Aid Program.—  Connally told the President 
not to introduce the Mutual Aid Program while the treaty was 
being debated. "The pact and arms aid to implement the pact 
aren't Siamese twins," the Texan said.51 Truman signed the 
instrument of treaty ratification and declared : "This treaty
is an historic step toward a world of peace . . . but it is 
only one step." One hour later, he submitted an arms program 
to Congress asking for $1.45 billions in military aid.52 The 
Mutual Aid Program faced a more difficult fight and a closer 
vote than had the North Atlantic Treaty.
49"Congres8' Week," Time, 53 (June 13, 1949), l8.
50"Par-off Frontier," Time, 54 (August 1, 1949), 9.
51Connally, p. 337.
52Time, 54 (August 1, 1949), 9.
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The Administration bill was vague on presidential 
powers earmarking funds for specific countries. In Joint 
session behind closed doors, the Senate Armed Services and 
Foreign Relations Committees informed the State Department 
that the bill must be redrafted. The Administration withdrew 
the bill and produced, a new measure carefully specifying the 
destination of all United States arms. The Atlantic Treaty 
countries were allocated $l.l6 billions, Greece and Turkey 
$211 millions and $27.6 millions were divided among Iran,
Korea and the Philippines. The new bill was favorably re­
ported to the House of Representatives.53
The revised bill was found unsatisfactory. Voting 
209-1 5 1, the House passed the small allocations to Greece, 
Turkey, Iran, Korea and the Philippines, but cut the alloca­
tion to the North Atlantic Treaty countries by nearly half.
A growing sentiment for economy, an easing of tension in East- 
West relations, a spreading skepticism about Europe's willing­
ness and ability to organize for a common defense and an en­
thusiasm for air power and the atomic bomb as the really re­
liable instruments of defense against Soviet aggression--all 
contributed to the House revolt.54
53"To Do the Needful," Time, 54 (August 1 5, 1949), 13.
5^"The Bi-Partisan Honeymoon Is Over," Newsweek, 34 
(August 2 9, 19 4 9), 1 3.
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Against this unfavorable background. Administration 
leaders in the Senate moved toward restoring most, if not 
all, of the House cut. Connally later called it a "hard 
four-day fight."55
The Senate, Connally and Mutual Aid
The general attitude of the eighty-first Senate.—  
The eighty-first, heralded as a Truman Congress, was more 
typically a Democratic Congress— fragmented, split into many 
factions. The loyalty of Administration Democrats was unpre­
dictable. Democratic senators ranged from Glen Taylor, who 
had left the party to campaign with Henry Wallace's Progres­
sives, to Harry F. Byrd, who had left the party to campaign 
with Strom Thurmond's Dixiecrats.
Republicans also quarreled. In the initial party 
caucus, thirteen liberals— Saltonstall, Lodge, Raymond Bald­
win, Aiken, Flanders, Smith, Morse, Knowland, Edward Thye, 
Young, Gurney, Tobey and Irving Ives— challenged the leader­
ship of Taft and Wherry. The liberals, who finally polled a 
fourteenth vote, were defeated by a two to one ratio, but 
fourteen votes represented a powerful balance of power in an 
unpredictable Senate.5^
55connally, p. 339.
56"Divided Republicans," Time, 53 (January 10, 1949),
14.
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By early February, Truman and the so-called "coopera­
tive” Congress no longer cooperated. The historic schisms 
between Northern and Southern Democrats emerged and made co­
alition between Southern Democrats and Republicans distinctly 
probable on many issues. After only sixty-nine days the co­
alition halted the President in his attempt for labor-law re­
vision. 57 Republicans mocked the "do-nothing Eighty-First" 
Congress. "The accomplishments of this Congress," said Taft, 
"will not be zero, though they will look like zero to Mr. 
Truman."58 Majority leader Scott Lucas declared, "l am not 
ashamed of the record."59
In late May, Ernest K. Lindley characterized the Con­
gress. He wrote:
This is a Congress which nobody controls— no individual, 
no clique, and no fixed combination of interests. It is 
a Congress in which party discipline is weak— one of 
shifting alignments, nearly all of which cut across party 
lines. Perhaps it is so striking in this one only be­
cause somewhat more cohesion, somewhat more amenability 
to White House leadership, might have been anticipated 
on the Democratic side during the first session after 
victory in a national election. The fact is, however.
57"Freedom to Filibuster," Newsweek, 33 (March 21, 
1949), 2 1.
58"Old Friends, Old Enemies," Time, 53 (March 28, 
1949), 2 1 .
59"Do-Something Blst?", Newsweek, 33 (March 7, 1949),
23.
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that most of the Democratic members are deciding for them­
selves how to vote. No less important is the fact that 
most of the Republicans also are making their own indivi­
dual decisions.
Independence made the Congress slow at times and it 
also produced a middle-of-the-road Congress which never fully 
satisfied either "Pair Dealers" or conservatives.
The foreign policy of the eighty-first Senate.—  The 
split on domestic issues did not necessarily affect the North 
Atlantic Treaty and the implementing Mutual Aid Program, The 
State Department, remembering the passage of the Vandenberg 
Resolution, hoped that the new Senate would reflect the views 
held by the old.
However, the concept of bipartisanism was weakened. 
Connally seemingly retained the same views toward a two-party 
foreign policy that he had maintained during his earlier ten­
ure as Foreign Relations Committee chairman. In an interview 
in January, he indicated that he would dedicate his efforts 
to strengthening the bipartisan foreign policy which he and 
Vandenberg had helped to put into operation. He said, "l 
hope and expect that the bipartisan foreign policy will be 
continued. During these days of world strife and uncertainty 
it is essential that we have an American foreign policy,
^^Ernest K. Lindley, "Tides in the 8lst Congress," 
Newsweek, 33 (May 23, 1949), 26.
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rather than a Republican or Democratic p o l i c y . B u t  the 
Texan restored the normal eight-five majority party ratio to 
the committee rather than maintaining the seven-six ratio 
that had been in effect since 1946. Further, a Vandenberg 
speech reflected changes wrought by the election. On major 
programs, Vandenberg could be expected to cooperate, but he 
would not support an "impromptu and unpredictable" foreign 
policy of President Truman.
North Atlantic Treaty chances were bolstered in mid- 
February when Taft issued a statement favoring support, and 
fifty senators, in reply to a Washington Post poll, said they 
would favor war if Russia attacked a Western European govern­
ment. ̂ 3 By late March, only one senator, George Malone, had 
publicly announced opposition.
Connally, as Administration spokesman on foreign af­
fairs in the Senate, had called the pact "a covenant in be­
half of security," and a "stern warning against aggression 
and aimied attack," but, he said, "it does not contain any
G^The New York Times, January 3, 194-9, p. 3. 
62"Secondary Responsibility," Time, 53 (January 31,
1949), 19.
63"Scraps over Paper," Newsweek, 33 (February 28,
1949), 16.
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agreement to automatically go to w a r . C o n n a l l y  was aware 
that the Congressional right to declare war was sacred to 
most senators. The Texan further defined as his "horseback 
attitude" that "we cannot be Sir Galahads, and every time we 
hear a gun fired, plunge into war and take sides, without 
knowing what we are doing and without knowing the issues in­
volved. "65
Washington observers felt that most senators favored, 
and would vote for, the treaty. However, concern mounted over 
the Administration plan to implement the treaty with legisla­
tion authorizing arms for Western Europe. Jenner observed, 
"Spending in Europe is no longer needed. This so-called bi­
partisan foreign policy leaves the Republican Party and the 
American taxpayer holding the bag."^^ But, in early May,
support for both programs seemed secure. Lindley wrote;
During the past year, the condition of Western Europe has 
greatly improved— economically, politically and psycho­
logically. Already one can see in some members of Con­
gress the relaxing influence of these developments. The 
Atlantic Pact will be ratified, and the shipment of some 
arms to Europe almost certainly will be approved."?
64The New York Times, March 19, 1949, p. 4.
G^Newsweek, 33 (February 28, 1949), 1 6 .
66"chipping and Chiseling," Time, 53 (April 11, 1949),
21.
6?Erne8t K. Lindley, "Fair-Weather Test of Congress," 
Newsweek, 33 (May 9, 1949), 24.
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There was reason for optimism. Walter George, chair­
man of the Senate Finance Committee, seemed to support the 
treaty with an arms program. In his first senatorial state­
ment, the newly-appointed Dulles announced support for the 
pact and an arms program, but reserved decision on the extent 
of the arms program.
However, when Secretary Acheson announced that sup­
port of the North Atlantic Treaty implied support for the 
Mutual Aid Program the facade of unanimity vanished. Byrd 
supported the treaty but was unwilling to provide arms. Van­
denberg expressed fear that senators had their "eyes glued 
on a few million dollars worth of rifles and knapsacks" in­
stead of the treaty.68
Connally had quarreled with the State Department over 
the timing of the presentation of the two programs to the 
Senate. Other senators were aware of these disagreements. 
Jenner said:
Of course, we all know that the . . . Senator . . . had
a run-in with the State Department . . . because the De­
partment then wanted to bring the arms implementation
measure up in the Senate, and . . . he . . . thought it
would Jeopardize ratification of the treaty. I say . . . 
there is nothing wrong with this country that a little 
honesty and integrity in higher altitudes will not
remedy.69
^&Time, 53 (May 9, 1949), 23.
69u .S., Congressional Record, Blst Cong., 1st Sess.,
1949, 95, Part 8, 13103.
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Connally tried to convince senators that the two pro­
grams were not connected. He reassured doubting colleagues 
that they could logically vote for ratification of the treaty 
without obligating themselves to support military aid to co­
signatories of the pact. Only four days later, denying that 
he said there was "no obligation" to give military aid, Con­
nally added, "There is an obligation of mutual aid. It may 
mean anything according to the particular needs of the par­
ticular situation. The obligation might or might not be 
physical military support.
Senators opposing the treaty were categorized in one 
of three groups. The first group contained isolationists 
such as Jenner and Langer who opposed all international al­
liances. The second was composed of men like Flanders, who, 
as a long-time internationalist, felt that the treaty did not 
promise enough. The third, including Taft, felt that the 
treaty committed the United States to arms assistance and, if 
it did, Taft said, "l believe it will promote war in the world 
rather than peace."?!
In the closing hours of debate. Senate speaking re­
vealed confused soul-searching and stubborn reservations.
?QThe New York Times, July l4, 19^9, p. 7.
71"praternity of Peace," Time, 5^ (July l8, 19^9), 13.
156
Gillette announced support "with the deepest reluctance, with 
deep misgivings, with grave doubts and qualms." Taft, an­
nouncing opposition, suggested extension of the Monroe Doc­
trine to Western Europe in lieu of a new t r e a t y . B u t  only 
a handful of senators ever expressed doubt about the passage 
of the treaty. Connally never publicly doubted passage. In 
March, he had predicted that the treaty would be overwhelm­
ingly passed and as the ratification debate began, he was 
confident that no more than eight would vote in opposition. 
The only purpose of debate, according to the Texan, was to 
let the opposition talk itself out.73
The Mutual Aid Program faced a more difficult fight 
despite the support of Secretary Acheson, George Marshall and 
respected army officials. Congress became more economy- 
minded. Appropriating an additional $1.4 billions offended 
many Congressmen. Others felt that the President asked for 
too much power. Republicans felt that Acheson had ignored 
the policy of bipartisanism in making an arms commitment to 
Europe.
Connally was not confident as the arms debate ap­
proached. Taking advantage of his position as Congressional
72"Last Thoughts," Time, 54 (July 25, 1949), 11.
73”The Senate and the Pact," Newsweek, 34 (July l8, 
1 9 4 9), 14.
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leader and giving views of the State Department, he Issued a 
formal statement calling for "prompt" action on the arms plan 
"In the Interests of world security."74
Later, describing Administration efforts to reestab­
lish bipartisanism, Connally said: "We are trying. In so far
as Is possible, to meet all objections,"75 but with many sena­
torial factions he admitted that "there will be a lot of kick­
ing and snorting.
Still, most observers believed that Congress would 
approve the arms plan In principle. But the amount of the 
appropriation was doubtful. As debate approached, the Senate 
was In an unruly mood. Connally conceded that the Administra­
tion faced "a hell of a fight."77
Connally's Speaking for Mutual Aid
The Mutual Defense Assistance Bill of 19^9 was first 
Introduced by Connally on July 27, 1949, and debate began on 
September 19th. Only twenty-eight members answered to the 
first calling of the roll but, shortly, seventy-two members
74The New York Times, June l6, 1949, p. 1.
75ibld., August 3, 1949, p. 2.
7 6"Tom Connally," U.S. News and World Report, 26 
(April 1, 194 9), 3 7.
77"Money for MAP," Newsweek, 34 (August 8, 1949), 15.
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were crowded Into the small chamber, sitting uncomfortably 
on the Individual chairs that had been provided.
Connally's formal speaking for Mutual Aid.—  Connally 
made one major address on the bill and thereafter was content 
to handle debate and deliver a short closing statement.
As he Introduced the measure on September 19th, Con­
nally reminded colleagues of the favorable vote, twenty-two 
to three, of the Joint Armed Servlces-Forelgn Relations Com­
mittee which reported the Mutual Aid Bill to the Senate and 
thought their vote "should be persuasive.
Connally directed his first appeal to senators who 
he felt would support the administration program. He based 
his appeal on three Ideas: (1) The United States must lead
the free world. (2) The United States Senate has fulfilled 
past obligations. (3) The United States has Incurred obli­
gations under the North Atlantic Treaty.
The Texan turned first to an argument that had been 
effective In past debates. He appealed to the senators' 
sense of national pride. He argued, "Destiny has placed In 
our hands the leadership of the nations of the earth who want 
freedom and democracy under constitutional and parliamentary
TSu .S., Congressional Record, 8lst Cong., 1st Sess.,
1949, 95, Part 8, 13019.
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government,"79 and further warned that "we must never permit 
this encouraging momentum toward peace which is building up 
in the free world to subside."®® The Texan recognized that 
many members of the present Senate were hesitant to extend 
further United States foreign aid. He admitted that an arms 
program was not appealing to many citizens but argued that 
it was "another vitally important step . . .  on the road to 
world peace." "Unfortunately," he added, "it is a long, bit­
ter road, full of steep hills and unpleasant detours."®^ The 
appeal to the senators’ pride as leaders of the free world 
was probably effective in 19^9 as the United States reacted 
to the relatively new "cold war."
Next, Connally reviewed for the audience the past ac­
tions of the Senate in the pursuit of mutual security and in­
ternational defense. The policy of mutual help began, said 
the Senator, with the "program of aid to Greece and Turkey," 
Connally continued :
We have further shown our steadiness and our firmness, by 
undertaking the interim aid program, the Rio Treaty, the 
magnificent concept of the Marshall Plan, Senate Resolu­
tion 239, and the North Atlantic Treaty— all approved by 
overwhelming votes in the United States S e n a t e .
79ibid., p. 13025. ®®Ibid., p. 13019.
®llbid., p. 13018. 82ibid., p. 13019.
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This argument appealed to two groups of senators. The argu­
ment appealed to the veteran senators by reminding them that 
in the past they had met the challenges to world peace. The 
argument appealed to newcomers in the Senate by reminding 
them that the Senate was building a tradition of foreign aid. 
They, as freshmen, should add to that tradition.
Finally, Connally moved to the controversial point 
of prior United States obligation incurred by signing the 
North Atlantic Treaty. The Texan recognized the issue as 
the most dangerous to the Administration.
First, Connally did attempt to pacify reluctant "go- 
alongs" such as Gillette, who had voted for the treaty with 
"misgivings." He pointed out the lack of long entangling ob­
ligations: "Whether we continue the aid another year or any
future time beyond the year will depend upon the action of 
the Senate and the House of Representatives." He emphasized 
for the doubters that "there are no commitments, there are 
no pledges, there are no agreements, there are no promises 
in the bill for a longer program."^3 Connally knew the dan­
ger of attempting to oversell the senators because he knew 
that his audience contained knowledgeable politicians who
83lbid., p. 13021.
l6l
were not naive in the ways of foreign aid. He admitted, "l 
would be less than frank, however, if I encourage the hope 
that the recipient countries would not need further assist­
ance from the United States at the conclusion of this one 
year program."84
Next, for the first time since North Atlantic Treaty 
negotiations started, he became definite on the point of the 
United States commitment under the treaty. He said, "We are 
obligated by the clause within it [the treaty] relating to 
self-help and mutual aid."85 it must have been difficult for 
the Senator, who had earlier said that Secretary Acheson has 
gone "too far" in describing United States involvement in the 
treaty,86 to say now that "we have solemnly agreed to work 
with the other parties to the treaty in building up the capa­
city of the member states to defend themselves against at­
tack. "8? But Connally expressed hope that all senators would 
"move speedily to fulfill our obligations under the Atlantic 
pact, "88 and concluded with specific treaty citations proving
84ibid. 85lbid., p. 13019.
86The New York Times, April 28, 1949, p. 1.
8?u.S., Congressional Record, Blst Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, 95, Part 8, 13020.
88%bid., p. 13025.
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United States obligation. "We are bound," Connally said 
later, "by article five and by article three to extend mutual 
aid and self-help. This bill is mutual aid. We are helping 
the other nations and they are helping us,"®9
Since February, Connally had, for the sake of the 
North Atlantic Treaty, maintained that the treaty did not ob­
ligate the United States to furnish "arms" to participating 
countries. But he now directed senatorial attention to the 
wording of "mutual aid and self-help." "Mutual aid" could 
mean "arms." Therefore the arms program was fulfilling a 
legitimate obligation incurred under the accepted treaty.
The Texan could only hope that friendly senators would for­
get their possible anger over his word-play and vote to honor 
their obligation. Admittedly, the third idea was the least 
appealing of Connally's argument.
From this beginning, designed to appeal to friendly 
senators, Connally turned to the announced opponents of the 
legislation. The Senator declared that "a number of argu­
ments have been made against the military assistance program 
which the Senate should consider carefully. I am prepared 




Connally first turned his attention to the isolation­
ist bloc led by Wherry, Jenner and Langer. He said, "Some 
try to minimize the advantage which the United States will 
obtain from the enactment of the bill. The bill is to the 
distinct advantage of the United States in carrying out the 
purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty."91
First, the Texan attempted to show the isolationists 
the importance of the treaty countries to United States se­
curity. "As in World War I and World War II," Connally said, 
"the countries of Western Europe, both physically and psy­
chologically remain our front line of d e f e n s e . "92 Connally 
hoped that "the Senate and the American people thoroughly 
realize what the principle of common defense means with re­
spect to our future security p l a n s . "93 His implication was 
clear. Twice in the recent past the United States had ig­
nored European politics. Twice the United States had gone 
to war because of its error in judgment.
Second, Connally addressed himself to a 1935 isola­
tionist argument, recently revived, which argued that legis­
lation-encouraged armaments races cause war. Connally main­
tained that "we have not created a world armaments race.
91lbid., p. 13024. 92ibid., p. 13019.
93ibid., p. 13021.
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What does the Soviet Union intend to do with its army of
5,000,000 m e n ? ”94 ne further argued that "we are not sending
a single soldier to any of those countries for combat pur­
poses, nor are we insisting that they increase the size of 
their armed forces."95 The argument did not deny that arma­
ments races cause war, but it did deny that United States 
legislation was the cause of the arms race.
Third, Connally insisted that arms aid to Europe was 
necessary to discourage Russian aggression. "Weakness in­
vites aggression,” Connally said, "and aggression, if allowed 
to continue, inevitably brings war in its wake."96 Connally 
tried to introduce the isolationists to the realities of an
air age. He said, "In the shrunken world in which we now
live we cannot afford to permit our friends to remain so weak 
that they will invite aggression and be picked off one by one 
like pigeons in a shooting gallery."97 Connally's refutation 
of the isolationists was probably adequate. The true isola­
tionists were few in number and had suffered severe losses in 
prestige since Pearl Harbor. The people had repudiated them 
at the polls in 1944 and 1948. Knowing that he occupied a
94ibid. 95ibid., p. 13020.
S^Ibid., p. 13019. 97Ibid.
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relatively strong position comparatively, the Texan made his
refutation lengthy and hard-hitting.
The second bloc of senators refuted by Connally were
the liberal internationalists, led by Flanders, Kefauver and
Pepper, who wanted the bill to promise more. His line of
argument was to emphasize the number of countries that would
be helped by the program. He noted the promise of additional
aid to Greece and Turkey, commended the aid that had been
given those two countries and indicated that "we must see
this program through to its finish."98
Connally touched upon what the bill promised for Iran,
Korea and the Philippines. This argument also appealed to
conservative senators such as Knowland, who daily condemned
the Administration's Par East policy. Connally did not want
the Mutual Aid Program to fail because of resentment over a
lack of aid to the Far East. He said:
I have always had the deepest sympathy and regard for the 
people of China and I am confident that feeling is shared 
by the whole American people. Traditionally, our two 
countries have been on the friendliest of terms. We re­
gret exceedingly that today China is threatened with to­
talitarian conquest. However, I do not think there is 
much to be gained by rehearsing now all of the things
which were done or might have been done by us to help the




Connally told the liberals that the bill was so ade­
quate that the countries would be aided economically as well 
as militarily. He added, however, that the task would be 
"difficult to achieve, as we well know in this country."100 
Connally had to use more care in his refutation to the second 
bloc of senators. They were, for the most part. Administra­
tion senators and international Republicans. Their help was 
essential in passing the arms program. Rather than disagree 
with their premise that the United States should give more 
aid, the Texan simply tried to persuade them that the Mutual 
Aid Program did aid more than just the North Atlantic coun­
tries.
Finally, Connally addressed the third opposing bloc 
of senators, the economizers, led by George and Byrd, who 
worried about the program's cost. The Texan admitted, "The 
financial argument is, of course, particularly appealing to 
a great many people because we are all anxious to keep our 
budget balanced and our economy on a sound and healthy basis. 
Yet I find it extremely difficult to put a price tag on world 
peace."101
He attacked those who were suggesting drastic cuts 
similar to the House action. Connally made his argument as
lOOlbid., p. 13025. 101Ibid., p. 13023.
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an analogy. *'lf a man needs a square meal," he said, "we 
would not simply give him a ten cent sandwich, which will 
merely whet his appetite, but will not satisfy the needs of 
his body at a l l ."102 effect, he was challenging the sena­
tors to defeat or pass the bill but not to reduce it to an 
ineffective pittance.
The third bloc of senators, led by Connally's Southern 
friends, Walter George and Harry Byrd, were potentially the 
most dangerous to Connally's position. He had no easy alter­
natives. He met the appealing economy argument with an ap­
peal for self-preservation: economy in defense spending is
false economy. Connally hoped that, faced with the decision 
to pass the full appropriation or kill the entire appropria­
tion, the economizers would vote favorably for the Adminis­
tration.
Connally'8 speaking during floor debate.—  Connally's 
objective during floor debate was "to keep my supporters on 
their toes. I wanted swift action and no slip-ups."103 On 
two occasions he indicated his desire for speed by accepting 
amendments without debate. He said, "l am going to accept 




chewing on it when we are going to accept it.”̂ ®^
Connally was irritable but controlled during debate. 
He lost his temper only twice during the four days. Once he 
charged that "l do not think we are going to be able to fix 
it so as to satisfy . . . QpergusorQ . . . because when we 
fix this, he will break out in a new p l a c e . "1^5 in the final 
moments of debate, he lost an argument over the allocation of 
time for debate. Connally snapped, "l had twenty minutes. I 
had forty minutes originally, and gave . . . Vandenberg . . . 
twenty minutes, and that left me twenty minutes as I view it.
I do not want to be flim-flammed by both the chair and the 
Senator from G e o r g i a . "10^ connally lost the argument and 
took sixteen minutes.
Perhaps because of his illness and his desire to avoid 
needless talk, the Connally humor was present only once in the 
debate. Senator Thye had spoken on the value psychologically 
of a small permanent peace force as an international police­
man. The Texan bragged :
What he said reminds me of an incident which occurred in 
my state some years ago. We had a famous police force 
called the Texas Rangers. They had a reputation for 
quickly restoring order in any community when turmoil or
Congressional Record, Blst Cong., 1st Sess., 
1949, 95, Part 8, 13154.
l O S i b i d ., p. 13082. l O G i b i d . ,  p. 1316I.
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mob action might exist or be threatened. The mere pres­
ence of the Texas Rangers restored order. On one occa­
sion, old Captain Bill McDonald, who was a famous Texas 
Ranger, was instructed by the Governor to send a group 
of Rangers to a place where a riot was occurring. Cap­
tain McDonald went there alone . . . .  When he got there, 
the sheriff and the committee approached him and said, 
"Just one Ranger?" He said, "Well, there's Just one 
riot, ain't there?"10?
Because he had used questionable tactics to assure 
passage of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Texan may have felt 
his personal prestige was weak. Instead, throughout his 
speaking on the bill, Connally made use of the authority of 
other government and military leaders. In his short conclud­
ing speech. Just prior to voting, he reminded the audience 
that "the military aspects of the bill were recommended by 
all three of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Further, "they are 
recommended not alone by the Secretary of Defense, but by 
the Secretary of State. They are recommended by the Presi­
dent of the United S t a t e s . "^08 fjg specifically quoted Gen­
eral Omar Bradley. The Texan also had used the highly popu­
lar Bradley as an authority twice in his main address. Brad­
ley was an excellent choice of authority because he was a 
highly popular war leader and was free of ties to the Truman 
Administration. He was respected by both Democrats and Re­
publicans.
lOTibid., p. 13113. lOBlbid., p. 13162.
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Connally referred to himself only once in debate. In 
describing his dissatisfaction with the first vague bill that 
had been written, he said, "All the members of the committee 
know that the chairman of the committee . . .  as soon as he 
examined the bill said 'No, that will not do.'" Why had he 
introduced the bill? Connally replied, "The chairman . . . 
usually introduces a bill of this kind. I introduced the 
bill as a working paper, something to go on, because we had 
pressure from the department."1^9 gut Connally did not rely 
heavily on his prestige in the debate.
Aftermath
The George Amendment to cut the Mutual Aid Program 
in half was defeated in a key vote, forty-six to thirty-two. 
Just eighteen hours before news of Russia's advance to an 
atomic power, the Senate approved the arms bill, fifty-five 
to twenty-four. The bill allocated one billion dollars to 
the Atlantic Treaty countries, 211 millions to Greece and 
Turkey, twenty-seven millions to Korea, Iran and the Philip­
pines and seventy-five millions for aid to China, to be spent 
at the discretion of the President. The House of Representa­
tives, which had cut the program so drastically, accepted the
109ibid., p. 13084.
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Senate proposal and the Mutual Aid Program became law.
Connally’s appeals to the Administration senators had 
been correct. Most senators recognized that an obligation 
had been made in the North Atlantic Treaty. That obligation 
had to be fulfilled if the United States were to maintain 
leadership in the free world.
Opposition came from the isolationists, the liberal 
internationalists and the economizers. Only the liberals ac­
cepted Connally's arguments. The isolationists, of course, 
voted against the arms program. Probably no argument could 
have secured their vote. The remainder of the negative votes 
came almost entirely from the economy-minded Southern sena­
tors. Many had bolted the Democratic Party in 1948 and now 
they elected to vote against the arms program rather than in­
crease national expenditures. Again, probably no argument 
could have convinced them to vote for the program.
Afterwards, sitting wearily on a bench outside the 
Senate chamber, Connally asserted that no evolution in Ameri­
can foreign policy since lend lease had been so difficult to 
achieve.110
llpThe New York Times, September 29, 19^9, p. l4.
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION
Tom Connally's Senate career passed through four 
stages. In the period from his first election in November, 
1928, until July, 1941, when he assumed the chairmanship of 
the Foreign Relations Committee, Connally was regarded by the 
public as a rather typical Southern senator. Although he had 
been a member of the Foreign Relations Committee since 193I, 
the Texan had participated in only one major foreign policy 
debate in the Senate. Other senators recognized him as per­
haps the best "rough and tumble" debater in the Senate, and 
Connally was regarded more highly for his ability to censure 
Republicans than for his statesmanship in foreign affairs. 
During this phase of his career, the Senate saw Connally take 
an active part in domestic debates over Supreme Court reor­
ganization, the poll tax and a federal anti-lynch law.
The death of Pat Harrison of Mississippi in June,
1941, elevated Walter George to the chairmanship of the Sen­
ate Finance Committee. Connally replaced George as the For­
eign Relations Committee chairman. The entry of the United
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States Into World War II made Connally's committee the pres­
tige body of the Senate. Until November, 1943, the Texan was 
regarded as an ineffective leader who was permitting the Sen­
ate's traditional role of "advise and consent" to die by de­
fault.
In the period from the passage of the Connally Reso­
lution in November, 1943, until January, 1949, Connally be­
came respected as the chief Administration spokesman on for­
eign affairs in the Senate. The Senator had originated a 
unique spirit of bipartisanism in foreign affairs by the 
formulation of the "committee of eight" in early 1944. Con­
nelly's prestige was further enhanced by his participation 
in international conferences at Mexico City and San Francisco, 
the General Assembly meetings of the United Nations, and two 
Foreign Ministers conferences in Paris. The Texan's pres­
tige probably peaked in 1945 but he was still highly respected 
even after the Republican Congressional victory in November, 
1946, reduced him to the ranking minority member of the For­
eign Relations Committee.
During the final four years of his Senate career, 
Connally found himself in the difficult position of serving 
as Congressional leader during a time of enormous overseas 
expenditures and diminishing American prestige in the cold
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war. Connally, restored to the committee chairmanship, be­
came identified as a co-villain, with Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson and President Harry Truman, in formulating a give­
away foreign policy that aided Europe at the expense of los­
ing Asia. The growing Republican minority, with the double 
incentive of a vulnerable Truman domestic policy and a pro­
spective Republican victory in 1952, became increasingly ag­
gressive toward Connally.
During each of these career phases, Connally spoke 
on important foreign policy matters. In October, 1939, he 
spoke for repeal of the Neutrality Act. In November, 1943, 
his resolution committed the United States to postwar par­
ticipation in an international peace organization. In July, 
1945, he introduced the United Nations Charter to the Senate, 
and in September, 1949, the Texan led the fight for a Mutual 
Aid Program to implement the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza­
tion. The purpose of this study has been to determine whether 
Connally's speaking on these selected occasions reflected the 
changing conditions of his Senatorial career.
Connally's Changing Prestige 
Connally's speaking during the period of the four de­
bates studied did reflect his changing prestige in the Senate.
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From fifth-ranked to chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee.—  Connally was chosen to lead the floor fight in 
the Neutrality Act debate almost by default. Key Pittman was 
ailing. Fat Harrison and Walter George were primarily inter­
ested in the Finance Committee and Robert Wagner was involved 
in labor legislation. Connally accepted the assignment be­
cause he was interested in the repeal of the Arms Embargo 
clause.
Connally was probably aware of his lack of prestige 
in a foreign policy debate. In contrast, the leaders of the 
opposition, William Borah and Hiram Johnson, were veteran, 
nationally-known figures in the foreign policy area. Even 
Gerald P. Nye was better known than the Texan. In the de­
bate, Connally did not attempt to support arguments by his 
own authority. He mentioned a personal experience only once, 
an unimportant reference to his past service in the House of 
Representatives. In fact, Connally used Borah as his prin­
cipal authority in the debate. He referred to the Idaho sena­
tor twelve times and, in the course of the floor debate, also 
quoted Johnson to strengthen his own position. Connally at­
tempted to utilize the prestige of his opponents to prove 
his argument.
In 19 4 3, Connally, the Foreign Relations Chairman, 
implied that he should be shown more respect by senators as
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he snapped that he had not come to the debate to be "heckled 
and browbeaten," but actually, the committee and the chairman 
were on the defensive throughout the debate. Once, during an 
exchange with the BgHg bloc of senators he defended his twenty- 
five year record of internationalism but generally the Senator 
did not orally capitalize on his added prestige.
However, in 1945, Connally effectively emphasized his 
important committee chairmanship. He reviewed his part in 
instituting bipartisanism on "the committee of eight," pride- 
fully praised the individuals who had served with him on the 
Foreign Relations Committee and reminded senators that the 
committee had taken steps to fully inform them on the progress 
of committee hearings.
In 1949, Connally referred to his position as commit­
tee chairman only once. He indicated that, as chairman of 
the joint Foreign Relations-Armed Services Committee study­
ing the bill, he had protected senators' interests by expres­
sing dissatisfaction with the bill's vague wording. However, 
he found it difficult to explain why he then had introduced 
the unsatisfactory bill. Connally probably knew that several 
factors--his return of a political division to the membership 
of the Foreign Relations Committee, senators' displeasure 
over some methods used in passing the North Atlantic Treaty,
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and growing dissatisfaction over the Administration's foreign 
policy— all worked to hamper his personal prestige. Whatever 
his reasons, Connally did not attempt to capitalize upon his 
committee position.
From provincial senator to internationally known gov­
ernmental representative.-- The Senator's speaking reflected 
a change in the Connally image during the four debates stu­
died. In 1939, as a relatively inexperienced senator in for­
eign policy debates, Connally had no international stature. 
His speaking was that of a provincial senator. The use of 
Southerners to illustrate hypothetical stories, the reliance 
on rather crude Southern humor in the retort concerning the 
repopulation of Ethiopia, and the Toombs anecdote build the 
provincial image. Further, Connally seemed to examine the 
problem solely in terms of national self-interest. While the 
desire to aid Great Britain and France was expressed, and was 
sincere, the Texan's primary thought in 1939 was to maintain 
and protect United States neutrality.
In 1943, Connally's image was in a process of change. 
He was not the rather obvious provincial of 1939. There was 
no reference to Texas or the South and the Senator attempted 
to project to the Senate his desire for international coopera­
tion. Unfortunately, the absence of experience or personal
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authority made creation of an international image difficult. 
Consequently, in 19#3, Connally projected neither a provin­
cial or international image.
Twenty months later, the Texan's speeches clearly 
mirrored the image of an internationally known governmental 
figure. The entire approach was international. Provincial 
factors that led to the defeat of the League Covenant were 
condemned. The Senator spoke with an assurance gained by 
participation in international conferences at Mexico City and 
San Francisco. Connally frequently reminded the senators of 
his work at San Francisco and of the contributions he made 
in committee work on the Security Council,
The Senator maintained his international outlook in 
the 19^9 debate. He emphasized the need for strong United 
States leadership tc help preserve peace in a "shrunken 
world." Citations of past Senate foreign policy action and 
an explanation of the bill's purpose in countries from Iran 
to China gave the speech an international flavor. His Texas 
pride permitted a comparison of the Texas Rangers to a small 
international police force, but the Senator's speech generally 
was that of an internatlonally-wlse governmental figure.
From an ignored to respected to distrusted Senate 
leader.—  The first important Senate foreign policy debate
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under Connally's leadership was the Connally Resolution de­
bate of 19 4 3. Connally, of course, was aware of the criti­
cism over the committee's delay in reporting a postwar reso­
lution. He recognized several valid reasons for the delay 
and apparently did not fully realize that others were blam­
ing the committee inaction upon his ineffective leadership.
In any case, his 1943 speech was that of a chairman who ex­
pected to be obeyed. He spent no time refuting the counter­
resolutions that had been proposed. He simply generalized 
the need for international cooperation and requested passage 
of the Resolution. This was not the action of a man who ex­
pected to be ignored or charged with ineffectiveness. His 
bitter reaction to the realization that the committee recom­
mendation was to be debated indicated that Connally apparently 
did not fully appreciate the dissatisfaction expressed about 
his leadership.
By 19 4 5, the Senator could accurately forecast Senate 
opinion of his leadership. He was aware of the general satis­
faction of the Senate over the bipartisan aspects of the For­
eign Relations Committee. Fellow senators had displayed 
their warmth and affection for him upon his departure and re­
turn from San Francisco. Connally's speeches on behalf of 
the Charter acknowledged an awareness of the Senate respect
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for him. He indulged in an almost paternal interpretation 
of the Charter and seemed to be confident that his interpre­
tations would be accepted. Unlike 1943, the Senate was will­
ing to accept Connally's explanations.
In 1949, the Senator's speeches indicate no realiza­
tion of a change in Senate attitude toward his leadership. 
Only once in debate did Connally seem to apologize for com­
mittee action. As he read the provisions of the Mutual Aid 
Program, he took considerable time to explain the reasons for 
opposing future aid to China. The Connally of 1945 probably 
would not have felt compelled to unduly explain his position. 
But generally the Senator's speech is not that of a man who 
knows he is distrusted. However, the Mutual Aid Program de­
bate occurred relatively early in the fourth phase of Con­
nally 's Senate career, and the distrust which was clearly ap­
parent in 1952 might not have been obvious to him in 1949.
Prom a spokesman for FDR to a spokesman for Truman.-- 
Connally's speaking did not appear to change with the change 
in national Administrations. Only once, in 1949, did Con­
nally specifically cite the President as favoring the pending 
legislation. The Texan usually emphasized the responsibility 
and the right of the Senate to advise the President rather 
than indicating that passage of legislation was fulfilling 
the wish of the Executive.
l8l
In 1939, Connally was Independent of Franklin Roose­
velt. Roosevelt had not spoken to Connally socially for over 
a year. Indeed^ Connally chose to use Roosevelt's authority 
negatively in the debate indicating that a mere repeal of the 
Arms Embargo "might not be all the President would have de­
sired. "
In 1943, Connally did not refer to Roosevelt's wishes 
for passage of a postwar resolution.
In 1945, Connally made no reference to the late Presi­
dent Roosevelt or to his ex-Senate colleague, Truman. In 
fact, Connally stressed that the San Francisco Charter was 
not the work of "one individual."
In 1949, although Connally used the President as an 
authority for passage of the program, he also was careful to 
remind Senators that the committee had rejected the first 
vague bill which gave the President discretionary powers in 
allocating funds to foreign countries.
Connally's Changing Audience
The United States Senate underwent many changes in 
the years from 1939 to 1949. Did Connally's speaking reflect 
the changes that occurred in the Senate?
From pre-war Isolationism to wartime internationalism 
to postwar moderation In foreign policy.—  Connally was
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acutely conscious of isolationists in the Senate. In three 
of the four debates studied, he devoted lengthy refutation 
to isolationism as a foreign policy.
In 1939, Connally made a lengthy attack on the isola­
tionist position. He spent considerable time refuting the 
argument that munitions makers, in league with Wilson, had 
led us to war. He also indicated that a repeal of the Neu­
trality Act did not imply a surrender of the "freedom of the 
seas" concept. Both arguments were favorites of the isola­
tionist bloc led by Borah, Nye and Vandenberg. In 1939, Con­
nally 's long refutation was probably accurate audience analy­
sis. The isolationists were a powerful bloc, and, if Hiram 
Johnson was accurate in his pre-debate prediction, they con­
trolled twenty-four votes.
In 19 4 3, Connally continued to direct arguments 
against the isolationists. He reminded them that they had 
opposed the League of Nations when United States support might 
have saved it and that they had preached neutrality and dis­
armament while Germany and Japan were arming. Connally was 
probably correct in directing some refutation to the isola­
tionist bloc, but his speech did not accurately recognize the 
strength of the liberal internationalists led by Pepper and 
Ball. They had become a sizeable minority, numbering at least
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fourteen, compared to a maximum of ten in the isolationist 
group. In view of the growing internationalism in the Senate 
and considering the time spent refuting the isolationists, 
Connally's short explanation to the liberals defending the 
need for a general resolution demonstrated inadequate audience 
analysis.
In 1945, Connally did not seem to consider the possi­
bility that any bloc in the Senate could affect passage. The 
speeches seemed to capture accurately the mood of interna­
tional good feeling present in the Senate.
In 1949, Connally recognized the presence of three 
groups in the Senate. Again, the bulk of his refutation, a 
lengthy three-part argument, was directed toward the isola­
tionists. But, while Connally's speaking would seem to sug­
gest otherwise, the isolationists were no real danger in 1949. 
His speech magnified their influence. The Senator's refuta­
tion directed toward the liberal internationalists would seem 
to have been satisfactory since, almost without exception, 
they later supported the Mutual Aid Program. But the Texan 
does not seem to understand the growing strength of the mod­
erates in the Senate. The group, composed of Republicans and 
Southern Democrats, were becoming increasingly reluctant to 
engage in large foreign spending programs. Connally's meager
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refutation of the moderate viewpoint was not adequate.
From heavily Democratic to Republican to slightly 
Democratic.—  Prom 1939 to 1949, Senate control shifted from 
Democratic to Republican to Democratic. During the four de­
bates studied, the Democrats were in the majority with the 
margin of control decreasing from forty-seven in 1939 to six­
teen in 1943 to fourteen in 1945 to twelve in 1949.
Connally did not seem to adapt or react to the chang­
ing currents in party control in the Senate. There are at 
least two possible reasons why Connally's speeches failed to 
reflect party control.
First, party labels were, and are, deceiving in the 
area of foreign policy. William Borah, Republican, was al­
lied with Bennett Champ Clark, Democrat, in 1939. Kenneth 
Wherry, Republican, was allied with Harry Flood Byrd, Demo­
crat, in 1949. While most isolationists were Republicans, 
the addition of a massive economic aid program to our for­
eign policy made many Southern Democrats "economic" isola­
tionists. Party labels no longer accurately typed an atti­
tude concerning the conduct of foreign policy.
Second, more than any other senator, with the possible 
exception of Vandenberg, Connally was identified with the con­
cept of bipartisanism in conducting foreign affairs. Any
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attempt by Connally to inject party labels into foreign policy 
debate would have been entirely out of character and would 
have violated his sincere belief that politics should end "at 
the water's edge." Even in 1949, when the political repro- 
portioning of the Foreign Relations Committee had severely 
strained the bipartisan concept, the Texan made no appeals 
on the basis of party affiliation.
Connally's Changing Speech Approach 
As Connally's personal prestige waxed and waned, and 
while the Senate was in a constant and rather rapid transi­
tion, were changes reflected in the Senator's approach to the 
speech situation?
Changes in style and method of delivery.—  Connally 
was sixty-two when the Neutrality Act was debated and had 
been speaking in public, usually successfully, for forty-six 
years. It is not surprising, in view of his past successful 
experiences, that his style and method of delivery did not 
change after 1939.
There is no evidence in contemporary magazine or news­
paper articles, the Connally Papers or the Congressional Re­
cord to indicate that the Texan ever departed from his highly 
calisthenic, colorful style of speaking.
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The method of delivery remained constant through the 
four debates examined. In all debates, Connally carried a 
manuscript, either in one hand, or hung over one arm. But 
it is not accurate to term the Senator's delivery as manu­
script reading. In all debates, textual evidence indicates 
that he departed from his script often to supply additional 
supporting material or to respond to a questioning senator. 
Unlike most senators making a major address, Connally wel­
comed interruptions and the formal speeches examined in this 
study are actually combinations of a prepared manuscript and 
running debate. Connally's delivery was more nearly extem­
poraneous speaking than manuscript reading.
Changes in developing material.—  The Texan's speeches 
generally show no great changes in the types of developing 
material used in his foreign policy speeches; however, there 
were changes in the emphasis placed on some types of develop­
ing material.
In 1939, Connally made extensive use of hypothetical 
illustrations to communicate the image of an aggressive Ger­
many and a helpless Great Britain. Visual aids were used to 
show the location of countries aiding Germany and the easy 
access of Great Britain to the United States. These were de­
vices that the Senator tended to ignore in the later debates.
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As his personal prestige increased and as the Senate 
audience became more conditioned to making international com­
mitments, the Texan’s developing material tended to become a 
rather predictable combination of testimony and example.
Testimony usually played a major part in the support 
of Connelly's arguments. The authorities used by Connally 
were usually known and respected by his listening audience.
In 1939, Borah and Johnson were primary authorities. In the 
Charter debate, the Senator made use of testimony by members 
of the United States delegation to San Francisco as well as 
that of high echelon military advisors who had accompanied 
the delegation to San Francisco. In the 19^9 debate, authori­
ties included President Truman and cabinet members Dean Ache­
son and Louis Johnson. However, principal testimony was given 
by General Omar Bradley, a man highly respected by the Senate 
audience.
The historical example was used extensively by Con­
nally. In 1939, he traced the development of German sub­
marine warfare against the United States and read lengthy 
lists of torpedoed ships and their cargos. In 1943, he cited 
attempts made for early international peace movements and des­
cribed the evolution of world peace machinery. Further time 
was spent citing examples of the partial success of the League
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of Nations and the development of German and Japanese power 
during the nineteen-thirties. In 1945, his entire speech 
seems built around the historical reasons for the failure of 
the United States Senate to ratify the League of Nations.
In 1949, Connally attempted to show the historic naturalness 
of the Mutual Aid Program by tracing Senate acceptance of the 
Marshall Plan, the Rio Treaty, and the Vandenberg Resolution. 
The Senator concluded by indicating examples of the folly of 
ignoring past aggressions.
The historical example and testimony were Connally's 
favorite types of developing material and his speeches did 
not reflect major changes after 1939.
Changes in debate tactics.—  Connally was known 
throughout his career as the best "rough and tumble" debater 
in the Senate. The Senate was filled with men of both parties 
who had felt the lash of Connally's tongue.
In 1939, Connally was a "rough and tumble" debater.
In the twenty-six day debate, he was bitingly sarcastic in
debate with the isolationists. He verbally abused Lundeen
and Clark. In the final minutes of the debate, when Wheeler
objected to Connally's preamble, Connally attacked the Montana
"spouting geyser." He also used humor extensively to ridicule
the numerous amendments which the isolationists attempted to 
apply to the Neutrality Act.
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In 1943, the Senator also used sarcasm to answer the 
B2H2 Senators. However, his abuse never reached the personal 
Intensity of the 1939 attack on Lundeen or Wheeler. When 
Pepper replied in similar fashion, Connally retreated and did 
not use invective in the debate again.
The combination of humor, sarcasm, and invective that 
had characterized the Senator's earlier speaking were not 
substantially present in the 19^5 and 19^9 debates. He en­
gaged in a personality fight only once in 1945 and that was 
a colloquy with Scott Lucas which went much further than Con­
nally intended. In 1949, while Connally was obviously irked 
occasionally by Donnell, Watkins and Ferguson, he never in­
dulged in any old-style verbal sparring with them.
In 1943, the Texan made his only use of parliamentary 
tactics in debate. During the final week of debate he insti­
gated the practice of requesting unanimous consent to end de­
bate and bring the Resolution to a vote. The B2H2 Senators 
were forced to object. Senators prefer not to use an objec­
tion because it violates an unwritten rule of senatorial 
courtesy, so the unanimous consent device was a valuable one 
for Connally to use because it placed the objecting senators 
in an embarrassing position.
Connally's debate tactics did change as the Texan's
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career progressed. As he developed an international image, 
Connally tended to cease his "rough and tumble" tactics.
Summary
On the basis of the four debates examined in this 
study, Connally's foreign policy speeches did reflect his in­
creased Foreign Relations Committee prestige, his evolution 
from a provincial Southern senator to an internationally 
known governmental leader, a change of emphasis placed on 
certain types of developing material and a change in debate 
tactics.
Connally's foreign policy speeches did not reflect 
his changing leadership image, the change in national Adminis­
trations, the changing foreign policy attitude of the Senate, 
or a change in style or method of delivery.
Tom Connally retired from the Senate in January, 1953,
after thirty-six years service in Congress. Over thirty
Senate colleagues paid tributes to him in the Senate chamber.
The final tribute came from Connally's Texas colleague, Lyndon
Johnson. The Junior Senator from Texas said:
We will remember his command of the English language, his 
flashing wit, his uncanny ability to explain the intricate 
and complicated problems of modern life in the homely 
terms of the average American. We will also remember his
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patriotism, his courage, his sense of responsibility that 
led him to fight for what we believed to be right.1
ly.S., Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess.,
1952, 98, Part 7, 9497.
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